Offensive In The South; Mahdi Army Demobilized & Sadr Withdraws From Elections

Events are moving with amazing rapidity in Iraq. U.S. and Iraqi forces have begun a major offensive in the southern province of Maysan. Elsewhere, U.S. and Iraqi forces continue to target criminal Iranian proxies and have made several major captures.

And in very big news indeed, the Mahdi Army now appears to be no more. Sadr has issued a directive demobizing the Mahdi Army, promising to reconstitute a new force that will only be authorized to target U.S. forces. Additionally, Sadr has announced he will not participate with any candidates in the upcoming provincial elections. Sadr's star has plummeted and his popularity appears to be reaching a nadir.
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Iraqi forces, supported by U.S. forces, are opening up a new front, launching a major offensive in Maysan Province, a hotbed of Iranian and Sadrist activity. Nibras Kazimi, who runs Talisman Gate, posted two weeks ago on this planned offensive, providing a lot of interesting background:

. . . The Iraqi Army and the Marines are preparing for a major campaign against Mahdi Army and Iranian targets in Maysan Province (‘Amara). Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki may even put the entire elected leadership of ‘Amara—many of whom are Sadrists—out of a job, by flexing his authority under emergency powers. There is even talk of air strikes against military targets—weapons depots, transportation vehicles and individuals—on the Iranian side of the fence; these are targets that are arming and otherwise supporting the Special Groups throughout Iraq.

Iran’s logistics trail goes from Maysan through southern Babil/Hillah Province (al-Hamza) and from there into central Iraq, i.e. Baghdad. . . .

. . . Maysan is a weird place: even after draining the marshes in the early 1990s, Saddam could not claim full control of the province. And ever since the late 1980s, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards has maintained forward bases deep inside Iraqi territory, such as ones around the town of Al-Mijerr al-Kabir. Iraqi opposition groups were active in these areas right up to the fall of the regime. Furthermore, Iran had a large recruiting pool among Marsh Arab refugees who lived in camps almost right across the border.

. . . [A]rrest warrants for Maysan officials are being prepared, and intelligence is being gathered about other Sadrist leaders who have gone into hiding there.

I expect the battle for Maysan to be difficult: this would be Iran’s last stand in Iraq. The fighting would also be occurring on topographical and human terrain that the Iranians have been studying and cultivating for decades. It could start incrementally, and the ante could be raised as the operation faces increased resistance, eventually leading to bombing runs inside Iran.

. . . It should be noted that the vast majority of Sadrist support in Baghdad and Basra comes from families that trace their roots to Maysan Province. Furthermore, Maysan is home to the largest concentration of Iraqi tribes with unknown Arab ancestry—most likely remnants of pre-Islamic ethnic groups and whatever was left in the wake of rebellions by black slaves and gypsies in ‘Abbasid times.

Read the entire post. That offensive in Maysan began yesterday, according to the Long War Journal, though there have been no reports as of yet of any major engagements or arrests.

Elsewhere, U.S. and Iraqi forces continue to target Iran's proxy forces, with the most recent being an important capture of a "brigade" commander in Sadr City. As LWJ notes, since the Basra offensive that began on March 25:

. . . Hundreds of Mahdi Army commanders have been killed or captured in Baghdad, Sadr City, Basrah, Amarah, Nasiriyah, Diwaniyah, Hillah, Najaf, Al Kut, and other Shia cities.

The most high-profile Mahdi Army leaders killed or captured this year include Arkan Hasnawi and the leadership of the Imam Ali Bin Abi Talib Jihadi Brigades in Karbala. Many weapons smugglers, financiers, cell and battalion leaders, facilitators, counterfeiters, and other senior operatives have been killed or captured.

Read the entire article. Also several days ago, "Iraqi police . . . captured three Iranian-backed Special Groups operatives behind the kidnapping and murder of five US soldiers at the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center in January 2007."

The biggest news comes from Moqtada al Sadr, who has issued a directive demobilizing the Mahdi Army and withdrawing from the upcoming elections. Sadr announced, at the same time, that he will reconstitute a small force that will only be authorized to target U.S. forces. This from Nibras Kazimi:

I read Sadr’s directive yesterday: I have to admit that at first I dismissed it as a forgery, seeing that it appeared on an anti-Sadrist website that had peddled forged statements attributed to Sadr in the past. Not only was the wording weird and disjointed, but Sadr actually demobilizes the Mahdi Army, going far beyond “freezing” its activities as he did twice in the past year. He limits “resistance” to a “group that shall be authorized to do so by us in writing soon” and that they alone were the ones allowed to carry arms. Everyone else must turn pacifist.

. . . WaPo’s story . . . seemingly confirms that Sadr did indeed release this statement, as evidenced by the alleged reactions of his aids “some of whom appeared surprised by the cleric’s announcement”—surprised? Why of course, that would be the natural reaction to a declaration of surrender! . . .

Read the entire post. What appears to be happening is that Sadr, whose star has been falling like lead in Iraq over the past year at least, is trying to salvage at least the appearance of relevance. WaPo, after duly reporting the Sadrist spin in its lead story, states:

. . . [S]ome Iraqis saw both of Sadr's recent decisions as a sign of his movement's frailty following military offensives by the Iraqi and U.S. militaries against his supporters in the southern city of Basra and the Sadr City area of the capital.

Critics of Sadr say he is pulling out of the elections to avoid embarrassing losses and keeping most of the Mahdi Army from fighting so that it will not face defeat by U.S. and Iraqi troops.

"These statements and allegations of special companies are nothing but attempts to cover up their weakness," said Kassim Ali, 24, a student at the Kufa Technical Institute. "The Mahdi Army cannot face up to the well-trained and well-equipped Iraqi army."

Read the entire article.

And Sadr does appear to be incredibly weak. You will recall that Sadr called for weekly demonstrations after Friday prayers to protest the ongoing SOFA negotiations to set the framework for U.S. military presence in Iraq after the U.N. mandate ends in January, 2009. The number of people attending those demonstrations in Sadr City suggest that support for Sadr has crashed:



This from the weekly standard.

. . . The U.S. military released imagery of the demonstrations which occurred the past three Fridays. The first week, the military estimated Sadr had 10,000 protesters in attendance on May 30; about 3,000 on June 6; and 1,500 today. These numbers are paltry, as Sadr City contains an estimated 2.5 million Shia, and his protests in 2006 would draw hundreds of thousands of Iraqis.

The military also noted that some Iraqis in Sadr city were “coerced” to join the demonstrations. “Clearly the number of participants is decreasing,” said Lieutenant Colonel Steve Stover, the spokesman for Multinational Forces Baghdad. “The steady drop might suggest increasing support for the GoI [government of Iraq] and less support for Muqtada al Sadr.”

Read the entire article. It would seem that the only way the U.S. and Iraq can be defeated will originate out of the halls of Washington.

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Stepping Up The Pressure On Sadr

The US and Iraqi forces are increasing the pressure on Sadr and his militia while PM Maliki's decision to give the Sadrists a choice between dismantling their militia or being kept out of politics is creating real problems in the Sadr movement. We now know that the murder of Sadr's brother-in-law and senior Mahdi operative in Najaf the other day came shortly after he had written to Sadr recommending that the militia be disbanded.

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This from Bill Roggio at the Long War Journal:

The senior-most Iraqi general in charge of the security operation in Basrah has issued an ultimatum for wanted Mahdi Army leaders and fighters to surrender in the next 24 hours as the Iraqi and US military ignore Muqtada al Sadr's threat to conduct a third uprising. US troops killed 15 Mahdi Army fighters in Baghdad yesterday and have killed 56 fighters since Sadr issued his threat last weekend.

In Basrah, General Mohan al Freiji, the chief of the Basrah Operational Commander and leader of the security operation in the province, has given issued warrants "for 81 people, including senior leaders of the Mahdi militia, and they have 24 hours to give up," The Associated Press reported.

Iraqi troops continue to clear Basrah, although the fighting has been sparse since security forces cleared the Mahdi Army-controlled Hayaniyah neighborhood in Basrah last weekend. Iraqi forces "seized a cache containing huge amounts of weapons and ammunition" in the Al Tanuma neighborhood in eastern Basrah, Voices of Iraq reported. "The cache contains more than (1000) mortar rounds of different calibers, explosive equipment, and improvised explosive devices," a source told the Iraqi newspaper.

Iraqi and US forces have not stopped its operations against The Mahdi Army in Baghdad and the South despite Sadr's threat to conduct a third uprising. US forces in Baghdad alone have reported 56 "criminals" killed since Sadr issued his warning. The US military refers to the Mahdi Army as criminals in an effort to marginalize and delegitimize the group.

Twenty-seven Mahdi Army fighters were killed during clashes in Sadr City and Baghdad on April 20. . . .

. . . The Iraqi government's political pressure on the Mahdi Army to disband combined with the Coalition and Iraqi military offensive against the Mahdi Army has appeared to cause some deep rifts within the Sadrist ranks. Sadrist politicians have complained about being politically isolated, and some appear to be working to disband the Mahdi Army and conduct negotiations with the US to end the fighting.

The assassination of Riyad al Nouri, Sadr's brother-in-law and a senior aide in Najaf, continues to spark reports that his death was carried out from within the Sadrist movement. On April 17, The Long War Journal reported that Nouri was pushing for the Sadrist movement to disband the Mahdi Army lest the party be shut out from the political process, and US military officers believe he was killed because of this. . .

Read the entire article.

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Assessing The Road To A Stable Iraq

Ann Gildroy and Michael O'Hanlon, writing in the Washington Post, do a good job of assessing how we get from today's reality to a stable and secure Iraq. There is much to do, and it requires America to maintain its committment, but they see the end goal as achievable within the next few years.

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This from Ann Gildroy and Michael O'Hanlon today:

Last week, in testimony before Congress, Gen. David Petraeus had a chance to answer the half-rhetorical question he coined at the start of the Iraq war: "Tell me how this ends?" Appropriately, he chose not to answer. In fact, he declined to speculate whether U.S. combat force reductions beyond those planned through July would be possible later this year.

At one level, we know what the answer should be -- an Iraq democratic and stable enough to hold together on its own once we leave. If politicians can resolve major differences without escalating bloodshed, and if they oppose terrorism, eschew nuclear weapons, and avoid blatant aggression against their neighbors or their own people, we will have achieved our core goals.

But how to get there and on what timeline? . . .

We believe that, after a 75 percent reduction in the rate of violence in Iraq over the past year, and significant accomplishments by Iraqi leaders on at least half a dozen key political matters, there is a reasonable prospect of achieving a sustainable stability there within the next few years. That said, continued progress will be far more likely if major reductions in U.S. forces beyond those currently planned await early 2010. There are six key reasons that such strategic patience is appropriate:

· Basra and the south. As events in March showed, Iraq's south has a long way to go. Competing Shiite militias, with varying ties to Iran and the Iraqi government, pursue the spoils of power and oil wealth there. Basra is a virtual mafia land. Over time, the Iraqi government cannot leave this region, which accounts for 70 to 80 percent of the country's oil wealth, in the hands of criminals. We may not need large U.S. forces in the south, but we will need greater, not less, engagement in the coming year or two.

· Local and national elections. This fall, Iraq is scheduled to have local elections in its 18 provinces. Next fall, it will have parliamentary elections at the national level. Election sites, political offices and campaign events all require physical protection. We do not want to make Iraqi politicians worry so much about security that they behave as they did in the 2005 elections, watching out for their own sectarian groups (and affiliated militias) out of sheer survival instinct. Those who claim that accelerating our drawdown will foster greater Iraqi political compromise and reconciliation do not, in our experience, understand the motives and the reasoning of most Iraqis.

· Refugee return. Since 2003, more than 2 million Iraqis have fled their country, and a comparable number have been internally displaced. With security now far better, many will be interested in going home. But as their homes are generally occupied by others, doing so could reignite an ethnic cleansing dynamic. There is no organized process in place to handle this problem. Nor is there an international or Iraqi program to help people relocate elsewhere in Iraq (with, for example, housing grants to build new homes, which could also help create jobs). Pulling American forces out before such a policy can be developed and implemented would ask far too much of Iraqi Security Forces, given the incendiary nature of this issue.

· Kirkuk. The problem of disputed property is most acute in Kirkuk, an oil-rich city in northern Iraq that Kurds feel to be rightly theirs but where many Sunni Arabs reside as well (having been relocated there by Saddam Hussein in recent decades). A referendum was supposed to have been held last year to resolve Kirkuk's status. But the United States rightly discouraged the vote from happening then because there was no adequate mechanism to compensate those who would have lost at the polls (whoever they might have been). Until a referendum can be written, voted upon and initially implemented, Kirkuk will remain a powder keg. We will be asking for trouble if we expect Iraqis to handle this on their own so soon.

· A national oil law. Related to Kirkuk is the question of how Iraq's future oil resources will be developed and shared. . . .

· "Overwatch" of Iraqi security forces. The Iraqi army and police are much larger, better equipped and more proficient than ever. But they are still not a dependable force. Just last year, we had to ask Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to purge well over half the brigade and battalion commanders of each organization in the Baghdad area. Another round of purges, maybe two, may be necessary. . . .

There is real hope for major progress on most of these matters in the coming two years. If this does not happen, or if backsliding occurs on other key political and strategic issues where progress has been made recently, the case for a continued American presence in Iraq will weaken. Either way, we can aspire to major additional reductions in U.S. force levels come 2010. But alas, probably not before.

Read the entire article. They bring up a point here that bears emphasis. Yes, we can and do need a national discussion on Iraq and how to go forward. But the meme that somehow drawing down our forces will increase the chances of reconcilliation is dangerously ludicrous. Assertions such as that are not part of a reasoned debate. They are far left screed.

(H/T IraqPundit)

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Bad News From Iraq

The Provincial Elections law, one of three major pieces of legislation passed by the Iraqi Parliament this month, was vetoed by the Presidency Council and has been sent back to Parliament for reconsideration and revision.




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The provincial elections bill, which would create moderately strong provinces, is at the center of a debate in Iraq over whether there should be a strong or weak central government. History would suggest that this is not an easy issue to resolve. In American history, we had the Articles of Confederation, creating a weak central government, that was finally replaced with our Constitution in 1788. And then we fought a civil war over much the same issue. Now its Iraq's turn, and the issue seems equally divisive. This from the NYT:

Political momentum in Iraq hit a sudden roadblock on Wednesday when a feud between the largest Shiite factions led to the veto of a law that had been passed with great fanfare two weeks ago. The law had been heralded by the Bush administration as a breakthrough for national reconciliation.

The law called for provincial elections by October, and it was hoped that it would eliminate severe electoral distortions that have left Kurds and Shiites with vastly disproportionate power over Sunni Arabs in some areas, a factor in fueling the Sunni insurgency. It would also have given Iraqis who have long complained of corrupt and feckless local leaders a chance to clean house and elect officials they believe are more accountable.

But the law was vetoed at the last minute by the three-member Iraqi presidency council, which includes President Jalal Talabani and two vice presidents. The veto came after officials in a powerful Shiite party, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, objected to provisions that they contend unlawfully strip power from Iraq’s provinces.

Politicians involved in the debate said the main objections came from Vice President Adel Abdul Mehdi, a Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council member. The bill now goes back to Parliament, where its prospects are unclear, given the acrimonious debate over the issue that led to the veto.

. . . The veto is “somewhat of a setback,” Mike McConnell, the director of national intelligence, acknowledged Wednesday during a hearing in Congress.

A common refrain among American combat commanders is that new local elections could help sweep out ineffective leaders while remedying deeply uneven provincial councils, a legacy partly of the Sunni Arab boycott of previous provincial elections.

. . . The Sadrists, who were furious at the veto, want to retain a strong central government that has the legal muscle to deal vigorously any province that Baghdad leaders believe is acting against the country’s best interests. They said the veto breached the historic agreement among political blocs two weeks ago that allowed the simultaneous passage of the provincial powers bill, the 2008 budget and another law granting amnesty to thousands of Sunnis and others in Iraqi jails.

“It’s a struggle of two wills,” said Nassar al-Rubaie, a legislator from the Sadr movement. “One side wants to strengthen the central government and federal authority, and the other wants to undermine it and grant the provinces greater powers.”

Read the entire article.

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