. . . Read the entire survey here. When this surfaced several days ago, Obama disclaimed any knowledge of the answers on the survey. He stated that his staff had acted on his behalf. Yet now we find out he was interviewed by the Independent Voters of Illinois — Independent Precinct Organization on the survey the day after it was submitted and that he then submitted an amended version (linked above) with his hand written notes in the margins. His response when approached with that information is incredibly lawyerly - even the hand written notes "do not prove" that he "completed, approved — or even read — the . . . questionnaire." He is sounding more like Slick Willie by the moment. Read the whole story at the Politico. 
Not long ago, Obama asked America to believe that he sat in the pews of Trinity United Church of Christ with his family for twenty years, yet never once heard the vile racism and anti-Americanism spewed by Rev. Wright. And now he asks us to make a similar blind leap of faith as regards a 1996 survey ascribing to Obama very left positions.
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In 1996, Obama was sent a survey to complete by a political organization, Independent Voters of Illinois — Independent Precinct Organization, as regards his run for the Illinois State Senate. The answers portray a candidate running hard to the left on every issue. For example:
Finance
. . .
7 . Do you support vouchers or other means of public funding for private or parochial
schools? No.
. . .
Health & Human Services
. . .
24. Do you support:
a. Medicaid funding for abortions? Yes.
b. insurance coverage of abortions for state employees? Yes.
c. parental consent/notification for minors seeking abortions? Depends on how
young - possibly for extremely young teens, i.e. 12 or 13 year olds.
d. any other restrictions on abortions. No.
. . .
Criminal Justice
33. Do You support:
a. admissibility of illegally obtained evidence? No.
b. electronic eavesdropping? No.
c. police radar? Yes, unless it is abused.
. . .
e. state censorship of the arts? No
34. Do you support:
a. capital punishment? No.
b. criminal prosecution ofjuveniles as adults? No.
c. mandatory sentencing? No
d. work release, home monitoring, other alternatives entencing? Yes.
35. Do you support state legislation to:
a. ban the manufacture, sale and possession of handguns? Yes.
b. ban assault weapons? Yes.
c. mandatory waiting periods and background checks? Yes . . .
Unlike Obama's 20 year association with Rev. Wright, this is one Obama could well argue away on the basis of the fact that he has had more than a decade to ponder these issues. But Obama instead is asking us to believe what would seem, on the face of these facts, to be an impossibility.
Two months ago, Obama was a tabula rosa and the question was what is this man's character. We know much more today. The question now is whether America is ready to willingly suspend disbelief and pull the lever for Obama anyway.
Monday, March 31, 2008
Survey Says?
Taheri Sees An Iranian Hand In Basra
It was bound to happen and may well be happening right now: a war between the Islamic Republic in Iran and the new Iraq. Read the entire article.
Iranian columnist Amir Taheri opines on the influence in Basra and their extensive support for the rebels in Basra.
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This today from Amir Taheri writing in the NY Post:
Much of the media have portrayed the latest battles for Basra, and attempts by armed groups to undermine the recently improved security in Baghdad, as a power struggle among rival Shiite factions.
In this analysis, three Shiite factions - the Fadila (Virtue), the Dawa (The Call) and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq - that support Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's coalition government are trying to disarm the remnants of the Mahdi Army of the elusive mullah Muqtada Sadr.
But that explanation has several problems.
To start with, it is the regular Iraqi army - not any Shiite armed faction - that is doing the fighting in Basra. To underline that point, Maliki went to Basra to supervise operations personally.
And the kind of fighting witnessed in Basra is different from the usual militia operations.
This is a war of position, with units acting as detachments of a regular army trying to deny the Iraqi government forces control of specific territories. The fighters defying the Iraqi army may be Iraqi irregulars, even nominal members of the Mahdi Army - but those leading them are acting as textbook regular-army commanders.
At least some of the officers in charge of the rebel units may be seconded from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as part of a broader plan to control the Basra region, and thus the lifeline of the Iraqi economy.
. . . The type of weapons used in both Basra and Baghdad also suggests at least some outside involvement. The rebels in Basra are using a large number of armored vehicles to move men and materiel around - something no other Shiite militia, and certainly not the Mahdi Army, had ever done. They're also using heavy artillery, mobile rocket launchers and a sophisticated communications system unavailable to militias.
Elements of the Mahdi Army may provide the visible face of the rebellion, but there is no evidence that the militia (supposing it even still exists as an organized force) is the sole star of this show.
Sadr, after all, has extended the ceasefire he declared six months ago - and, in a recent letter, admitted that he had failed to "liberate" Iraq and create an "Islamic society." Last week, he issued another statement calling for a political settlement in Basra - a far cry from the bellicose noises made by these rebels with the help of Iranian state-owned media.
Spending most of his time in Iran, Sadr is now preparing to claim a theological position within the Shiite hierarchy - an ambition that cannot be realized through gunfights in the streets of Basra and Baghdad.
One other notable fact: Whoever is running the show on the rebel side has been able to devise a battle plan that included simultaneous attacks along a north-south axis that includes Baghdad, al-Amarah and Basra. No other Iraqi militia group, Shiite or Sunni, has had the resources to stage such a campaign before.
The rebels are trying to retain areas that connect Basra, a vast urban sprawl, to the Shatt al-Arab, an estuary that forms part of the border between Iran and Iraq. If the Iraqi government is kept out of these areas, Iran would control both banks of the strategically vital waterway. Iran has already occupied several islands in the waterway facing Basra, using them as advance observation posts.
. . . Visitors to Basra since Saddam's fall have often been struck by the massive "Iranian" presence there. Much of this consists of large numbers of Iraqi Shiites, known as mua'aweddin (returnees), who have come home after years of exile in Iran. There are also those who hold both Iranian and Iraqi nationality. Known as muzdawajun (double nationals), they are often accused of being loyal to Shiism rather than any secular concept as a nation state.
Why has Basra, a relatively calm place for the last five years, heated up now?
One reason may be the British decision last year to withdraw from the city. This left a vacuum that the new Iraqi army and police were unable to fill immediately. Iran may have seized the opportunity to try to grab as much influence and presence as it could - both via Shiite militias (including the Mahdi Army) that it has financed for years and by sending large numbers of operatives across the border.
. . . Both sides may simply be interested in testing the waters at this stage. But the war over who will shape the future of Iraq, indeed of the Middle East as a whole, is in its early stages.
Sadr Criticizes Iran, the ISCI Meets Iran, & Maliki Continues The Offensive
One day after Muqtada al Sadr, the leader of the Mahdi Army, called for his fighters to abandon combat, the fighting in Basrah has come to a near-halt and the Iraqi security forces are patrolling the streets. While Sadr spokesman said the Iraqi government agreed to Sadr's terms for the ceasefire, Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki has said the security forces will continue operations in Basrah in the south. Meanwhile, the Mahdi Army took heavy casualties in Basrah, Nasiriyah, Babil, and Baghdad over the weekend, despite Sadr's call for the end of fighting. Read the entire article, there is much more. Feeling the heat of the recent offensive against his forces around Iraq, Muqtada Al Sadr, who has long been suspected of receiving support from the Iranian government, decided to publicly condemn the Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Read the entire article. The more the situation in Iraq clarifies, the murkier it becomes. That said, this appears mostly positive from the U.S. standpoint.
To call Iraqi politics byzantine is an oversimplification. Maliki's Iraqi government appears the clear winner at this point, as Sadr has backed down in Basra and elsewhere in Iraq. This matter is far from over as Maliki continues to demand that the militias in Basra hand over their weapons and appears ready to force the issue. And now Sadr has lashed out at Iranian intervention in Iraq.
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PM Maliki welcomed the unilateral ceasefire called by Sadr (see here) and there is some indication that he is considering or has agreed to calls for at least a partial amnesty of Mahdi Army members currently being held by the government. Nonetheless, Maliki is moving more forces into Basra and fully intends to disarm the militias in Basra to the extent possible. Further, members of the rival Shia party, ISCI, met with the head of Iran's Qods force to ask them to stop supplying Sadr's Mahdi militia. This from Bill Rogio at the Long War Journal:
Maliki was clear that operations would continue in the South. "The armed groups who refuse al Sadr's announcement and the pardon we offered will be targets, especially those in possession of heavy weapons," Maliki said, referring to the 10 day amnesty period for militias to turn in heavy and medium weapons. "Security operations in Basra will continue to stop all the terrorist and criminal activities along with the organized gangs targeting people."
The Iraqi military said it was moving in more forces into the south after admitting it was surprised by the level of resistance encountered in Basrah. "Fresh military reinforcements were sent to Basra to start clearing a number of Basra districts of wanted criminals and gunmen taking up arms," said Brigadier General Abdel Aziz al Ubaidi, the operations chief for the Ministry of Defense. "Preparations for fresh operations have been made to conduct raids and clearance operations in Basra... the military operations would continue to restore security in Basra."
The reasons behind Sadr's call for a cessation in fighting remain unknown, but reports indicate the Mahdi Army was having a difficult time sustaining its operations and has taken heavy casualties. "Whatever gains [the Mahdi Army] has made in the field [in Basrah], they were running short of ammunition, food, and water," an anonymous US military officer serving in South told The Long War Journal. "In short [the Mahdi Army] had no ability to sustain the effort.
TIME's sources in Basrah paint a similar picture. "There has been a large-scale retreat of the Mahdi Army in the oil-rich Iraqi port city because of low morale and because ammunition is low due to the closure of the Iranian border," the magazine reported.
McClatchy Newspapers indicated a member of the Maliki's Dawa party and the leader of the Badr Organization, the military wing of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, traveled to Qom, Iran to lobby Qods Forces officers to get Sadr to halt the fighting. The trip "had two aims, lawmakers said: to ask Sadr to stand down his militia and to ask Iranian officials to stop supplying weapons to Shiite militants in Iraq." The two men met with Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani, the commander of Iran’s Qods Force, the foreign special operations branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps.
The Mahdi Army has also taken high casualties since the fighting began on March 25. According to an unofficial tally of the open source reporting from the US and Iraqi media and Multinational Forces Iraq, 571 Mahdi Army fighters have been killed, 881 have been wounded, 490 have been captured, and 30 have surrendered over the course of seven days of fighting. . . .
The LWJ does not mention the Iranian response to the ISCI meeting, but it must have been positive as it appears that Sadr has now publicly denounced Iran. This from Meir Javedanfar at Pajamas Media:
His verbal attack was an unprecedented turn of events for the young Shiite, who for the last year has been traveling to Iran on several occasions to complete his theological studies in order to become an Ayatollah himself. Western security sources have long suspected that these trips have also been used in order to receive financial assistance from Iran, and to coordinate the Mahdi army’s military and political strategy with the leadership in Tehran.
There are important reasons behind his offensive against Khameini.
Primarily, Al Sadr is furious at the fact that members of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), have joined the Iraqi army’s offensive against his forces in important areas such as Baghdad and Basra.
ISCI, which is led by Ayatollah Abdul Aziz al-Hakim has the support of middle and upper class Shiites in Iraq, while Al Sadr’s Mahdi army has the backing of poor Shiites. Al Sadr is not only upset because ISCI has decided to turn its guns against fellow Shiites, but also at the fact that ISCI has been the recipient of a larger amount of aid from Tehran than his organization. This may lead Al Sadr to believe that ISCI has embarked on this adventure, with Tehran’s blessing. This belief would explain why, during his controversial interview with Al Jazeera on Saturday night, Al Sadr condemned what he called “Iranian intervention in Iraq’s security and politics.”
Presumably, his hope is that by condemning and distancing himself Tehran, he could get more local grass root support inside Iraq; something which he could use later on in order to stage a political and military comeback.
While its too early to declare victory and celebrate, nevertheless, Al Sadr’s recent move can be considered as an achievement for the US, in its ongoing struggle with Tehran over influence in Iraq.
Until now, Tehran has been masterfully controlling both Al Sadr and ISCI allies as a tool to increase its influence. Whether or not Washington sanctioned Maliki’s recent operations against the Mahdi army; the rift created between Iraq’s two major Shiite organizations is making Iran’s Iraqi adventure more cumbersome at least in the immediate future.
. . . For now, Washington and Al Maliki’s government must use the recent military setbacks for Al Sadr as an opportunity to reach out to poor Iraqis who form the basis of Al Sadr’s support. Unless economic assistance is provided to improve their lives, and security, Tehran could step in. . . .
It would not be the first time that Tehran has supported two opposing sides in a conflict, and it would not be the last either.
Sunday, March 30, 2008
Well, That Was Quick
Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr Sunday ordered his armed militia to get off the streets in Basra and to cooperate with the government to restore security. In exchange, he asked the government to release prisoners and declare an amnesty. Read the entire article. Maliki would be as foolish to stop now as the U.S. was in allowing Sadr to survive in Najaf in 2004. Unfortunately, Sadr is somewhere in Iran, far from coalition crosshairs at the moment. None-the-less, Maliki needs to disarm Sadr's militia in Basra and establish government control. Now is not the time to blink.
No sooner had I written below that al Sadr would not push an uprising in Iraq than he should wave the unofficial French flag and sue Maliki for peace.
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Perhaps our MSM's reports of an Iraqi Army quagmire in Basra were a trifle premature. The offensive in Basra and the response to Sadrist uprisings in Baghdad have resulted in several hundred Mahdi Army casualties. And now Sadr has ordered his militia off the streets and sued for a cease fire. This from the Washington Post:
The Iraqi government quickly welcomed the comments as a move toward restoring calm.
A spokesman for the government, Ali al-Dabbagh, said on state-run Iraqi television that the government considered Sadr's statement a "positive step."
He repeated government assertions that the military operations in Basra were not aimed at Sadr's followers. "We expect all those who claim that they are followers of the Sadr movement to heed this call and those who do not shall be treated as outlaws and criminals."
In his statement, Sadr made the offer in exchange for the government stopping "random, illegal raids and arrests." He also called on the government to declare a general amnesty and to release prisoners taken during the fighting, especially his followers.
Sadr's statement stopped short of directing fighters to turn over weapons to Iraqi security forces, which has been a key demand of the government.
The move came after Sadr over the weekend told his supporters to ignore the government's orders to disarm.
. . . Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who launched the offensive Monday against armed groups, vowed "to stand up to these gangs in every inch of Iraq."
Maliki denied accusations that the Iraqi government was trying to undermine political rivals before provincial elections this year. "We came to Basra to fight the outlaws and the smugglers, not to confront a party or a political group, because we do not seek political confrontation," he said.
. . . Sadr, speaking in a television interview aired Saturday, said the Iraqi government "is far from the people and is dealing with them in a dictatorship way." He also said his militia's "strategic objective" was "the liberation of Iraq from the occupier."
In the interview, Sadr called for a demonstration April 9 against the U.S. occupation of Iraq. He also rejected accusations that he was being supported by Iran, saying, "I am an independent in that I am not a political or military extension to Iran or any others." . . .
Analyzing & Spinning The Offensive in Basra
The most intense fighting in Iraq in months had the ring of the familiar. Another battle against followers of a rebel Shiite cleric. Fighting in the south that spread to other cities.
The Basra Offensive will not reignite major hostilities in Iraq and to call the Iraqi Army "bogged down" in Basra just a few days into the Iraqi government's offensive to retake the city is ridiculous.
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Much of the MSM is trying to shoehorn the Iraqi offensive against Sadr - and its spillover outside Basra - into its anti-war meme that Iraq is a quagmire, etc. To the contrary, it is absolutely necessary both to take control of Iraq's major port city and to exert control over their country. The offensive in Basra is necessary to bring peace to the country, and it is doubtful that Sadr will long risk open warfare again with the U.S.
Sadr, if you will recall, made a powerplay in 2004, seeking to defeat the U.S. in an uprising against U.S. forces that ended with the decimation of his Mahdi Army in Najaf in 2004. Sadr reconstituted a militia with support from Iran. In 2006, following al Qaeda in Iraq's bombing of the Mosque of the Golden Dome, Sadr’s forces, heavilly supported by Iran, engaged in a brutal campaign against Sunnis that led Iraq to the brink of civil war and gave a large part of the impetus for the surge. Indeed, it is clear that Iran is attempting to set up Sadr's Mahdi militia along the lines of Hezbollah and duplicate Iran's control of Iraq much as they control Lebanon.
Fifteen months ago, our MSM was speculating that Maliki would not authorize any action against Shia militias - and in particular Sadr's miitias - that were almost as problematic as al Qaeda. PM Maliki was portrayed as beholden to Sadr and, indeed, he had protected Sadr's militia from U.S. offensives. The NYT continued to harp on that meme long after it became apparent that Maliki had broken with Sadr and had come to view Sadr as a major obstacle towards governing Iraq.
Sadr, for his part, pulled back from any direct confrontation with U.S. forces during the surge. He has, however, made a bid for control of several cities in the south, with the most important being Basra. The British never exerted real control over the city, and their withdraw led to a complete vaccum that the various Shia militias attempted to fill. This was much more along the lines of gangland warfare to control the crime in 1920's Chicago than anything else - it was a campaign of assassinations and intimidation with the prize being control of Iraq's major port and the truckloads of cash that could be skimmed from the theft and blackmarket sales of oil. A recent NYT article provides an excellent and thorough review of the situation in Basra as of February of this year.
Now you have much of the MSM attempting to claim that the battle in Basra has returned Iraq back to open warfare and that, because Iraqi forces have not yet cleared the city of Basra five days after the offensive began, the offensive in Basra has stalled and the Iraqi military is losing. Both are ridiculous claims.
As to the latter, war is not a video game where the fighing ends in an hour. Offensives to force an enemy from a city - MOUT operations - are arguably the most difficult and time consuming of all military operations. In World War II, MOUT operations ate up entire divisions over a period of months. In Vietnam, during the TET offensive, it took nearly thirty days to drive the NVA out of Hue. Proclaiming anything about the Basra offensive after five days shows more than anything that our current crop of journalists lack any military experience and any understanding of military history.
As to the former claim, that the offensive in Basra will ignite much further unrest in Iraq, that ignores the necessity of establishing central government control over Basra and it mispercieves the potential ramifications. This is not 2004 and Sadr is no longer viewed as a bulwark against Sunnis nor a necessity for delivery of services. He does not enjoy large scale support throughout the Shia population. A NYT "news analysis" today, though rife with speculation, nonetheless explains the situation adequately:
But as the week came to a close, it was clear that the current fighting in the southern city of Basra and the clashes in Baghdad had some fundamental differences from the battles in Najaf and Baghdad that plagued the American military in 2004.
For starters, the Shiite rebels are fighting mainly Iraqi soldiers, rather than Americans. Their leader, Moktada al-Sadr, is not defending against attacks from a redoubt inside the country’s most sacred shrine, but is issuing edicts with a tarnished reputation from an undisclosed location, possibly outside the country. And Iraq’s prime minister, a Shiite whom Americans had all but despaired would ever act against militias of his own sect, is taking them on fiercely.
The differences represent a shift in the war, whose early years were punctuated by uprisings against Americans by a vast, devoted group of Mr. Sadr’s followers, who were largely respected by Shiites. As their tactics veered into protection rackets, oil smuggling and other scams, Mr. Sadr’s followers too began to resemble mafia toughs more than religious warriors, splintering and forming their own gangs and networks, many beyond Mr. Sadr’s direct control.
Even some Sadrists seemed to understand the toll their methods were taking on their popular appeal, which has become increasingly important as provincial elections draw near.
. . . Basra residents were groaning under daily assassinations and kidnappings and a wholesale policy of intimidation. By the time the fighting started in Basra on Tuesday, that discontent had spread to a large swath of Iraqi society — including some of its largely Shiite army and police. The shift opened up a space for Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki to move against the Mahdi Army. And while it is far from clear that his effort will succeed — reports of soldier and police surrenders abound — the mere fact that he is trying is new.
. . . [A] strong note of support for Mr. Maliki’s actions could be heard in the words of some Iraqis interviewed this week, who cast his success as crucial to the future of their country.
“If Mahdi Army wins this war, that means Iraqi will be destroyed,” said a Shiite businessman from Baghdad. “That means Moktada will be president and it will be a stick in the eye of the Americans. It will be a religious country, an extreme country.”
The Mahdi Army’s image is considerably changed from 2004, when its members were seen as Shiite Robin Hoods, protecting undefended neighborhoods, helping distribute cooking gas, and standing up to what many Shiites saw as an act of American aggression, when tanks rolled into Sadr City, a Shiite neighborhood in Baghdad. But during th