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There are a plethora of questions raised by the Benghazi slaughter, but the two most critical were those the President didn't answer at the Town Hall debate - who denied repeated requests for security and why. The Romney camp should be smelling the blood in the water.
As I pointed out on this blog the day before the Town Hall Debate, the only reason "security professionals" at the State Dept. would refuse requests for increased security in Benghazi, even as evidence mounted that the security situation was seriously deteriorating, would be because of a policy decision approved, if not made, at the Clinton and / or Obama level. So it was no surprise that when an undecided voter explicitly asked Obama "who" refused numerous requests for increase security and "why," Obama spent his two minutes of response time doing everything but addressing those two simple questions.
Someone with much better youtube skills than I has put out a great video highlighting this issue.
This really goes to the heart of not only the Benghazi failure, but the entire failure of the Obama foreign policy. To deny security in Benghazi is prima facie proof of a foreign policy disconnected from reality. So the answer to "who" denied requests for increased security and "why" need to be asked again at the foreign policy debate - and this time, America deserves real answers.
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Showing posts with label security. Show all posts
Showing posts with label security. Show all posts
Thursday, October 18, 2012
The Two Critical Questions On Benghazi
Saturday, June 20, 2009
When The Regime Will Fall
On one side are unarmed protestors, tired of being brutalized, suffering economic meltdown, and their sole means of making their voices heard, the Presidential election, stolen from them by a mid-level cleric posing as a Grand Ayatollah. Arrayed against them, a deeply corrupt clerical class that has gotten rich off the backs of their people. That regime is held in place by a security apparatus, some of whom in the IRGC are in the economic bed with the clerics. But most in the security apparatus are not. Only a portion of them will fight to the death to protect this theocracy. The regime will fall when the security apparatus begins to turn. That is what to watch for.
Having said that, this from the NYT today:
The Iranian police commander, in green uniform, walked up Komak Hospital Alley with arms raised and his small unit at his side. “I swear to God,” he shouted at the protesters facing him, “I have children, I have a wife, I don’t want to beat people. Please go home.”
A man at my side threw a rock at him. The commander, unflinching, continued to plead. There were chants of “Join us! Join us!” The unit retreated toward Revolution Street, where vast crowds eddied back and forth confronted by baton-wielding Basij militia and black-clad riot police officers on motorbikes.
Dark smoke billowed over this vast city in the late afternoon. Motorbikes were set on fire, sending bursts of bright flame skyward. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, had used his Friday sermon to declare high noon in Tehran, warning of “bloodshed and chaos” if protests over a disputed election persisted.
He got both on Saturday — and saw the hitherto sacrosanct authority of his office challenged as never before since the 1979 revolution birthed the Islamic Republic and conceived for it a leadership post standing at the very flank of the Prophet. A multitude of Iranians took their fight through a holy breach on Saturday from which there appears to be scant turning back. . . .
Dark smoke billowed over this vast city in the late afternoon. Motorbikes were set on fire, sending bursts of bright flame skyward. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, had used his Friday sermon to declare high noon in Tehran, warning of “bloodshed and chaos” if protests over a disputed election persisted.
He got both on Saturday — and saw the hitherto sacrosanct authority of his office challenged as never before since the 1979 revolution birthed the Islamic Republic and conceived for it a leadership post standing at the very flank of the Prophet. A multitude of Iranians took their fight through a holy breach on Saturday from which there appears to be scant turning back.
Maybe the next time, that Iranian policeman does not turn away from the protestors, but joins them. For there will come a point when those in the security apparatus see their kinsman being beaten, maimed and killed and say, enough is enough. When that happens, the evil that is Iran's theocracy will fall.
20 June 20098: The Regime Turns On Its Own People (Updated)
20 June 2009: Life, Death & Terrorism On Iran's Streets
19 June 2009: Countdown To High Noon
19 June 2009: An Iranian Showdown Cometh - Liveblogging Khameini's Speech At Friday Prayers
18 June 2009: Iran Update
16 June 2009: Iran 6/16: The Fire Still Burning, An Incendiary Letter From Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, State Dept. Intercedes With Twitter & Obama Talks Softly
16 June 2009: Breaking News: Vote Recount In Iran, Too Little, Too Late
15 June 2009: Iran Buys Time, Obama Votes Present, Iraq's Status Is Recognized
15 June 2009: The Fog Of War - & Twitter
15 June 2009: Chants Of Death To Khameini
15 June 2009: Heating Up In Iran
14 June 2009: Heating Up In Iran
14 June 2009: Tehran Is Burning; What Will The Iranian Army Do? (Updated)
13 June 2009: The Mad Mullah's Man Wins Again - For Now
15 April 2008: The Next Moves In An Existential Chess Match (Background On Iran's Theocracy)
Monday, July 21, 2008
What In The World Is Maliki Saying?
We will likely see significant force reductions from Iraq over the next several months and I would not be surprised to see force reductions below those of pre-surge levels by September. There is still a mission to keep the remnants of al Qaeda and the Special Groups under constant pressure. And there is a need to maintain significant combat power to dissuade Iran from any unwise moves for the foreseeable future. So into all of this we have McCain saying we need to drawdown forces based on conditions. We have Obama who wants to "end" the a war that is already won, pulling out all combat brigades on a firm schedule of surrender over sixteen months. And now we have Maliki saying . . . what? SPIEGEL: Would you hazard a prediction as to when most of the US troops will finally leave Iraq? Maliki seems to be saying that most U.S. troops can withdraw, predicated on the security situation. I am less sanguine that the situation will allow a drawdown that fast, and it also depends on how you define "most of the U.S. troops." I would hardly call this an embrace of the hard timeline for which Obama has called as part of his plan to declare the Iraq war illegitimate. SPIEGEL: Would you hazard a prediction as to when most of the US troops will finally leave Iraq? Now it appears that Maliki is closer to endorsing the Obama plan, with some lip service being paid to conditions on the ground. That would be significant. But now today we get a third version where Maliki does everything but endorse Obama for President - according to a NYT translation of the still unreleased audio. This from the NYT: . . . But in Iraq, controversy continued to reverberate between the United States and Iraqi governments over a weekend news report that Mr. Maliki had expressed support for Mr. Obama’s proposal to withdraw American combat troops within 16 months of January. The reported comments came after Mr. Bush agreed on Friday to a “general time horizon” for pulling out troops from Iraq without a specific timeline. Read the entire article. Patterico, commenting on this latest translation, notes: I trust the New York Times implicitly, which is why I see no reason for them to release the actual audio of the tape, to see if anyone disagrees with their translation. We don’t want to double-check things ourselves; we want to be told what the truth is. And yes, I’m entirely serious about that. (Click the links to see just how serious.) (H/T Instapundit) The actual audio of the interview needs to be made public to clarify what was actually said. Beyond that, Maliki may be playing an incredibly dangerous game indeed. Let there be no doubt in anyone's mind that the only thing standing between Iraq as a functioning democracy and Iraq as a sattelite of Iran is the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq. While Maliki may be playing for the domestic political scene as it exists today, his politicing could well undermine John McCain and do his country incredible harm in the long run if the U.S. elects as President a man whose central promise has been to declare Iraq an illegitimate war and a defeat. If we are asked to go, we of course should do so. But Maliki may have just bought himself a defeat straight from the jaws of victory.
PM Maliki's interview with Der Spiegel has now been translated into three different versions. Did Maliki say in the interview that he wanted to see the complete withdraw of U.S. troops from Iraq within sixteen months? Translation one - no. Translation two - maybe. And now the NYT translation three - yes, and Maliki all but endorsed Obama. What is going on?
Before addressing what Maliki said, let's address the current context. We have won the counterinsurgency war in Iraq. For all of the reasons I posted here, it's over. Having called it several days ago, McCain, apparently read my post and followed suit with his own announcement of victory two days later.
Unfortunately, victory in a counterinsurgency does not mean the end to hostilities - just that the enemy is so fragmented and the government sufficiently strong that, so long as the military continues its current clean up operations aimed at pressuring the remnants of the enemy still milling about in the dark corners, the the enemy cannot conduct any sustained operations. That goes for both Iran through its proxies and al Qaeda. If major hostilities restart, and that is still possible over the next few years, it will be a new war. That said, as I wrote in my post assessing victory in the counterinsurgency war:
Hot Air captured the initial translation published by Der Spiegel of their interview with Maliki:
Maliki: As soon as possible, as far as we’re concerned. US presidential candidate Barack Obama is right when he talks about 16 months. Assuming that positive developments continue, this is about the same time period that corresponds to our wishes.
That would seem to coincide with this from General Petraeus in an interview given before the Der Spiegel interview was published:
But then there was translation two, also captured at the Hot Air link above. Der Spiegel did a bit of covert midnight editing and, voila, the interview now reads:
Maliki: As soon as possible, as far as we’re concerned. U.S. presidential candidate Barack Obama talks about 16 months. That, we think, would be the right timeframe for a withdrawal, with the possibility of slight changes.
Diplomats from the United States Embassy in Baghdad spoke to Mr. Maliki’s advisers on Saturday, said an American official, speaking on condition of anonymity in order to discuss what he called diplomatic communications. After that, the government’s spokesman, Ali al-Dabbagh, issued a statement casting doubt on the magazine’s rendering of the interview.
The statement, which was distributed to media organizations by the American military early on Sunday, said Mr. Maliki’s words had been “misunderstood and mistranslated,” but it failed to cite specifics.
“Unfortunately, Der Spiegel was not accurate,” Mr. Dabbagh said Sunday by telephone. “I have the recording of the voice of Mr. Maliki. We even listened to the translation.”
But the interpreter for the interview works for Mr. Maliki’s office, not the magazine. And in an audio recording of Mr. Maliki’s interview that Der Spiegel provided to The New York Times, Mr. Maliki seemed to state a clear affinity for Mr. Obama’s position, bringing it up on his own in an answer to a general question on troop presence.
The following is a direct translation from the Arabic of Mr. Maliki’s comments by The Times: “Obama’s remarks that — if he takes office — in 16 months he would withdraw the forces, we think that this period could increase or decrease a little, but that it could be suitable to end the presence of the forces in Iraq.”
He continued: “Who wants to exit in a quicker way has a better assessment of the situation in Iraq.”
Mr. Maliki’s top political adviser, Sadiq al-Rikabi, declined to comment on the remarks, but spoke in general about the Iraqi position on Sunday. Part of that position, he said, comes from domestic political pressure to withdraw.
UPDATE: What is the point? A number of people are making a big deal of the fact that the statement from Maliki’s office was issued by CENTCOM, after the U.S. Government contacted Maliki’s office. It is relevant, then, that Der Spiegel’s original translation contained exactly the part that Maliki’s office insists was left out of the final version — namely, an explicit condition that Maliki’s agreement to a rough 16-month timetable “[a]ssum[es] that positive developments continue.” In other words, Maliki’s support for withdrawal depends on conditions on the ground.
Friday, July 11, 2008
ABC Asks Some Of The Questions That Obama Should Have Asked
Whatever nuance Barack Obama is now adding to his Iraq withdrawal strategy, the core plan on his Web site is as plain as day: Obama would "immediately begin to remove our troops from Iraq. He will remove one to two combat brigades each month, and have all of our combat brigades out of Iraq within 16 months." Read the entire article.
In April, during the hearings with Gen. Petraeus and Amb. Crocker, Obama had an opportunity to raise and discuss his plans to order a withdraw from Iraq unrelated to conditions on the ground, beginning immediately and being completed within 16 months. This would have given the public a platform to evaluate Obama's insane plan. From a national security standpoint, from an Iraqi security standpoint, and from a U.S. force protection standpoint, the plan would deeply harm the U.S., play into the hands of Iran and al Qaeda, threaten all the security and political gains made in Iraq, and threaten the security of our withdrawing forces. Indeed, what Obama proposes would turn into a Dunkirk for U.S. forces. Obama studiously refrained from asking before the public any questions that would have raised these issues. But today, at least ABC News is asking some of them - those that concern logistics and force protection.
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This from ABC News:
It is a plan that, no doubt, helped Obama get his party's nomination, but one that may prove difficult if he is elected president.
Military personnel in Iraq are following the presidential race closely, especially when it comes to Iraq.
The soldiers and commanders we spoke to will not engage in political conversation or talk about any particular candidate, but they had some strong opinions about the military mission which they are trying to accomplish, and the dramatic security gains they have made in the past few months.
We spent a day with Maj. Gen. Jeffery Hammond in Sadr City. He is the commander of the 4th Infantry Division, which is responsible for Baghdad. Hammond will likely be one of the commanders who briefs Barack Obama when he visits Iraq.
"We still have a ways to go. Number one, we're working on security and it's very encouraging, that's true, but what we're really trying to achieve here is sustainable security on Iraqi terms. So, I think my first response to that would be let's look at the conditions.
"Instead of any time-based approach to any decision for withdrawal, it's got to be conditions-based, with the starting point being an intelligence analysis of what might be here today, and what might lie ahead in the future. I still think we still have work that remains to be done before I can really answer that question," Hammond said when asked how he would feel about an order to start drawing down two combat brigades a month.
Asked if he considered it dangerous to pull out if the withdrawal is not based on "conditions," Hammond said, "It's very dangerous. I'll speak for the coalition forces, men and women of character and moral courage; we have a mission, and it's not until the mission is done that I can look my leader in the eye and say, 'Sir, Ma'am, mission accomplished,' and I think it is dangerous to leave anything a little early."
That phrase, "sustainable security," is something you hear a lot in Iraq.
Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, who is the operational commander of all U.S. forces in Iraq, says he has seen things improve significantly here.
As for Obama's stated plan to bring home the troops within 16 months, Austin said, "I'd have to see the entire plan. I'd have to understand the strategic objectives of the leadership, and based on those strategic objectives, come up with operational objectives. It's very difficult to comment on one way or the other, whether one plan would work or one plan wouldn't work. Right now, we are helping the Iraqis achieve sustainable security, and helping them to increase the capability of the Iraqi security forces, and we are making great progress along those lines."
On the streets of Baghdad, where a suicide bomber had struck just days before, Capt. Josh West told us he wants to finish the mission, and that any further drawdown has to be based on conditions on the ground.
"If we pull out of here too early, it's going to establish a vacuum of power that violent criminal groups will be able to fill once we leave," West said.
Capt. Jeremy Ussery, a West Point graduate on his third deployment, pointed to his heavy body armor as we walked in the 120-degree heat, saying, "The same people keep coming back because we want to see Iraq succeed, that's what we want. I don't want my kids, that hopefully will join the military, my notional children, to have to come back to Iraq 30 years from now and wear this."
But Ussery added, "You can't put a timetable on it -- it's events-based."
Success on the battlefield is not the only complication with Obama's plan.
Physically removing the combat brigades within that kind of time frame would be difficult, as well.
The military has been redeploying troops for years, and Maj. Gen. Charles Anderson, who would help with the withdrawal, told us as we toured Camp Arifjan in Kuwait, "We have the capacity to do a minimum of two-and-a-half brigade combat teams a month -- can we expand that capacity? Sure. Can we accelerate? It depends. It depends on the amount of equipment that we bring back. And it's going to depend on how fast we bring them out."
It is the equipment that is the real problem.
. . . While Anderson and his troops have a positive attitude, several commanders who looked at the Obama plan told ABC News, on background, that there was "no way" it could work logistically.
Tuesday, May 6, 2008
An NYT Iraqi Reporter On Security In Baghdad & The Need For Americans To Stay In Iraq
Mohamed Hussein is an Iraqi employee of The New York Times in Baghdad. He left Iraq on New Year’s Day in 2007 to escape the sectarian violence from Shiite militias and Sunni insurgents who were both active in his mixed neighborhood. He returned last week, after 15 months out of Iraq. . . . Read the entire article. Wow. Of all places I would expect to see this article, the NYT was the last. My hats off to them for publishing it.
Mohamed Hussein, an Iraqi reporter for the NYT, recently returned to Iraq from Syria where he had gone to escape the violence of Baghdad in 2006. He is amazed by the changes in security, grateful to the Americans, and warns of the dire consequences that will occur if the U.S. leaves Iraq before the gains in security are made permanent.
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This from Mr. Hussein writing in the NYT:
BAGHDAD — I came back to Baghdad last week.
First, it is important to mention the main cause that made me leave everything behind and go to Syria. By the end of 2006 my neighborhood had become an unbearable place. No one could continue there. It was without any simple services, from bakery shops to the hospital and physicians. They all closed their doors and left.
But the real cause is something hidden inside me that affected me more. . . .
The other more important cause that made me leave was that it seemed like someone had started a campaign to assassinate everyone living in my area, no matter from which side -Sunni or Shiite - as they just needed numbers of people who had to be killed.
In Syria I did not really get any rest because although my wife and children came with me, my parents stayed behind. They were alone and they are both aged people, so they did not think anyone would target them. . . .
After spending more than a year in Syria one day my father called me saying: “You can now return, and do not worry. Everything is fine now.”
. . . I wanted to return, but at the same time I hesitated. I wanted to know if the situation there was as people said, or if they just exaggerated.
During my travel from Syria to Baghdad I was completely relaxed. There were no worries, no fear of looters and terrorists with Al Qaeda, or Ansar al-Sunna (Protectors of the Sunni), Jaish al-Mohammed (Army of Mohammed) who used to control everything on the expressway between Syria and Baghdad.
Then when we stopped to get some rest near a big restaurant called Bilaad ash-Sham I saw many Iraqi and Syrian buses filled with travelers, and many four-wheel-drive vehicles.
They told me that everything was going fine and that stories that I had heard about the security situation in some Baghdad districts were right.
I reached Baghdad at 6 a.m. . . .
. . . I had heard about: the huge difference in security, which was much better than when I left.
. . . It was a really strange feeling to see my neighborhood again. In some ways it was the same, in others different. The main road had become ugly because there are now many damaged buildings and shops, and I noticed the marks of bullets and shrapnel everywhere around.
At the end of the journey when we reached the main entrance of my neighborhood my mother told me “Just slow down and say ‘Asalaam alaikum,’ (Peace be with you). Do not tell them you were in Syria.” She was afraid they would think I was a wanted man who had run away.
At that moment everything I had heard before seemed not right and I became more anxious with each meter I came closer to the checkpoint. Then I turned my head to the left and I saw the biggest cement wall I have ever seen, which encircles my neighborhood.
There were two Iraqi soldiers standing at the checkpoint. One of them stopped me and told me to open the trunk and engine. The other smiled, saying: “It is the day of bombed cars.”
He inspected my car with an explosive detector device. The other was just looking at us and it seemed that he recognized my mother’s face because he said: “Hi, auntie.”
Now I felt really safe because those people were working properly, not like the security forces in my neighborhood before who were making a secure path during the night for militia members to pass through, targeting everything there.
I think that the Iraqi police and army are working in the right way because there is an American military center inside my neighborhood. But all the people I met said that if the Americans left, those militias would eat our flesh without mercy.
I spent my first night without hearing any kind of shooting and mortar bombing, not like a year earlier when my daughter was asking me about all the sounds around and I was telling her, “Do not panic, baby, that is fireworks.”
This morning I heard the man who sells cooking gas knocking on the cylinders shouting “gaz, gaz, gaz ” which is something that had not happened for two years in my neighborhood.
This meant that all the things I heard about the improvements are true. Even the people are more friendly and I can say that there is now a kind of mutual trust between the people and the soldiers, not like before when there was no trust between each other.
Now, maybe if we think deeply about it, we will find that each needs the other. People need the soldiers to secure them. At the same time the U.S. troops are now in a safe place, maybe they can have more than one Green Zone.
Will it stay safe or not?
I guess that all depends on the American troops, since we will not have qualified Iraqi forces soon. Although most Iraqi forces are sincere you find some have been infiltrated by groups of gunmen and sectarian people who made the mess all around us.
So we still need the Americans because if they intend to leave, there will be something like a hurricane which will extract everything - people, buildings and even trees. Everything that has happened and all that safety will be past, just like a sweet dream.
As people say in my neighborhood: “The Americans are now Ansar al Sunna.” Protectors of the Sunni.
Sunday, May 4, 2008
Iran and Lessons In Diplomacy
Although Iran met with the U.S. in Iraq several times in 2007 and gave assurances that they would stop the arming and funding of militias, their promises have proven false. To the contrary, there has been a sharp increase in the operational tempo of their proxy war since the start of 2008. Not surprisingly, Iran has refused to meet again with Ambasador Crocker to discuss security in Iraq. In February, they could not meet because of "scheduling difficulties." Today, they refuse to meet because of "Americans' massive attacks on the Iraqi people in various cities" - i.e., we are attacking their proxies, particularly in Sadr City. There are some clear lessons about the limits and advisability of diplomacy to be gleaned from our attempts to engage Iran.
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The Washington Post is reporting that Iran is refusing to meet with our Ambassador in Iraq, Ryan Crocker, to discuss the security situation in Iraq ostensibly because U.S. forces are attacking defenseless Iraqis in cities throughout the country. Why would they meet with us in 2006 and 2007, but not in 2008?
In 2006, it looked to the world as if the U.S. was going to pack its bags and go home, leaving Iraq to be divided between al Qaeda and Iran - obviously the desired outcome for Iran. The theocrats in Tehran were doing their part, giving money to all sides and executing a low level proxy war against the U.S., just enough to add to the mayhem without crossing the line that would bring the 82nd Airborne in on a night jump into Tehran. They only needed patience. And so they met with the U.S. and Iraq on several occasions to give empty assurances, merely awaiting the inevitable.
But then something happened on way to the mosque. Bush refused to blink, Petraeus executed a brilliant counterinsurgency plan, al Qaeda grossly overplayed its hand in the Sunni tribal regions, and PM Maliki grew into his office. So that when 2007 came to an end, Tehran had a major problem. Al Qaeda was strategically defeated, peace was decending, and the Iraqi government grew stronger each day. It was decision time for the mad mullahs.
Clearly the trajectory was towards the development of a strong, secular Iraqi government and a stable Iraq. That would be the worst possible outcome for Iran's theocracy. Their theocracy is deeply unpopular, their hold on their citizens is maintained by the gun, and their legitimacy is based on a philosphy representing a complete break with a millenium of Shia apolitical traditions. Thus, the decision was easy - step into the breach and increase the operational tempo of their proxy war against U.S. forces and the Iraqi government.
And that is precisely what the theocracy has done in 2008. Rockets were smuggled into Iraq and the Green Zone has been under steady bombardment throughout much of this year from the Sadrists. Sadrist proxies increased their attacks, and attempted to carry out bombings disguised as al Qaeda. According to intelligence, there was a surge of Iranian Qods force members into Iraq in February. And of course, there was the takeover of Basra once the British withdrew. Iran upped the ante considerably in an effort to turn the tide.
Here is where things get interesting. Though the U.S. has been complaining about IED attacks since early 2007 and pointing the finger at Iran, apparently PM Maliki and the Shia's dominating the Iraqi government with a plurality did not consider Iran a major threat. But then came Basra. When the Iraqi forces went into Basra to reestablish government control, they found themselves fighting people armed, funded, trained and quite possibly led by Iran. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker have both said that Basra was the wake-up call for the Iraqi government. They now fully understand the extent of Iran's proxy war and its danger to their government.
All of that said, this leads one to suspect that Iran's refusal to meet with Ambassador Crocker and the Iraqi government in February was likely to forestall any complications from having to explain the increase in their operational tempo. With the Iraqi government seemingly not hostile in February, there was nothing to be gained from the meeting - and thus the "scheduling conflict." The same is true today's call for a meeting, though the information is all out in the open now and the Iraqi government is highly annoyed. There are no more scheduling conflicts. Rather Iran's refusal to meet now seems, as best I can assess, a weak attempt at spin aimed at an international audience and our Democrats. In any event, their refusal to meet is a tacit acknowledgment that they do not intend to change course.
Update: As discussed here, Iran did meet with an Iraqi delegation that travelled to Tehran recently carrying with it the evidence of Iran's acts of war inside Iraq. According to a member of the delegation, Iran refused to acknowledge the evidence, claimed it was not training, funding or arming the militias, and gave its assurances that it would respect Iraqi sovereignty. In other words, business as usual.
What are the lessons to be learned here. The first is that any agreement with Tehran isin't worth the paper its printed on. Anyone deeply familiar with the near thirty year history of Iran's mullahocracy knows that, but this is simply one more example. While their diplomats were promising greater security in Iraq, their Qods force was smuggling in rocketry for the Sadrists.
Two, while "we should never negotiate out of fear, but never fear to negotiate," we must not be so stupid as to attempt a negotation with a country that has shown no indication that it would do so in good faith. That is merely an invitation to be played and manipulated - and in Chamberlainesque fashion, encourage rather than discourage more aggressive behavior on Iran's part.
Three, and most importantly for our peace at all costs left, diplomacy is not a panacea. It will not cure all ills. It will not solve the problem of Iran's proxy war in Iraq if Iran is bent on turning Iraq into a mirror of Lebanon.
Thursday, February 21, 2008
Still Trying to Call The Surge A Failure
It is now widely considered beyond dispute that Bush has won his gamble. The surge was a terrific success. Choose your metric: attacks on American soldiers, car bombs, civilian deaths, potholes. They're all down, down, down. Lattes sold by street vendors are up. Performances of Shakespeare by local repertory companies have tripled. Read the article. The surge is a failure despite the fact of tremendous security gains and despite the acts of reconciliation studiously ignored by Kinsley because of our troop levels. As I wrote in the linked post at the top, the left is becoming ever more surreal and transparent in their attempt to come up with ostensible justifications for legislating defeat. And the logic with which Kinsley attempts to make his argument could not be a better illustration of my point.
I blogged here that, given the significant progress in Iraq as to both security gains and politcal reconciliation, that those committed to defeat were coming up with ever more surreal reasoning to justify their transparent partisan positions. I also wrote that it would difficult for the left to keep moving the goal posts. But Michael Kinsley shows today that where there is a will, there is a way.
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Today, far left pundit Michael Kinsley, wrting with the literary equivalent of an army of earth moving vehicles and tow trucks, is upending the goal posts marking success in Iraq and trying to move the posts out the far left side of the stadium:
Skepticism seems like sour grapes. If you opposed the surge, you have two choices. One is to admit that you were wrong, wrong wrong. The other is to sound as if you resent all the good news and remain eager for disaster. Too many opponents of the war have chosen option two.
But we needn't quarrel about all this, or deny the reality of the good news, to say that at the very least, the surge has not worked yet. The test is simple, and built into the concept of a surge: Has it allowed us to reduce troop levels to below where they were when it started? And the answer is no.
Friday, January 18, 2008
Al Qaeda, Current Ops in Iraq, & Security In Baghdad
The map above shows in dark red the remaining areas where al Qaeda is still active in Iraq. The light areas indicate transit routes. This today from the Long War Journal:
Nearly one year to the day of the announcement of the "surge" of US forces to Iraq and the change in counterinsurgency plan, Iraqi and Coalition forces have shrunk al Qaeda's ability to conduct operations inside Iraq, a senior US commander said.
During a press briefing in Baghdad, Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, the Commander of Multinational Corps Iraq, said al Qaeda in Iraq has been ejected from its strongholds in the cities to the rural regions of Iraq.
From late 2006 into 2007, "Iraq was caught in a cycle of bloodshed under the dark cloud of al Qaeda," said Odierno. Al Qaeda was "entrenched in numerous urban safe havens across Iraq" until the surge forces launched Operation Phantom Thunder in June 2007.
Al Qaeda in Iraq's network has been significantly degraded, but is still a threat. Al Qaeda remains active in regions near Miqdadiyah, Mosul, Hawijah, Samarra, and southeast of Baghdad in the Arab Jabour region. "Although the group remains a dangerous threat, its capabilities have been diminished," said Odierno. "Al Qaeda has been pushed out of urban centers like Baghdad, Ramadi, Fallujah and Baqubah, and forced into isolated rural areas. Many of their top leaders have been eliminated, and finding qualified replacements is increasingly difficult for them." Multinational Forces Iraq also estimates it has significantly degraded al Qaeda's ability to fund operations by dismantling its financier networks and leaders.
Operation Phantom Phoenix, the current nationwide operation targeting al Qaeda's remaining safe havens, was launched on Jan. 8. Iraqi and US forces have captured or killed 121 al Qaeda fighters, wounded 14, and detained an additional 1023 suspects. Al Qaeda's leadership has been hit hard during the operation, with 92 high values targets either killed or captured.
Iraqi and US forces have also discovered 351 weapons caches and four tunnel complexes, Odierno said. Iraqi and US forces have also discovered three car bomb and improvised explosive device [IED] factories and 410 IEDs, including 18 car bombs and 25 homes rigged with explosives. Also found were "numerous torture chambers, an underground medical clinic, several closed schools, and a large foreign fighter camp with intricate tunnel complexes," said Odierno. . .
Read the entire post here. The USA Today uses its front page today to highlight the dramatic security gains in Iraq made with the counterinsurgency strategy:
About 75% of Baghdad's neighborhoods are now secure, a dramatic increase from 8% a year ago when President Bush ordered more troops to the capital, U.S. military figures show.
The military classifies 356 of Baghdad's 474 neighborhoods in the "control" or "retain" category of its four-tier security rating system, meaning enemy activity in those areas has been mostly eliminated and normal economic activity is resuming.
The data given by the military to USA TODAY provide one of the clearest snapshots yet of how security has improved in Baghdad since roughly 30,000 additional American troops arrived in Iraq last year.
U.S. commanders caution that the gains are still fragile, but at the moment U.S. and Iraqi forces "basically own the streets," said Col. Ricky Gibbs, a brigade commander in southern Baghdad.
The fight to control Baghdad is the centerpiece of the counterinsurgency strategy launched a year ago by Gen. David Petraeus, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq. The plan, popularly known as the "surge," seeks to reduce sectarian and other violence by moving troops off large bases and into dangerous neighborhoods to protect civilians.
The 310 neighborhoods in the "control" category are secure, but depend on U.S. and Iraqi military forces to maintain the peace. The 46 areas in the "retain" category have reached a level where Iraqi police and security forces can maintain order, a more permanent fix. The remaining areas have fewer security forces based there, though they are not necessarily violent.
In February 2007, when additional U.S. forces began arriving, only 37 Baghdad neighborhoods were in the "control" and "retain" categories.
The drop in violence in Baghdad and elsewhere helped avert a religious civil war, said Thomas Hammes, a retired Marine colonel and author.
. . . The U.S. military is wary of handing over security responsibility too quickly to Iraqi forces. "There are concerns we'll pull out of here too fast just because we have such great gains," Gibbs said by phone from Iraq.
. . . Although weakened and pushed out of Iraq's major cities, al-Qaeda remains focused on trying to dominate the capital, Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno, the No. 2 U.S. commander in Iraq, said Thursday. "Their long-term sights are still set on Baghdad," he said.
Read the entire article here.
Friday, December 21, 2007
DOD Report: Iraq’s Security & Economy Improving; Iran Continues Its Lethal Meddling Unabated
The quarterly DOD report, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, December 2007, has been released. It contains some good news, some troubling, particularly as to Iran and the Kurdish north. The report compliments and, in some instances, flushes out many of the problems identified by LTG Barry McCaffery in his own report. What follows is a brief summary of the DOD report:
1. Political Stability:
Security is substantially improved setting the conditions for improvements across the spectrum of government functions.
The most notable improvements in governance and the economy are at grass roots.
The Iraqi central government is grid-locked and not functioning to pass needed legislation.
2. National Reconciliation:
The central government has succeeded in passing a law authorizing pensions for former civil servants in the Saddam regime.
The “de-Baathification laws” has received first and second reading but has yet to be voted out of the central government.
Reconciliation is occurring at the grass roots level as Sunnis join the political process and Maliki has been reaching out to bring Sunnis into the political process, irrespective of specific legislation
3. Politics:
The Maliki government has been weakened by resignations in August of Sunni ministers and the earlier resignation of Sadrist ministers
Maliki has appointed technocrats unaligned with any political party to take the positions left by Sadrist ministers. Several of his nominations are being thwarted by manuevering in the parliament.
Hydrocarbon Laws are still stuck in parliament, but the government has been de facto collecting and distributing oil revenues to the provinces, and there has been no complaints to date that it has been doing so unfairly.
The Kurdistan Regional Government has passed their own hydrocarbon law in direct challenge to the Central government, which has declared the KRG laws illegal.
Constitutional review of all the “hard questions” left unanswered in the original Constitution is ongoing but showing no signs of resolution. Some of the biggest issues resolve around Kurdish aspirations for a separate government and “Article 140” issues – i.e., whether major oil-rich territories, including Mosul and Kirkuk, will come under the ambit of the KRG.
The UN is playing a positive role in resolving the Constitutional issues and, in particular, those associated with Article 140.
Provincial Elections – The UN is also playing a positive role in setting the stage for provincial elections. The law authorizing these elections is now with Maliki for review. The problems are lack of a census, security and logistics concerns, and large numbers of displaced persons are seen as problems that must be addressed.
4. Government Reform:
Ministry Reform – work with the various ministries by State Dept. and USAID are receiving mixed results
Provincial Reconstruction Teams – These are in every province and are doing exceptional work in helping to rebuild infrastructure, foster local governance and economic development.
Rule of Law – the Iraqi legal system of detention through trial is not yet up to speed. The number of judges in the country only recently went from 100 to 1200.
5. Transnational Issues:
Iran – Iran’s lethal meddling in Iraq is a significant destabilizing force and has in no way abated.
. . . There has been no identified decrease in Iranian training and funding of illegal Shi’a militias in Iraq. Tehran’s support for Shi’a militant groups who attack Coalition and Iraq forces remains a significant impediment to progress towards stabilization. The Iranian Islamic Revolu-tionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) provides many of the explosives and ammunition used by these groups, to include Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM). Although Sadr’s late August 2007 freeze on JAM activity is still in effect, some elements continue to attack Coalition forces with Iranian weapons. The GoI and the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq have made it clear to the Iranian Government that IRGC-QF’s lethal activities must cease.
Syrian Influence
Terrorists, foreign fighters, and former Iraqi regime elements continue to find sanctuary, border transit opportunities and logistical support in Syria. Syria is estimated to be the entry point for 90% of all foreign terrorists known in Iraq. Recent efforts by the Syrian Government to stem the flow of foreign terrorists and suicide bombers inside of Syria may have had some effect in decreasing the flow of extremists into Iraq. The Syrian Government participates in the Neighbors Process framework, having hosted both the inaugural Border Security Working group in August 2007 and the follow-up Border Security Working group in November 2007. While these are positive diplomatic steps, it is not clear that Syria has made a strategic decision to persistently and comprehensively deal with foreign terrorists. The Syrian Government must take additional measures to further reduce the flow of foreign terrorists transiting Syria into Iraq.
Tensions on the Border with Turkey
Turkey’s primary concerns regarding Iraq continue to be terrorism conducted by the Kurdistan Peoples Congress (KGK, formerly Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK)) from camps in northern Iraq, increased autonomy for the Kurdistan Regional Government from the central Iraqi Government and the final status of the oil rich city of Kirkuk. After the election of President Gul in Turkey and Prime Minister Maliki’s visit to Turkey, these governments signed a counter-terrorism cooperation agreement establishing a bilateral, interagency security commission to work towards curbing the actions of terrorist organizations, including the KGK and al Qaeda.
6. Economy:
Oil production now averages 2.28 million barrels per day and is increasing with improvement to security and infrastructure.
The economy is expanding at a healthy rate of 6.3%, but there are some significant problems that need to be addressed. Weak institutions, a poor business climate, limited access to capital, lack of essential services, poor technical skills and security issues remain obstacles to private sector-led growth.
Inflation is being brought under control. Year-to-date inflation as of October 2007 is 4.2%, compared to year-to-date inflation through October 2006 of 42.7% and 22.9% in 2005.
Unemployment and underemployment are estimated at 17.6% and 38.1%, respectively.
Agriculture, which employs 25% of Iraqi’s workforce, is being modernized with new technologies and the growth of private farms are at the heart of a program by USAID.
The key to resolving long-term employment issues in Iraq is private sector investment, but this requires a secure positive legal environment, access to capital and access to markets. Access to capital is increasing through U.S. and Iraqi central government programs, but Iraq’s legal system is still in a state of flux and market access still remains problematic.
7. Essential Services:
The news here is not improving but still poor.
Improving the availability of basic services such as electricity, water and healthcare to all Iraqis could help improve the public’s confidence in the government. During this reporting period, the GoI’s improvements in budget execution have translated into minimal advances in the delivery of essential services to the people of Iraq, mainly due to sectarian bias in targeting and execution of remedial programs. With the U.S. Government’s 2004 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction fund limited to deobligated funds authorized for reobligation and with significantly reduced appropriations for other reconstruction funding sources in 2008, Iraq will now be required to fund most future reconstruction projects.
Electricity – both demand and generation are up significantly.
Water and sewer – this area seems shaky at best
The Mosul Dam is a catastrophe waiting to happen. The Mosul Dam was built on an unstable rock foundation that is continuously dissolving, resulting in the formation of cavities and voids below the dam’s foundation that could cause catastrophic failure.
8. Security:
Security has improved dramatically. Violence is down by all measures to a level last seen in the summer of 2005.
In many parts of Iraq, the reopening of schools, clinics, markets and improvements in essential services all suggest improvements resulting from hard-fought security gains. These improvements coincide with the growing willingness of Sunni and Shi’a tribal leaders to cooperate with efforts to stabilize Iraq. . . .
Shi’a criminal activities have become growing threats to security and stability as the role of insurgents and AQI wanes.
“Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - Qods Force (IRGC-QF) efforts to train, equip, and fund Shi’a extremists also continue despite reported assurances to Prime Minister Maliki that Iran will cease lethal aid. Unequal adherence to Muqtada al-Sadr’s call for a Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) forces ceasefire has resulted in schisms within the Office of Martyr Sadr and JAM, particularly among JAM special groups, but has also opened the door for increased engagement with the Shi’a community.”
“AQI retains the capability to conduct spectacular and highly lethal terrorist attacks in parts of central and northern Iraq. This helps explain the rise in car bomb attacks in July 2007 that temporar-ily disrupted an overall downward trend from February through November 2007. AQI has also shifted to a murder and intimidation campaign directed at its former Sunni allies in an attempt to counter the growing anti-AQI tribal movement. This strategy has not been productive, however, and the tribal movement continues to spread beyond western Iraq to other provinces such as Salah ad Din and Diyala, where the CLC program has been important in reducing AQI’s capabilities.”
Part II of the report deals with the statistics governing the growth in training and operations of Iraqi military, police and other security forces.
You can find the entire DOD report here.
Wednesday, November 28, 2007
A Real Iraqi Benchmark
It's axiomatic that if you want to know the true morale of a military unit, you ask the private. So hats off today to the Washington Post for doing essentially that in attempting to gauge how Iraqis themselves feel about the security situation in their county. WaPo asked Baghdad's cab drivers:
Haider Abbas, a 36-year-old taxi driver, had only a few moments to answer what is often a life-or-death question in this city: Would he drive a passenger home?
The home, on that scorching afternoon last month, happened to be in Adhamiyah, a notoriously dangerous neighborhood where several cabbies had been gunned down. Abbas hadn't been there in two years. But the fare pleaded that it had become safer, so the cabbie reluctantly agreed to go.
"To tell you the truth, I thought I had just traded my life for 5,000 dinars," or $4, said Abbas, who was shocked when he arrived in the traffic-jammed streets of Adhamiyah to see shops open and people strolling in the road. "Then I suddenly realized that security really is returning to Baghdad."
In a city where few residents believe official statements on declining violence, whether from the U.S. military or the Iraqi government, some of the most reliable figures on security improvements can be found on the odometers of Baghdad's taxi drivers.
After years of sectarian warfare whittled down the list of neighborhoods where they could safely work, cabbies are once again crisscrossing nearly all of Baghdad. Every day they assess the constantly shifting boundaries between danger and security, hoping that life will return to normal, but mindful that this is still a city where anyone could be killed at any moment for no particular reason.
. . . According to interviews with a dozen cabbies across the city, however, the mood now is far more hopeful than at any point since the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra, which plunged the country to the brink of civil war.
Abu Ahmed, 32, who lives just outside the fortresslike Green Zone, said that after the attack on the Shiite shrine, about 65 miles north of Baghdad, he could no longer drive on roads leading out of the capital. Even within the city, he said, it would have been suicide to travel to neighborhoods such as Ghazaliyah, Sholeh and Amiriyah.
"If you took a passenger to those areas," he said, "there was a good chance you would never come back."
Today, Abu Ahmed said, he takes passengers to any neighborhood in the city and any region of the country except for volatile Diyala province. "But I never go onto the side streets in the dangerous neighborhoods -- just the main roads," he said. "And sometimes I still have fear in my heart."
The office of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki says the number of attacks in Baghdad has plummeted from 1,442 in April to 323 last month. But instead of official pronouncements, the cabbies rely more on friends, family members, fellow drivers and what some consider a sort of innate intuition about the roads.
"We call the taxi driver in Iraq a roving reporter," said Haider Abbas, the driver who was surprised by the bustle in Adhamiyah. "We know every single neighborhood, and we can read the minds and hearts of the people who hire us."
. . . Cabbies gripe that the improved security situation also makes it harder to eke out a living. A growing number of Baghdad residents now feel comfortable driving their own cars around the city, obviating the need for taxis. The skyrocketing cost of fuel has made it harder to make ends meet. And high unemployment has led many young men to plop a yellow "TAXI" sign atop their vehicles, adding to the competition for passengers.
For taxi drivers who used to take passengers from Baghdad to Syria, the increased sense of security -- combined with strict new visa rules in Syria -- has stopped the exodus to the border, ending their source of income. . . .
Read the entire story.
Thursday, November 15, 2007
Iraq at a Tipping Point
The Washington Post identifies the new problem facing Iraq now – capitalizing on the peace. A lot of WaPo readers might be confused on this one, given that WaPo told us all about the unwinnable civil war in its front page stories, then went through a period of near news blackout, before now coming out with stories that have, as their underlying premise, that Iran is experiencing peace. The confusion of such readers is certainly understandable. This today:
Senior military commanders here now portray the intransigence of Iraq's Shiite-dominated government as the key threat facing the U.S. effort in Iraq, rather than al Qaeda terrorists, Sunni insurgents or Iranian-backed militias.
In more than a dozen interviews, U.S. Military officials expressed growing concern over the Iraqi government's failure to capitalize on sharp declines in attacks against U.S. troops and Iraqi civilians. A window of opportunity has opened for the government to reach out to its former foes, said Army Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, the commander of day-to-day U.S. military operations in Iraq, but "it's unclear how long that window is going to be open."
Read the entire article. The new Dem narrative is that the Iraqi politics are not working, and therefore we should declare defeat while we still can. This particular WaPo article reinforces that position, but it is also valid. It is not a call to retreat, rather it is the identification of a tipping point. And now is when we need Democrats and Republicans to be doing their utmost to influence events on the ground in Iraq, as money and programs become more important than the military at the tipping point. That should be the President’s message when he vetoes the next Reid-Pelosi-Murtha legislative attempt at declaring defeat.
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