What Is Wrong With Republicans???

Who didn't watch with amusement yesterday as Republicans refused to vote for Boehner's bill to make permanent the Bush era tax cuts for all Americans earning less than $1 million per year. It would seem that the Keystone Cops are alive and well in the Republican wing of Congress. As Gerard van der Luen of American Digest is wont to say, "Republicans, they thirst for death."

Republicans have precisely zero leverage on tax rates. Come January 1, all of the Bush era tax cuts expire and all the tax rates will go up automatically - and quite unfairly, Republicans will get the blame. Moreover, the centerpiece of Obama's tax plan was to raise tax rates on "the rich." It is time to give the people what they voted for. If four years of gross economic incompetency wasn't enough to convince the electorate, well, let's let them have the next four years good and hard indeed. Obviously, more lessons are needed.

In this instance, Republicans prepared to die on the hill of stopping higher taxes is much like Picket's charge - a suicidal act that did nothing beyond sealing the doom of Lee's Army of the Potomac. One of the first rules of warfare - don't reinforce failure, reinforce success - or at least where you have the greatest likelihood of success.

Where House Republicans hold absolute power is on spending. Give Obama whatever tax increase he wants, but then shut down the government over the budget ceiling. Moreover, refuse to pass anything but a life support budget until all sides agree on - and pass into law - a grand bargain that in real terms, sans the usual accounting gimmicks, will decrease the debt by 25% over the next four years.

Debt is where the real issue lies. Sure, Obama's tax increases will hurt the economy - but they won't kill it. Our continued accumulation of debt will. Between Obama's world record profligate spending and Fed Chairmen Ben Bernanke, who is keeping our printing presses spinning at a record pace, they are placing our nation in mortal peril. Obama and Bernanke are setting the stage for runaway inflation and the devaluation of the dollar. That is where Republicans need to draw the line in the sand - this far, and no further.

Tweet

Read More...

Summary only...

A Bloodbath In Queensland

Australia held its local elections in one of its six states today - Queensland. The left wing and deeply green Labor Party has ruled that state for all but two years since 1989. But today, the drubbing they took at the hands of the conservatives was the equivalent of a massacre. Going into today, Labor held a majority, 51 of the 89 seats in the Queensland Parliament. At the end of the day, they held on to only seven seats. That's two seats shy of the nine seats they needed to hold just to retain their status as a major party in Queensland. Wow.

No one is as happy about this as the bloggers down under at the great site Crusader Rabbit. Do pay them a visit and say your congrats. The good guys won this one.

Update: Queensland Ethically Cleansed. Heh.

Tweet

Read More...

Summary only...

Michael O'Hanlon Joins The Argument Against Withdraw From Iraq On A Timetable

Brookings Institution scholars Michael O'Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack, whose article on Iraq in the NYT in July, 2007, "A War We Might Just Win." , was pivotal in reducing pressure on the Bush administration to end the surge before it could work, have now weighed in again on the topic of Iraq. Fresh from a recent trip, and joined in their article this time by Stephen Biddle of the Council on Foreign Relations, they see the "timeline" approach and a large-scale withdraw of U.S. troops by 2010 as risking all the gains that have been made in Iraq to date. They explain why the security gains have occurred - the surge - and the tenuousness of those gains in the absence of a significant presence of U.S. troops this morning in the op-ed pages of the NYT. Key to maintaining the peace for the next few years is the fact that it is the U.S. military presence that is trusted by all sides and whose presence both dampens the thoughts of trying to take advantage of one's neighbours and largely insures the validity of the next two rounds of scheduled elections at the provincial and national level.

This from Mr. O'Hanlon, Pollack and Biddle:

ALMOST everyone now agrees there has been great progress in Iraq. The question is what to do about it.

Democrats led by Barack Obama want to take a peace dividend and withdraw all combat brigades by May 2010. Republicans like John McCain want to keep troops in Iraq until conditions on the ground signal the time is ripe. And now the Iraqi prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, has endorsed a timetable for withdrawal, though he seems to favor a somewhat slower pace than the Democrats propose.

If the Iraqi government tells us to leave, we should go. But this would be a bad deal for both Iraqis and Americans. Iraq is indeed much more secure than it was two years ago, thus it seems safe to suggest timing goals for significant withdrawals. Yet having recently returned from a research trip to Iraq, we are convinced that a total withdrawal of combat troops any time soon would be unwise. . . .

Violence in Iraq declined because the key combatants were either defeated in the field or agreed to cease-fires. These cease-fires were not accidents or temporary breathing spells. They were a systematic response to a new strategic landscape created by 2006’s sectarian bloodletting, the American surge last summer, the defeat of Al Qaeda’s forces in Anbar Province and the decision by battered Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias that fighting no longer served their interests. The underlying strategic rationale behind these stand-downs gives reason to believe that they are sustainable rather than ephemeral.

But this does not make the peace inherently stable. Wary former combatants are constantly on the lookout for signs — real or imagined — that rivals mean to take advantage of them. The cease-fires, moreover, are extremely decentralized: more than 200 tribal and regional groups have reached individual agreements with the United States to stand down from fighting; in time, some will inevitably test the waters to see what they can get away with, or will misinterpret innocent behavior from neighbors as threatening and retaliate.

A leader of one group of Sunni tribesmen who had switched allegiances and took up arms against Al Qaeda made this point at a meeting we had at Salman Pak, a military base south of Baghdad. He told us he was worried about encroachment onto his territory “from several directions” — apparently meaning he didn’t trust his Sunni neighbors any more than he trusted his traditional Shiite rivals. Left on their own, minor local flashpoints could easily spiral into a renewal of widespread violence.

For now, the American combat presence plays a critical role in enforcing the terms of these cease-fire deals and damping escalatory incentives from spoiler violence. Iraqi government security forces, while they demonstrated improved effectiveness this spring in places like Basra and the Baghdad slum of Sadr City, cannot yet play this role themselves.

In part this is because they are still not trusted by all cease-fire participants. To many Sunnis in particular, a government military commanded by a Shiite regime is not yet trustworthy enough to be tolerated without an American presence to keep it honest. To some extent, this is changing: for example, the National Police have replaced three-fourths of its leaders over the last year or so and now have more than a proportionate share of Sunnis in command positions.

But full reconciliation will take time. On our recent trip, we heard several Sunni sheiks — one was a brother of Sheik Abdul Sattar Buzaigh al-Rishawi, the Americans’ staunchest ally in Anbar until he was assassinated last fall — talk about their newfound regard for Prime Minister Maliki. However, some also discussed their convictions that most other Shiite politicians were “bums” at best and agents for Iran at worst. American troops, by contrast, are generally trusted, if not necessarily loved.

Troop loyalty is not the only concern. The Iraqi security forces are simply not yet able to operate effectively without United States air support, combat advisers and help with logistics and intelligence. When Iraqi units with no American embeds tried to take the port city of Basra last spring, they were turned back in mass confusion, and it required United States combat help to save the day.

American combat troops are also critical for political progress in Iraq. There has been real political change in Iraq — but less from the grand bargains imagined by many Americans and more through thousands of informal, local decisions by war-weary groups and individuals opting to put the past behind them. The pressure from this “bottom up” process has also translated into top-down progress. Over the past year the Iraqis have passed critical amnesty, de-Baathification and provincial-powers laws, as well as a federal budget — all of which had been previously seen as hopelessly deadlocked.

But to capitalize on this progress the next two rounds of elections — provincial races this fall and a national contest next year — must go smoothly and be seen as legitimate. The elections will create losers as well as winners, breeding a grave risk of instability in an immature polity. American combat troops are needed to protect polling places from terrorism, and even more important, from voter intimidation, fraud and the perception that the results were rigged.

Over time, the need for United States contributions will diminish. The longer violence stays down, the more Iraqis’ expectations of one another will improve. Groups of former insurgents being gradually integrated into the Iraqi security forces should become more trusting of the government. And as their technical proficiency and self-sufficiency increase, the need for partnership with American combat units will decrease.

Ideally, progress will also be made on such key issues as the resettlement of four million people now displaced by violence, the equitable sharing of Iraq’s future oil revenues, and a resolution of disputed internal borders in places like the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. But this won’t happen overnight: a stable post-election environment cannot possibly be established until after next year’s elections. If current trends continue, major reductions in American troop levels will be possible — but to begin large-scale drawdowns, much less to complete them, before mid-2010 is to run serious risks.

What can be done, then? One possible model is provided by Anbar Province, which has gone from being Iraq’s most violent region in 2006 to arguably its best today. In 2007, the United States had 15 maneuver battalions in Anbar. Today it has six — far fewer, but nothing close to zero. Several hundred marines remain as advisers with Anbar’s two Iraqi Army divisions; Americans still do some joint patrols with Iraqi forces (if fewer than before), and many Americans work with provincial police and border-security forces. Anbar offers a model for large — though gradual and partial — withdrawals across Iraq that can preserve stability in the process.

American experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo are also instructive. A key to stability in the Balkans has been the presence of outside peacekeepers to enforce the deals that ended the fighting. Yet the number of peacekeeping troops had fallen by about 50 percent four years after the cease-fires were reached in both cases. The Balkan peacekeeping job was easier in some important ways, as it was built on a formal peace treaty among just a few major parties, whereas Iraq’s newfound partial stability is built on scores of local cease-fires signed in 2006 and ’07. It seems clear that withdrawing troops faster from Iraq than we did from Bosnia and Kosovo could be very risky.

Still, the Balkan experience suggests a serious prospect for major withdrawals — perhaps on the order of half the American troop presence — in the next two to three years. Thereafter, if current trends continue, reductions might proceed roughly on the Balkan schedule — with barely 10 percent of the original force expected to be remaining a decade after the end of major hostilities.

Why, then, does Prime Minister Maliki want an earlier withdrawal of United States combat forces? Part of the answer may lie in simple overconfidence: as Americans may recall from the spring of 2003, victory can easily be declared too soon. Another factor, however, surely lies in Iraqi domestic politics. With elections looming, Mr. Maliki and other members of the current government hope to demonstrate that they brought about the end of the occupation and the return to normality during their term.

Mr. Maliki in particular has sought to position himself as the symbol of Iraqi sovereignty, and surely hopes to supplant his young rival Moktada al-Sadr, the standard-bearer for Iraqi nationalism. What better way to do this than to champion a timetable for an American withdrawal, especially when the security forces that would replace the Americans are under his command and his Shiite faction enjoys the preponderance of power in Iraq?

It would be tragic, however, to allow American haste and Iraqi political opportunism to undermine a real chance for long-term stability in Iraq. Perhaps an early withdrawal would succeed, and today’s system of cease-fires would survive a rapid United States drawdown. But much important work remains to be done in Iraq. And to believe that it can be done without the longer presence of a significant number of American combat troops requires a degree of optimism that could well end up making “Mission Accomplished” look as premature today as it was in 2003.

Read the entire article. It is unfortunate that PM Maliki chose such a pivotal time to act with hubris and overconfidence.

Read More...

Summary only...

Assessing The Road To A Stable Iraq

Ann Gildroy and Michael O'Hanlon, writing in the Washington Post, do a good job of assessing how we get from today's reality to a stable and secure Iraq. There is much to do, and it requires America to maintain its committment, but they see the end goal as achievable within the next few years.

_________________________________________________________

This from Ann Gildroy and Michael O'Hanlon today:

Last week, in testimony before Congress, Gen. David Petraeus had a chance to answer the half-rhetorical question he coined at the start of the Iraq war: "Tell me how this ends?" Appropriately, he chose not to answer. In fact, he declined to speculate whether U.S. combat force reductions beyond those planned through July would be possible later this year.

At one level, we know what the answer should be -- an Iraq democratic and stable enough to hold together on its own once we leave. If politicians can resolve major differences without escalating bloodshed, and if they oppose terrorism, eschew nuclear weapons, and avoid blatant aggression against their neighbors or their own people, we will have achieved our core goals.

But how to get there and on what timeline? . . .

We believe that, after a 75 percent reduction in the rate of violence in Iraq over the past year, and significant accomplishments by Iraqi leaders on at least half a dozen key political matters, there is a reasonable prospect of achieving a sustainable stability there within the next few years. That said, continued progress will be far more likely if major reductions in U.S. forces beyond those currently planned await early 2010. There are six key reasons that such strategic patience is appropriate:

· Basra and the south. As events in March showed, Iraq's south has a long way to go. Competing Shiite militias, with varying ties to Iran and the Iraqi government, pursue the spoils of power and oil wealth there. Basra is a virtual mafia land. Over time, the Iraqi government cannot leave this region, which accounts for 70 to 80 percent of the country's oil wealth, in the hands of criminals. We may not need large U.S. forces in the south, but we will need greater, not less, engagement in the coming year or two.

· Local and national elections. This fall, Iraq is scheduled to have local elections in its 18 provinces. Next fall, it will have parliamentary elections at the national level. Election sites, political offices and campaign events all require physical protection. We do not want to make Iraqi politicians worry so much about security that they behave as they did in the 2005 elections, watching out for their own sectarian groups (and affiliated militias) out of sheer survival instinct. Those who claim that accelerating our drawdown will foster greater Iraqi political compromise and reconciliation do not, in our experience, understand the motives and the reasoning of most Iraqis.

· Refugee return. Since 2003, more than 2 million Iraqis have fled their country, and a comparable number have been internally displaced. With security now far better, many will be interested in going home. But as their homes are generally occupied by others, doing so could reignite an ethnic cleansing dynamic. There is no organized process in place to handle this problem. Nor is there an international or Iraqi program to help people relocate elsewhere in Iraq (with, for example, housing grants to build new homes, which could also help create jobs). Pulling American forces out before such a policy can be developed and implemented would ask far too much of Iraqi Security Forces, given the incendiary nature of this issue.

· Kirkuk. The problem of disputed property is most acute in Kirkuk, an oil-rich city in northern Iraq that Kurds feel to be rightly theirs but where many Sunni Arabs reside as well (having been relocated there by Saddam Hussein in recent decades). A referendum was supposed to have been held last year to resolve Kirkuk's status. But the United States rightly discouraged the vote from happening then because there was no adequate mechanism to compensate those who would have lost at the polls (whoever they might have been). Until a referendum can be written, voted upon and initially implemented, Kirkuk will remain a powder keg. We will be asking for trouble if we expect Iraqis to handle this on their own so soon.

· A national oil law. Related to Kirkuk is the question of how Iraq's future oil resources will be developed and shared. . . .

· "Overwatch" of Iraqi security forces. The Iraqi army and police are much larger, better equipped and more proficient than ever. But they are still not a dependable force. Just last year, we had to ask Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to purge well over half the brigade and battalion commanders of each organization in the Baghdad area. Another round of purges, maybe two, may be necessary. . . .

There is real hope for major progress on most of these matters in the coming two years. If this does not happen, or if backsliding occurs on other key political and strategic issues where progress has been made recently, the case for a continued American presence in Iraq will weaken. Either way, we can aspire to major additional reductions in U.S. force levels come 2010. But alas, probably not before.

Read the entire article. They bring up a point here that bears emphasis. Yes, we can and do need a national discussion on Iraq and how to go forward. But the meme that somehow drawing down our forces will increase the chances of reconcilliation is dangerously ludicrous. Assertions such as that are not part of a reasoned debate. They are far left screed.

(H/T IraqPundit)

Read More...

Summary only...

Grand Ayatollah Sistani Weighs In On Sadr's Mahdi Militia

In a major development, Iraq's highest Shia religious figure, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, issued a public statement backing PM Maliki's call for Sadr's Mahdi Army to turn its weapons over to the government.










___________________________________________________________

This is incredibly good news for Iraq today. If Sadr is isolated and disbands his militia, the only security concerns remaining in Iraq will be the remenants of al Qaeda, Iran and criminal gangs, with neither of the latter two able to operate under the cloak of religious sanction. This could well mark a titanic shift in Iraq's security situation. Iran's deadly meddling will fall into stark relief, it will be much easier to combat, and it will be a possibly fatal setback for Iran's dream to "Lebanonize Iraq," as Ambassador Crocker referred to it, by creating a Hezbollah, beholden to Iran, out of the Mahdi Army.

In the wake of the Basra Offensive and the Sadrist uprising, PM Maliki stated several days ago that the Sadr militia needed to be disbanded or that he would enforce an apparently already existing law that would prevent any political movement associated with an existing militia from taking part in upcoming elections. Sadr, who steadfastly refused calls in the past weeks for his militia to turn their weapons over to the government, said in response to Maliki that he would consult the senior Shia clerical establishment. Yesterday, a spokesman for Sadr issued a statement implying that he had in fact consulted Iraq's senior cleric, Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and that Sistani had approved the continued existence of his militia. Grand Ayatollah Sistani has responded publicly.

This today from Bill Rogio:

With the Iraqi government applying pressure to the Sadrist movement and Muqtada al Sadr to disband the Mahdi Army, Iraq’s senior Shia cleric has weighed in on the issue. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the most revered Shia cleric in Iraq, backed the government’s position that the Mahdi Army should surrender its weapons and said he never consulted with Sadr on disbanding the Mahdi Army. Instead, the decision to disband the Mahdi Army is Sadr’s to make.

. . . Sistani did not sanction the Mahdi Army and called for it to disarm.

"Sistani has a clear opinion in this regard; the law is the only authority in the country," Saghier told Voices of Iraq, indicating Sistani supports Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki and the government in the effort to sideline the Mahdi Army. "Sistani asked the Mahdi army to give in weapons to the government." . . .

Sistani’s statements are the latest in a series of moves to politically isolate the Sadrist movement and delegitimize the Mahdi Army. On March 25, the Iraqi security forces started an operation in Basrah designed to clear the city of the Mahdi Army. After meeting early resistance in Basrah and fighting broke out in Baghdad and the South, the Iraqi military rushed reinforcements to the southern city. Six days after the operation began, Sadr ordered his fighters off the street. The Mahdi Army took significant casualties while the Iraqi Army secured the southern cities of Hillah, Kut, Karbala, Najaf, Diwaniyah, Nasiriyah, and Amarah in days. Clashes are still ongoing in Sadr City.

On April 6, Iraq’s Political Council for National Security moved to bar the Sadrist movement from participating in upcoming provincial elections in October if it did not disband the Mahdi Army. The plan had the full backing of Sunni, Kurdish, and Shia political parties.

The move caused panic inside the Sadrist movement as their political isolation became apparent. "We, the Sadrists, are in a predicament," Hassan al Rubaie, a Sadrist member of parliament said the day the Political Council for National Security announced the plan. "Our political isolation was very clear and real during the meeting." he said, referring to the meeting of the Political Council for National Security, where the legislation was announced. "Even the blocs that had in the past supported us are now against us and we cannot stop them from taking action against us in parliament."

Read the entire post. And I would note that none of our MSM is carrying this story. It is a travesty. If you want the important news from Iraq, the starting point is Bill Rogio and his Long War Journal.

Read More...

Summary only...

Pakistan: The Good, The Bad & The Ugly

The Good: Free and fair elections have been held, and Bhutto's party, has won the most delegates while the MMA, a religious party that supported the rise of the Taliban - has lost its hold over the Northwest Fronteir Province (NWFP), home of the Taliban and al Qaeda.

The Bad: Musharaffaf's party clearly lost, the pro-Wahhabi / pro-Saudi party of Nawaz Sharif came in second in the voting.

The Ugly: The victors will, in the long term, be able to deal most effectively with the terrorist threat. But in the short-run, they favor negotiating with the "alligator."

___________________________________________________________

The results of the election are nearly counted in what was, by most accounts, a free and fair election. This from the Long War Journal:

Election results are available for 240 of the 272 seats for the National Assembly, as well as for the four provincial assemblies. The PPP -- the party of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto -- is in the lead with 87 seats, followed by the 66 seats won by the PML-N, the party of Nawaz Sharif who is also a former prime minister. The PPP is on track to form the governing coalition.

The Pakistani Muslim League-Quaid, Musharraf's party, has won only 38 seats. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement -- a students’ movement based in Sindh province -- won 19 seats and the Awami National Party (a secular Pashtun party) won 10. The MMA only won three seats. Thirty-five seats have been distributed to independents, while results are still being counted for 26 of the seats. Elections were postponed in four districts.

. . . The clear winner is the Pakistan People's Party as it will form the next government, appoint a new prime minister, and will control the Sindh provincial government. The PPP was widely expected to win the election, but the outcome was by no means certain. The Dec. 27, 2007 assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the group’s popular leader, plunged the party into a leadership and identity crisis. The reins of the party were turned over to her husband Asif Ali Zardari, who faced charges of corruption for embezzling $1.5 billion during Bhutto’s time as prime minister, and her 19-year-old son Bilawal Zardari, a student at Oxford. Aftab Ahmed Sherpao, the former Minister of the Interior and leader of the PPP-Sherpao also is a winner within the PPP. He won his seat in Charsadda, where the Taliban made two attempts on his life during 2007.

Nawaz Sharif and his party, the Pakistani Muslim League-Nawaz, were also expected to win big. The PML-N is poised to take second place in the National Assembly polling and will also control the provincial government of Punjab. While Sharif was not allowed to run for political office, he is exercising power through his party. Sharif has opposed military operations against the Taliban and has been accused of accepting bribe money from Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda.

The Awami National Party, with its 10 seats, may serve as an influential coalition partner with the PPP. The ANP will control the Northwest Frontier Province, and has stated it will ally with either the PPP or PML-N to form the provincial government. The ANP is a secular Pashtun party that is opposed to military action against the Taliban and promotes nonviolent solutions. The Taliban conducted two major strikes against ANP offices in North Waziristan and Kurram the week before the election, killing and wounding scores of its members.

Western watchers who have closely followed the election in Pakistan see the transition to democracy as being key to fighting the Taliban and al Qaeda insurgency that threatens to destabilize nuclear Pakistan and the wider region. Numerous attacks against the West and India have been hatched in al Qaeda training camps in the tribal areas. The US government hoped a coalition between Bhutto and Musharraf would provide the unity needed between the secular political class and the military to fight the rise of the Taliban and al Qaeda in northwestern Pakistan.

Read the entire article. The NYT, in its coverage, emphasized that, at least initially, this is problematic for Bush, given his relationship with the now politically isolated Musharraf, and claimed that the victors wanted a "dialogue with the insurgents." That latter is not borne out in the reporting:

. . . Mr. Zardari, the leader of the Pakistan Peoples Party, said the new Parliament would reverse many of the unpopular policies that fueled the strong protest vote against President Pervez Musharraf and his party.

Bush administration officials said the United States would still like to see Pakistan’s opposition leaders find a way to work with Mr. Musharraf, a staunch ally for more than six years, but conceded that the notion appeared increasingly unlikely. In comments in Ghana, where he is on a tour of African states, President Bush on Wednesday praised Mr. Musharraf and said the election had been judged fair.

In an interview published Wednesday in The Wall Street Journal, Mr. Musharraf said that he had no plans to step down and that he wanted to stay in office to help bring about a stable democratic government.

Though Mr. Zardari said he wanted a government of national consensus, he ruled out working with anyone from the previous government under Mr. Musharraf.

Instead he said he was talking to the leader of the other main opposition party, Nawaz Sharif, whose party finished second, about forming a coalition.

. . . Mr. Sharif was twice prime minister in the 1990s and faced numerous corruption charges himself after being ousted by Mr. Musharraf in a coup.

Mr. Sharif quickly announced several conditions for joining a coalition. They included the impeachment of Mr. Musharraf and the restoration of the chief justice and other Supreme Court judges suspended by the president in November.

Mr. Zardari was less categorical, not calling for Mr. Musharraf’s impeachment, for instance. The struggle to end military rule and bring a return to democracy is a long, uphill battle, he said.

“We might have to take soft, small steps,” he said at a news briefing at his home in the capital after a meeting of 50 senior members of the party.

Still, the first order of business will be to undo restrictions on the media and restore the independence of the judiciary, he said.

. . . Mr. Zardari criticized the antiterrorism policies of Mr. Musharraf, saying that he had played a double game that had led to an increase in militancy. “We feel they in the government are running with the hare and hunting with the hounds,” he said.

The two opposition parties share similar views of how to tackle the terrorism problem. The new approach is more likely to be responsive to the consensus of the Pakistani public than was Mr. Musharraf’s and is more likely to shun a heavy hand by the military and rely on dialogue with the militants.

Mr. Zardari said his party would seek talks with the militants in the tribal areas along the Afghan border, where the Taliban and Al Qaeda have carved out a stronghold, as well as with the nationalist militants who have battled the Pakistani Army in Baluchistan Province.

. . . Some analysts saw opportunities for the United States if a new civilian government could persuade Pakistanis to get behind the fight against the militants. But past attempts to deal with the militants have left them stronger, and any policy too accommodating is likely to raise concern in Washington.

A former chief of staff of the Pakistani Army, Gen. Jehangir Karamat, said the election of a new government should help the United States if it was looking to work with moderate forces.

“It’s an opportunity to rejuvenate this whole relationship,” General Karamat said. “What we are seeing through these elections is moderate and liberal forces, which is absolutely great.”

Other analysts agreed. The emergence of a moderate Parliament should be good news for the United States, said Shuja Nawaz, a Pakistani military analyst based in Washington.

“If Parliament will now have a stronger hand than before in national decision-making, then the United States should be pleased, since it will not have to beg and cajole Pakistan to act in its own interests against the terrorists,” Mr. Nawaz said.

But the results left the Bush administration, which has leaned heavily on Mr. Musharraf, scrambling to find new partners in the campaign against Islamic militants in the region. The election of a hostile Parliament is expected to further marginalize the president, or even push him out, in a country where power traditionally lies with elected prime ministers or the military chiefs who have overthrown them.

. . . Mr. Musharraf told visiting United States senators that he had accepted the election results and the defeat of his party, and would work with any coalition government that was formed.

. . . Mr. Zardari discussed Pakistan’s options with the militants in an interview last week. He said the campaign against terrorism needed to be redefined in Pakistan. He said it needed to be better explained to the people so they understood it was not America’s war they were fighting, but a threat to their own nation.

Mr. Zardari said that Mr. Musharraf had lost popular support for the campaign and that the morale of the army had plummeted, asserting that only a popularly elected government with the backing of Parliament could reverse that.

He added that a counterinsurgency should be waged by the police in the tribal areas, and that Pakistan had to train and equip its police forces to curb much of the lawlessness. The army is a blunt instrument and should be used selectively so that militants are awed by its power, he said.

Read the entire article.

As I said, I do not think that this election can be characterized as a failure for President Bush. Rather, as the WSJ notes:

The results of Pakistan's parliamentary vote are being billed as a repudiation not only of Pervez Musharraf, but also of President Bush, who has mostly supported the Pakistani strongman over the past seven years. We're more inclined to see the elections as a vindication of both.

Overall, these are very positive developments, with the exception of the strong showing of Nawez Sharif's party. Perhaps now, Pakistan, whose prior governments, incuding Sharif's, have been responsible for fanning the flames of the Taliban, may now take a firm stand against them. To the extent they wish to try dialogue first, that is fine. It will clearly not work, as such dialogues have proven only a boon for further radicalization in the past. Indeed, as Gateway Pundit recently noted, Pakistani family from the NWFP are now fleeing into Afghanistan to escape the violence.

The Taliban and al Qaeda are folks for whom their goals are a zero sum game. They will win or be defeated utterly. Attempting to negotiate with them for half a loaf has not and will not work. That said may be the step necessary to get the people of Pakistan behind the fight and convince them that this radicalization must be ended wholly irrespective of whether the U.S. also has a dog in the fight.

The other question that I have is what will the new government do about the problem of Saudi maddrassas infecting their country with their Wahhabi poison. Until that one is addressed, the problem of radicalization in Pakistan will never be solved.

Update: Bill Rogio is reporting that: "The [Pakistani] government [in the NWFP] has essentially revived the same terms of the 2006 North Waziristan Accord, minus the demands for the tribes to oppose the Taliban and al Qaeda." This is insanity. The incoming government cannot possibly do worse than the craven bungling of the current government.

Read More...

Summary only...

Hillary and Romney in Nevada, McCain in South Carolina

The Republican race got just a little tighter, with a decisive victory for Romney in Nevada and a squeaker for McCain over the Huckster in South Carolina. The only Democratic race today was in Nevada, and that one turned out to be a pyrrich victory of sorts for Clinton.

The next scheduled primaries are January 26 in South Carolina for the Democrats and then January 29 for both parties in Florida. Those votes are followed by February 5 Super-Tuesday, with 22 states in play.

Now, to read the entrails, consult the oracles, and make my own SWAG's:

On the Republican side, the field probably just narrowed to three viable candidates - Romney, McCain and Giuliani.

Romney stays viable and very much in the running with his victory in Nevada. And as the economy becomes more of an issue, Romney's stellar economic credentials may be a decisive consideration to many voters.

McCain has two big wins in New Hampshire and South Carolina - but both wins have relied heavilly on independents and cross-over votes. As we move into states that have strict party primaries, the question is will the base still hold McCain's previous heresies against him? I'll tell you on February 6. I happen to like McCain for his national security credentials and his promise not to approve any spending bills that contain earmarks.

Giuliani - the wild card. A win in Florida puts him very much back in the running. And I have no idea whats going to happen in Florida.

The Huckster - He just lost in a friendly Southern state with a very high concentration of Christian fundamentalists, which has been his only demographic to date. He will join Ron Paul as a side show from here on out.

Fred - On July 3rd, the Republican race was Fred's to enter and win. He looked like the strongest possible candidate to me. But he has fumbled and bumbled ever since. It really is too bad, but Fred is no longer in the running.

The Democratic primary in Nevada was pretty fascinating on several counts:

- Hillary won the "caucus" count pretty decisively, despite the strip's biggest union coming out for Obama. What does this say about the power of the Unions?

- Obama may well spin this as a victory - and with some reasonable basis for so doing. While Hillary may have won the "caucus" count, the way votes are weighted by region in Nevada, Obama actually won one more delegate than Hillary.

- The allure of Obama until ten days ago was that he was an African American candidate who transcended race. Then, ten days ago, he embraced the race card against Bill and Hillary. Was that a fatal mistake? It may well have been. While white progressives have spent decades joined with the black civil rights establishment in portraying as racist any conservative criticism of their post-civil-rights-era agenda, its probably another thing entirely when the penultimate white progressives - Bill and Hill - are getting carded. I am not of the white progressive persuasion, so I can only speculate on this one.

Obama will likely take South Carolina, with its large black population. And if Obama stays as far away from the race card as possible between now and 5 February, perhaps this might still be a race. Otherwise, after this bit of drama, I think Hillary retakes the mantle of inevitability.

Read More...

Summary only...