Crediting the Brits' SAS

Man for man and below the field officer grade, there is no doubt that the British military is and has always been every bit as fine a fighting force as there is on this world today. Thus it is no surprise to hear General David Petraeus sing the praises of Britain's SAS and the tremendous contribution they have made to securing Iraq.
___________________________________________________________

This from the Telegraph:

British special forces had played an "immense" role in taking out terrorist bomb-making cells and insurgent leaders over the last five years, said Gen David Petraeus.

In one incident the SAS blended into the heavy Baghdad traffic by hiring a pink pick-up truck and removing their military clothing to capture a terrorist, the general said.

"They have helped immensely in the Baghdad area, in particular, to take down the al-Qaeda car bomb networks and other al-Qaeda operations in Iraq's capital city, so they have done a phenomenal job in that regard," he said.

. . . The SAS has been operating from Baghdad since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 carrying out strike operations against insurgents.

Very little is known about the success of their missions but Gen Petraeus indicated yesterday that working alongside their American colleagues in Delta Force the British had had a significant impact in defeating Al Qa'eda in Iraq.

The SAS had played a key part in defeating a network of car bombers in Baghdad that had brought devastation to the capital.

Quoting the Special Air Service motto "Who Dares Wins" the general said there had been numerous successes on many "very important operations".

"They have exceptional initiative, exceptional skill, exceptional courage and, I think, exceptional savvy. I can't say enough about how impressive they are in thinking on their feet," said Gen Petraeus, the main architect of "surge" strategy that has seen a substantial decrease in violence with the influx of extra American troops.

. . . SAS snipers have been extremely successful shooting dead suicide bombers about to detonate their devices and troopers have called in clinical air strikes to kill terror chiefs known as "high value targets".

Officers have said Baghdad is one of the "most challenging" environments the unit has ever faced in the world.

It is thought the troops have killed hundreds of insurgents both in Baghdad and when they have been called down to Basra to assist regular British troops.

But British special forces have paid a high price for their success in Iraq with 10 killed and scores seriously wounded, with some losing limbs.

Among the biggest cause of casualties has been from abseiling out of helicopters while carrying more than 100lbs of equipment. The troops now have a designated physiotherapist.

Last month a coroner allowed the naming of Tpr Lee Fitzsimmons and Sgt John Battersby who were killed when their RAF Puma helicopter crashed near the Baghdad suburb of Salman Pak.

Another SAS soldier Nick Brown died during a firefight with Shia fighters in Baghdad on 26 March when he was part of a team sent in to arrest a militia commander.

American commanders have also said SAS troops have been used to hunt for the five British hostage who were seized from a Finance Ministry building in Baghdad in May last year.

Read the entire article.

As an aside, as to Britain's political and military leadership, I have long been critical. It has been uneven to say the least dating all the way back to the appointment of Douglas Haig to the rank of Field Marshal a century ago - a man whose incompetence as a commander led to British deaths in WWI on a scale unseen in history. Most recently, the UK should have relieved the Commander of the HMS Cornwall within days of the Iranian kidnapping of 15 Marines and sailors (he was finally just relieved of command, over a year after the fact). Their wartime Rules of Engagement that allowed that kidnapping to occur were an atrocity. The British military failed in Basra - but not because of the British soldiers. The deal British military intelligence cut with Sadr in Basra was craven and foolish. The upper echelons of Britain's military leadership do not have the degree of quality one uniformly finds in Britain's lower and enlisted ranks. And only a few units in the world can stand on the same footing with the SAS.

Read More...

Summary only...

Iraq, A Broken Clock & The NYT

The difference between a broken clock and the NYT agenda journalism on Iraq over the past five years has been that the broken clock has been accurate at least twice a day. That said, the quality of the NYT Iraq reporting has just met with a sudden and amazing improvement. For the first time in the past five years, the NYT manages to get two major points right about Iraq in the same article. The NYT hits the nail on the head at the beginning of their article Saturday, "Big Gains for Iraq Security, but Questions Linger:"

Violence in all of Iraq is the lowest since March 2004. The two largest cities, Baghdad and Basra, are calmer than they have been for years. The third largest, Mosul, is in the midst of a major security operation. On Thursday, Iraqi forces swept unopposed through the southern city of Amara, which has been controlled by Shiite militias. There is a sense that Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki’s government has more political traction than any of its predecessors.

And at the conclusion of their article, the NYT finishes by hitting the nail on the head a second time, discussing that the security gains are fragile and Iraq needs U.S. forces for protection against internal and external foes if it is to survive (the foes go unnamed, as apparently acknowledging the Iranian's acts of war is still a bit too much reality for NYT to take on at the moment).
________________________________________________________

This from the NYT, following the lead paragraph quoted above:

For Hatem al-Bachary, a Basra businessman, the turnabout has been “a miracle,” the first tentative signs of a normal life.

“I don’t think the militias have disappeared, and maybe there are sleeper cells which will try to revive themselves again,” he said. “But the first time they try to come back they will have to show themselves, and the government, army and police are doing very well.”

While the increase in American troops and their support behind the scenes in the recent operations has helped tamp down the violence, there are signs that both the Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi government are making strides. There are simply more Iraqi troops for the government to deploy, partly because fewer are needed to fight the Sunni insurgents, who have defected to the Sunni Awakening movement. They are paid to keep the peace.

Pehaps the least covered aspect of the Iraq War has been the surge in Iraqi forces, both in numbers and training. We have heard of a few Iraqi units that have faded under fire, but given that we are building Iraqi forces from scratch, the degree at which they are progressing is heartening indeed. This is not just picking up the pieces of the old Soviet model, top down military that Iraq had under Sadaam. The U.S. military model is competely new to Iraq. It relies heavily on highly professional junior leaders who are expected to display judgment and initiative - and they are grown over years. Later in its article, the NYT to its credit, discusses in detail the tremendous growth in the Iraqi forces.

That said, NYT just can't untangle themselves from the far left meme that Anbar is only quiet because we have bribed the Anbar Sunnis. The Anbar Sunni Awakening started of its own accord as a push back to the animalistic brutality and draconian treatment at the hands of al Qaeda. True, thankfully, the U.S. has exploited it, but to suggest, as the NYT does, that bribery is at the heart of the pacification of Anbar is dissembling.

To continue with the NYT article:

Mr. Maliki’s moves against Shiite militias have built some trust with wary Sunnis, offering the potential for political reconciliation. High oil prices are filling Iraqi government coffers. But even these successes contain the seeds of vulnerability. The government victories in Basra, Sadr City and Amara were essentially negotiated, so the militias are lying low but undefeated and seething with resentment.

This is the NYT back in its old, highly disingenuous form. Sadr's forces resisted in Basra, supported by Iran, and they suffered exceptionally high casualties over six days of fighting before they surrendered. Much the same thing happened in Sadr City, where Sadr waved the white flag after suffering high casualties and with a full scale offensive into Sadr City literally days away. To describe these actions as simple negotiations and to call the Sadrists undefeated is ridiulous. Iran's proxy Sadr has suffered a devestating series of reverses and their popularity is at its nadir. Sadr just demobilized the Mahdi Army. Is the NYT paying any attention at all?

. . . Attacks like the bombing that killed 63 people in Baghdad’s Huriya neighborhood on Tuesday showed that opponents can continue to inflict carnage.

This too is quite troubling. That bombing was carried out by an Iranian proxy against Shi'ites. That was not an "opponent" doing the bombing, that was an act of war carried out at the behest of a foreign power that wants the U.S. out and Iraq "Lebanized." Unfortunately, the NYT studiously ignores the Iranian threat and acts of war throughout its otherwise heartening article.

Perhaps most worrisome, more than five years after the American invasion, which knocked Mr. Hussein from power but set off great chaos, Iraq still lacks the formal rules to divide the power and spoils of an oil-rich nation among ethnic, religious and tribal groups and unite them under one stable idea of Iraq. The improvements are fragile.

A year ago, there were the eighteen benchmarks that the NYT trumpeted to show that Iraq was a failed state incapable of governing itself. Today, of those benchmarks, the only substantive one remaining is the oil law. To cite to the oil law while studiously ignoring all of the other progress is both disingenuous and a red herring.

What the NYT fails to say is that no one claims that the oil wealth flowing to the central government is not being shared and shared fairly. The system is not broken because of the lack of an oil law. There is no blood being spilled over the sharing of oil wealth. As to the "5 year" remark, the NYT fails to note that democratic government in Iraq just turned two years old. The Iraqis are still arguing over the precise contours of how an oil law should be set up, true, but their time frame to get legislation in place on this issue is hardly excessive, particularly when compared to our own government's years of inability to pass laws on such things as entitlement reforms.

That said, the biggest problems the Iraqi government faces is getting basic government services out to the people. This is the non-warfare part of supporting Iraq that goes unreported in our news but that is equally as important to long term success as the security gains. The LWJ did an exceptional article on this topic several months ago that is well worth the read. In essence, the problem is not sectarianism, but a highly inefficient bureacracratic system that is riddled with far too much corruption. The Iraqi government and the U.S. are making much headway in streamlining the system and rooting out the corruption, but the challenges are immense and the clock is ticking.

. . . The most obvious but often overlooked reason for the recent military success has been an increase in the number of trained Iraqi troops.

The quality of the recruits and leadership has often been poor, even in recent months. In Baghdad’s Sadr City, one Iraqi company abandoned its position in April, forcing American and Iraqi commanders to fill the gap with hastily summoned reinforcements. In Basra, more than 1,000 recently qualified soldiers deserted rather than obey orders to fight against Mr. Sadr’s Mahdi Army. One senior Iraqi government official conceded that the deserters simply “felt that the other side was too strong.”

But sheer numbers have helped to overcome the shortcomings. After the embarrassing setback in Basra, Mr. Maliki was able to pull units from elsewhere to provide reinforcements and saturate the city with checkpoints and patrols, restoring a measure of order after years of domination by Islamist militias and oil-smuggling mafias.

This continuing Basra narrative of painting it as an Iraqi Army failure because they did not blow through unexpectedly strong resistance in six days of attacking against defenders occupying urban terrain is just utterly ridiculous. As is the NYT's continued emphasis of a few military units that did not perform to standard under fire. That was a small part of the forces sent into Basra. And some green units failing under fire is as old as the military itself. For example, the word "decimate" comes from the ancient world's finist military, the Romans, who inflicted a decimation - the ritual slaughter of every tenth soldier - upon legions or cohorts that broke under battle. Suggesting that Iraq's newly minted military is somehow weak because of the actions of a few units under combat likewise shows that, while the NYT may understand agenda journalism, their understanding of the military and history is sorely lacking.

But the government’s successes in Basra and Sadr City were not so much victories as heavy fighting followed by truces that allowed the militias to melt away with their weapons. “We may have wasted an opportunity in Basra to kill those that needed to be killed,” said one American defense official, who would speak candidly about the issue only if he was granted anonymity.

Let's see, hundreds of Sadrists killed, hundreds of criminals captured, virtually all of Iraq now under government control, the Iranians exposed, Sadr exposed, the Sadrist trend isolated in the Parliament, and the Mahdi Army demobolized. If that does not sound like victories to the NYT, they need to radically up their meds. The goal never has been complete destruction of the Sadrists, its been to split off the majority from the trained and paid Iranian proxies. With virtually all of Iraq in government hands, the ability of any militia to operate is severely circumscribed. The government does not have to destroy the militias in cataclysmic battles to win. Just as al Qaedea hemmoraged people and support as the tide turned against it, so too is that happening Sadr and his militia.

I wont' bother to fisk most of the rest. The NYT spends several paragraphs reporting quite literally the wildest speculations it can find from various individuals who state things such as that Maliki is an agent of Iran, etc. Compare that to the reporting from ABC not long ago and from the Atlantic Monthly where both describe Malik's popularity as being at its zenith across all religious and ethnic lines in Iraq. No need to discuss that, though, when you can get a money quote from someone with an axe to grind or a conpiracy theory dreamed up below their tin foil hat. But when we finally get to the end, the NYT, to their credit, hits the nail on the head a second time.

Reversible Gains

The anti-government and anti-occupation forces have also stumbled. The Islamist Sunni insurgents alienated many Iraqis with a trail of blood and bans on alcohol and smoking. And as attacks on Shiite areas by Sunni insurgents dropped, Shiites who had looked to the Mahdi Army for self-defense were less willing to put up with abuses.

. . . Despite their newfound confidence, some senior Iraqi officials close to Mr. Maliki said that without an American military safety net they are vulnerable to threats from outside and inside their borders. One important but less-noticed element of the security negotiations has been Iraq’s effort to extract an American pledge to defend the government against foreign or domestic aggression. Mr. Adeeb, the top Maliki adviser, said officials wanted the Americans to protect the Iraqi government against anything the government viewed as a threat — not just what the Americans saw as a threat.

“Our political system is weak, the terrorists and former regime members are sparing no effort to overthrow the system, and neighboring countries have their own ambitions,” Mr. Adeeb said. “Our army is not qualified to defend Iraq yet.”

Amen. Which is why a precipitous withdrawal from Iraq as Obama has articluated is just incredibly wrong-headed and comes with existential implications for all the gains made in Iraq and for the national security threats we face from the mad mullahs in Iran. When even the hyperpartisan NYT is coming around to that conclusion, one wonders if the fantasy based folks on the far left will begin to see the light. Or perhaps this is just laying the groundwork for the mother of all flip flops from Obama once he has a chance to visit Iraq and consult with our military commanders - General Pew and Admiral Rasmussen in particular.

At any rate, my hats off to the NYT. They have raised their level of reporting on Iraq to the level of a broken clock. This is a heartening development indeed.

Read More...

Summary only...

Pelosi Crosses The Line

The latest from the train wreck that is our House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi:

"The surge didn’t accomplish its goal. And some of the success of the surge is . . . [because of] the goodwill of the Iranians."

So the question is, is she traitorous or simply insane?
_______________________________________________________

Nancy Pelosi gave an interview with the SF Chronicle yesterday. When asked about what she observed in Iraq during her May 17 visit, she replied:

Well, the purpose of the surge was to provide a secure space, a time for the political change to occur to accomplish the reconciliation. That didn’t happen. Whatever the military success, and progress that may have been made, the surge didn’t accomplish its goal. And some of the success of the surge is that the goodwill of the Iranians-they decided in Basra when the fighting would end, they negotiated that cessation of hostilities-the Iranians.

As to reconciliation, Ms. Pelosi's narrative is ridiculous. Even our own perfidious MSM is now acknowledging both the great strides towards reconciliation that Iraq has made and the fact that the Iraqis are rallying around Maliki as a nationalist leader. Maliki is extremely popular across the spectrum of Iraq's citizens. Indeed, the only places where he is unpopular are in Tehran and, apparently, in the offices of Congressional Democrats.

As to Iran, any inference from events surrounding Basra that Iran is acting with goodwill towards the U.S. and the government of Iraq is not merely unsupported by the facts, it is a highly malignant falsehood. Iran's primary contribution to the situation in Iraq is death and mayhem. Their malign and extensive proxy war is at the heart of the need for the continuation of the surge.

Pelosi is a hyperpartisan hack. She is either wholly unable to distinguish reality or quite willing to ignore it in her all encompassing desire for political power.

_______________________________________________________

Reconciliation:

ABC News, May 28, 2008: Maliki's Midas Touch

. . . The Sunnis, Kurds and Shiites alike all eventually lauded the Basra operation as a huge success and whole-heartedly backed Maliki in his next endeavor — to revisit Mosul, and take on al Qaeda.

. . . Acutely aware of his political momentum, on May 12, Maliki, accompanied by crews from Al Iraqia TV, the official state-run media outlet — went to Mosul — and Maliki personally, and publicly, took charge of the military operations there.

He was the lead story and plastered across almost every local front page.

. . . Sadr is trying to grasp on to a sliver of political leverage, claiming to have struck the deal which brought his people their livelihoods back. While Maliki is lauding the latest in a series of successes to ensure security and a regained national unity to his country.

Certainly, it seems as though there is little Maliki can do wrong these days. With provincial elections around the corner, an Iraqi future without Maliki is almost impossible to imagine.

The Atlantic, May 13, 2008, Maliki's Southern Strategy

. . . At first, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's decision to confront Moqtada al-Sadr's Iranian-backed militas looked like a major strategic misstep. Now it appears to have transformed Iraqi politics, potentially paving the way for real reconciliation between Sunni and Shia.

. . . [T]here has also been a more lasting change: The Sadrists have been marginalized. Even the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who has been reluctant to make political interventions in recent years, pointedly condemned Sadr for refusing to disarm. Leading Sunni faction have also returned to the fold. The Kurds, who have their own problems with Sadr, are also on board. Maliki, suprisingly enough, increasingly looks like the leader of all Iraqis.

. . . Unfortunately, few Americans understand what Maliki has accomplished, and how much international assistance he needs to beat back foreign elements that aim to undermine Iraq's fragile democracy -- which is, as far as neighboring governments are concerned (particularly those that begin with an "I" and end with an "n"), a profoundly subversive influence.

USA Today, April 22, 2008, Iraq Frees Detainees

Most of those released were Sunnis who had been low-level army officials or former members of Saddam Hussein's Baath Party. . . .

The prisoners are being freed under an amnesty law passed by Iraq's parliament in February. More than 52,400 detainees in government custody have applied for their freedom. Of those, nearly 78%, or more than 40,000, were granted amnesty. . . .

"This is sort of a new life," Othman said. "Terrorism started and now it is ending. A new life is coming, God willing."

NYT, February 12, 2008, Making (Some) Progress In Iraq

Iraq’s Parliament has finally approved a budget, outlined the scope of provincial powers, set an Oct. 1 date for provincial elections and voted a general amnesty for detainees. All these steps are essential for national conciliation.

. . . We are, of course, cheered by the news that representatives from Iraq’s three main ethnic groups — Shiite, Sunni and Kurd — finally saw some benefit in compromise. . . .

_______________________________________________________

Iran

Washington Post, May 29, 2008, U.S. Cites Big Gains Against Al Qaeda

. . . [CIA Chief Michael]Hayden warned, however, that progress in Iraq is being undermined by increasing interference by Iran, which he accused of supplying weapons, training and financial assistance to anti-U.S. insurgents. While declining to endorse any particular strategy for dealing with Iran, he described the threat in stark terms.

"It is the policy of the Iranian government, approved at the highest levels of that government, to facilitate the killing of American and other coalition forces in Iraq. Period," he said.

Fox News, Aug. 9, 2007, Captured Video Shows Iraqi Insurgents Firing Sophisticated Iranian-Made Rockets at U.S. Positions

Dramatic video produced by Iraqi insurgents and captured in a raid earlier this week by U.S. troops clearly shows a battery of sophisticated Iranian-made rocket launchers firing on American positions east of Baghdad, Pentagon officials said Wednesday.

The video, captured during a raid on Monday by the 3rd Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment in northeast Nahrawan, shows insurgents setting up and carrying out an attack on Sunday, as well as an attack on July 11 that killed one soldier and wounded 15 others, officials said. The raid last month appeared to involve 34 launchers firing 107 mm Iranian-made rockets.

AFP, May 5, 2008, Iran Ex-President Under Fire For Comments On Insurgents

Ex-president [of Iran] Mohmamad Khatami was under fire from hardliners on Monday after comments interpreted as accusing Iran's clerical leaders of supporting insurgents in the Middle East.

. . . His speech has been seen by some observers as accusing the Iranian authorities of encouraging militants to destabilize the Middle East, in particular Iraq and Lebanon. . . .

Voices of Iraq, May 3, 2008, Karbala Operations Commander Accuses Iran of Disturbing the City

Karbala operations commander said on Saturday that Iranian intervention is disturbing the city's security.

He noted that huge quantities of Iranian made weapons were seized throughout different locations in the province.

"There is Iranian intervention . . . in Karbala," Major General Ra'id Shaker Jawdat said in a press conference at Karbala operations command's building, after showing a large quantity of Iranian-made weapons.

. . . "Those weapons entered Karbala to destabilize security, . . .

AEI, May 13, 2008, Speech by Col. H.R. McMaster, Advisor to Gen. Petraeus

Col H.R. McMaster: . . . When I traveled through the south on a last couple of visits, what I heard – and this is again on the point of militias being increasingly discredited, and this is from Iraqi Shiite leaders who were saying things like Iran is the true occupier of Iraq. They would say jokingly that the Iranians are now all Iraqi nationalists, which is a thinly-veiled swipe at some of the militias in some of these areas.

And so whereas before about a year ago, you wouldn’t really hear Iraqi leaders, especially in these areas in the south, offering criticism of Iran and the parties and communities within Iraq who were playing host to Iranian influence but you hear that almost all the time now among Shiite Arab leaders. And also a connection to Iran, and this again affects the militias, is becoming a liability much like being connected to Al-Qaeda was a liability for so-called resistance movements in the Sunni Arab community. These are again changes that I’ve seen in the last year.

The contradictions of Iranian policies I’ve mentioned at the beginning have been exposed and Iraqis have to deal with them now. They have to deal with them again partly because of that pressure on the political parties, who are embarrassed by the connections to Iran and what Iran is doing. So the sixth thing is, no big surprise, the exposure of Iranian activity and Iran’s true intentions. . . .

. . . In the case of what Iran is doing in Iraq, it is so damn obvious to anybody who wants to look into it, I think, that is drop the word “alleged” and say what they’re doing, which is, we know for a fact organizing and directing operations against the government of Iraq and against our forces – the government of Iraq forces and our forces – we know they have done that, certainly in the past. We know that they are supplying them with weapons and the most effective weapons that they used to attack the Iraqi people and our forces and these include the long-range high payload rockets that have been coming in from Iraq as well as the explosively formed projectile roadside bombs that come from Iran.

We know that they have trained forces in the employment of these munitions - and in pretty large numbers. We know that they were concerned that their maligned hand being obvious in Iraq would alienate their Arab neighbors so they try Arabize these efforts by using Lebanese Hezbollah for a lot of the training but it’s a pretty cosmetic shift that they’ve made in some portions of the training.

We know for a fact that they have directed assassination operations. They have a reputation of being some of the best assassins in the world. They’ve trained Iraqis to do that. They’ve trained them in skills not only for roadside bombs and in long-range rockets but also in snipers and other skills used to intimidate or kill individuals. And we know that they have been sort of backing all horses to destabilize the situation and we know that their support is continued to key Badr officials who are in influential positions who remain on the payroll of Iran and to advance the interests of Iran and, in some cases, to provide leadership for other militia organizations that are stood up.

We know that they ostensibly have supported this government but have armed, equipped and trained a militia that has been attacking the very government they ostensibly support. And this is not just something in Basra, this is last year. This is in Nasariyah, this is Samwa, this is in Diwaniyahm, this is in Amarah and it was in Karbala in August 26th and 27th of last year. And now again in Basra.

So I think it’s very obvious. Now on this specific question you have - has it increased or has it decreased? I think it’s very clear that what Iran has done over the last year is try to develop a considerable latent capability that it could turn on in short notice. And I think that it may have been that this bold and very quick action by the Prime Minister in Basra foiled what was to be perhaps a much larger and coordinated effort, maybe even coordinated with efforts in other places in the region, like what we’re seen happening right now in Lebanon.

So, anyway, I think it’s very obvious what they’re doing. I think it’s very obvious to Iraqis, it certainly is. The Iraqis I’ve spoken to are incensed about it and I think it’s no longer alleged. Yes?

Demetri Sevastopulo: If it’s been going on for so long, why is it you said earlier that the Iraqis are only recently starting to talk about Iranian involvement? Why did it not bother them before?

H.R. McMaster: Now, that’s a great point. Part of the reason is the intimidation factor. We know that Iran had really been able to establish a pretty high degree of control over some key officials, you know, provided them protection. And then also some assassination cells and elements of militia that would kill anybody who made a statement against Iranian interests. So what I think what has happened is Iran has so blatantly undermined the security situation and it’s so clear now that they want to keep Iraq as a weak, failing state, is what they would like I think, dependent on them for support that many more Iraqis now are disavowing connections to Iran and providing more space, more physical space in terms of intimidation. There’s more sort of a political space to address this issue than there had been previously.

And then also, if you remember Iran was a big supporter of the militias which before and this goes back to the effective operations against Al-Qaeda and the importance of it, those militias were justified in large measure because of the perception that they were protectors against these Takfirists and Salafi jihadistss who play with Al-Qaeda, and the Baathists, the former regime. So all these, what Iran could do was raise the specter of terrorist attacks against Shiite communities as a justification for its support in nefarious activities. Now, the contradiction of what they’ve been doing is much more obvious to many more people than it had been previously. . . .

Nancy Pelosi has slandered the incredible accomplishments of our soldiers. She owes our soldiers and our nation an apology. And she owes a special apology to the family of every soldier killed and maimed by Iran in the conduct of their proxy war. She has denigrated their sacrifice with her falsehoods in her pursuit of partisan power.

The tremendous offensiveness of Pelosi's falsehoods are bad enough. But what makes her remarks truly malignant are that those remarks are upon an issue at the heart of our national security. Indeed, on the largest national security issue we face, Iran, pretending that they are a benign and helpful entity can only serve to place our nation in ever greater danger. It prevents us from acknowledging reality and developing a plan to deal with Iran that will have the support of our nation. That is not merely inexcusable, but for the third most powerful person in our government, it is traitorous and criminal.

Read More...

Summary only...

A More Realistic View of Sadr's Movement

I was appalled by the article in today's WaPo, blogged below, praising Moqtada al-Sadr and giving very misleading treatment of his popularity, his relationship with Iran, and the strength of his movement. It was a travesty. Compare that article to one today from the LA Times of all papers. which provides a much more accurate look at the current popularity of Sadr's movement.

_____________________________________________________

This today from the LA Times today on the Sadr movement. It is interesting for several points, including the tactics used over the past several years to earn the loyalty of the populace, which very much mirrored the tactics used by Iran to create loyal militias in Gaza and Lebanon:

Four summers ago, when militiamen loyal to hard-line Shiite Muslim cleric Muqtada Sadr were battling U.S. forces in the holy city of Najaf, Mohammed Lami was among them.

"I had faith. I believed in something," Lami said of his days hoisting a gun for Sadr's Mahdi Army militia. "Now, I will never fight with them."

Lami is no fan of U.S. troops, but after fleeing Baghdad's Sadr City district with his family last month, when militiamen arrived on his street to plant a bomb, he is no fan of the Mahdi Army either. Nor are many others living in Sadr City, the 32-year-old said. Weeks of fighting between militiamen and Iraqi and U.S. forces, with residents caught in the middle, has chipped away at the Sadr movement's grass-roots popularity, Lami said.

More than 1,000 people have died in Sadr City since fighting erupted in late March, and hospital and police officials say most have been civilians. As the violence continues, public tolerance for the Mahdi Army, and by association the Sadr movement, seems to be shifting toward the same sort of resentment once reserved for U.S. and Iraqi forces.

"People are fed up with them because of their extremism and the problems they are causing," said Rafid Majid, a merchant in central Baghdad. Like many others interviewed across the capital, he said the good deeds the group performs no longer were enough to make up for the hardships endured by ordinary Iraqis who just want to go to work and keep their families safe.

With provincial elections scheduled for October, a public perception that Sadr loyalists were to blame for the violence could hinder the cleric's hopes of broadening his power and influence in the oil-rich south. . . .

Lawmakers from Sadr's movement blame the United States and Iraqi forces for the bloodshed that began after the government launched an offensive against Shiite militias in Basra. Sadr representatives insist that, if anything, support has soared as people come to sympathize with the Sadr loyalists.

"Even some Iraqi people who were not sympathizing with us before have now started to feel and identify with the oppression on the Sadr people. It has become clear to them that we are being targeted," said Liqa Yaseen, a parliament member representing the Sadr movement.

But interviews with dozens of Iraqis living in Sadr City and other Shiite militia strongholds in Baghdad suggest otherwise. So do anecdotes from U.S. troops who have met with Sadr City residents and local leaders and who say there has been a shift in the things they hear.

"After March 25 was the first time I had anyone tell us, 'Go in and wipe them out,' " said Sgt. Erik Olson, who spends most of his time visiting residents of Sadr City's Jamila neighborhood gathering "atmospherics," the military's word for figuring out what locals are thinking.

. . . Ahmed, a 29-year-old Mahdi Army member who did not want his full name used for fear of being arrested or attacked, said the group was the only "honorable resistance" to the U.S. presence. He said people in poor neighborhoods depended on it for handouts of fuel, help with funeral costs, and food distribution. But he acknowledged that as fighting continued, support dwindled.

"Of course some people are expressing their resentment and anger against the Mahdi Army, thinking that without them, they would not be targeted and their lives would not be badly affected," he said.

Another Mahdi Army member expressed anger after Sadr in late April warned of "open war" against U.S. forces if operations targeting Sadr strongholds did not stop.

"Did he mention that the 'open war' . . . will be among the houses or residential areas?" said the man, a Mahdi Army street leader who feared having his name published. "Fight? . . . I will not join the fight."

Some members blame the violence on rogue elements who have ignored truces called by Sadr, but they acknowledge that regardless of whoever is behind the fighting, the mainstream Sadr movement is viewed as the violator. "It takes all the blame for the fight because it started it," said Abu Ali, a Sadr City resident who said he had left the Mahdi Army after becoming disillusioned with its tactics fighting U.S. forces in crowded urban areas.

"We should fight them outside the cities, not among the families," Abu Ali said.

For years, Sadr's militia has been welcomed by many people in exchange for the services the cleric provides. Most important has been the security his fighters offer: Even people who don't relish having masked gunmen on their streets have accepted them in exchange for safety.

But with the recent fighting, that security is gone.

"I don't support them now, but in the past I did," Mohammed Mousawi, a 23-year-old civil servant, said of the Mahdi Army. "They served people a lot and solved problems in the area, but now things are different."

Mousawi said he had to pay 24,000 Iraqi dinars [about $20] a month to the militia to protect a small shop he runs and his home in Hurriya, a Baghdad neighborhood known for its militia presence. When the streets were quiet, he was willing to do so. Now, he resents it.

Hassan abu Mohammed, who has an appliance repair shop in Jamila, said the violence forced him to close his business for nearly two months. Abu Mohammed estimated that he was losing $1,200 a month but said it was worth it if the militiamen could be driven out.

"They used to come and take money on a monthly basis from us," he said, speaking for himself and other local merchants. He said the militiamen would demand to know the details of their businesses, whether their customers were Sunnis, Shiites or Americans, and whom they employed.

Shopkeepers, teachers and homemakers interviewed across Baghdad told similar stories and indicated that goodwill toward the militia was evaporating.

"The people do not support [them] anymore because they are responsible for barricading some areas and preventing people from going on with their lives and jobs," said Ibrahim Ghanim, a merchant in central Baghdad.

Allegations of extortion and abductions are not new, but U.S. military officials say such complaints have picked up. They say Sadr's truce with U.S. forces in August has led to splintering in the organization. Questions about which way Sadr will go, toward sustaining the truce or halting it, have fueled more Mafia-like behavior among his followers as they jockey for power and resources in the face of an uncertain future.

"Everyone is trying to claw their way to the top," said Olson, comparing it to Robin Hood turning into Tony Soprano. . . .

Read the entire article. I rarely say this but my hat's off to the LA Times today.

Read More...

Summary only...

Countdown Iran

I have previously laid out the extensive case for at least a limited attack upon Iran's Qod's force, if not a full attack both against the Qod's force and to end Iran's march towards a nuclear arsenal. That argument includes as one of many justifications that Iran has been conducting a deadly proxy war in Iraq with the intent of "Lebanizing" that country, as Ambassador Crocker put it several weeks ago. That justification just became stronger with the release of a British report posted below showing that the years of violence in Basra were driven by Iran. Suffice it to say, the Brits are upset. And from at least one article in the Telegraph today, they seem more than ready to support a U.S. attack on Iran.

_____________________________________________________

This from the Telegraph:

Iran has been the covert instigator of thousands of the attacks against British troops in southern Iraq for at least four years.

It is, without doubt, responsible for the deaths and serious injuries of many British personnel, who have been attempting to contain the violence in southern Iraq.

The Islamic state's malignant involvement in its neighbour's internal strife escalated dramatically in April 2004 following the first uprising across Iraq by disaffected Shia militiamen.

As Iraq descended into murderous anarchy, Iran began channelling vast amounts of cash and weaponry to the burgeoning insurgency. Tehran, it seemed, was happy to fund any Shia militia group, providing it attacked the British and Americans, and therefore further destabilised Iraq.

The chaos that ensued allowed Iran to manoeuvre itself into the position of regional power broker, and fed Tehran's determination to become a nuclear power.

Iran's powerful Revolutionary Guards Force, known as the al-Quds, which is believed to be beyond the control of the central government, supported the Jaish al-Mahdi, or Mahdi Army, the Shia militia created by Moqtada al-Sadr, and the Badr Brigades - two groups whose hatred for the coalition was matched only by that for each other.

The cash was used to pay recruits – mainly young, unemployed and ill-educated Shia men from the slums of Baghdad and Basra – who were only too willing to take up arms against a force they regarded as occupiers rather than liberators.

It is also widely believed that the al-Quds perfected the improvised explosive devices (IED) which, in just a few short months, went from being rudimentary and unreliable to highly sophisticated lethal weapons capable of firing multiple projectiles and penetrating the armour of American and British tanks.

The IED, with its highly advanced infra-red triggering devices, became the weapon of choice for the insurgents and the technology was soon being passed to the Sunni and al-Qa'eda groups in Baghdad, who shared the same enemy, despite being locked in their own internal conflict.

As the American and British body counts increased so did the rhetoric from London and Washington. Both governments warned Iran to stay out of Iraq's affairs but each accusation was met with persistent denial by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose stock response became "where is the proof?"

But with a named British officer stating in a military report what many in the Army have suspected for years – Iran's direct involvement in the deaths of British troops – the question now is what does this mean for the Islamic Republic?

Even if the British Government wanted to exact some form of military revenge from Iran it is doubtful whether it has the capability. A one-off air strike would do little apart from enraging the pro-Iranian militias operating in southern Iraq.

Instead, it will add to the growing weight of evidence being accumulated by MI6 and the CIA that will one day be used to justify a limited but precise US-led attack against Tehran if it continues to develop nuclear weapons.

Iran's nuclear ambitions are completely unacceptable to both America and Britain, who now regard Iran's nuclear strategy as a one of the most dangerous threats, second only to Islamic terrorism, facing the West.

It has long been rumoured, but always officially denied that, given the right circumstances, Britain would support a limited air campaign against Iran's nuclear installations, such as the one launched by Israel in 1981 against the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor.

Although Britain is unlikely to take part in the attack itself, it would offer some form of support, such as in-flight refuelling or allowing the RAF's Airborne Warning and Control (AWAC) aircraft to be used.

Iran has been playing a dangerous game for too long. If it continues to do so it is highly likely the West will act – and with some justification, the relations of Britain's dead soldiers might say. . . .

Read the article. I suspect that if we are going to see an attack on Iran, it will occur in the June/July time frame.

One note on the above article. At one point, the author states: "Iran's powerful Revolutionary Guards Force, known as the al-Quds, which is believed to be beyond the control of the central government, supported the Jaish al-Mahdi, or Mahdi Army, the Shia militia created by Moqtada al-Sadr, and the Badr Brigades - two groups whose hatred for the coalition was matched only by that for each other." Everything about this paragraph is problematic. The Oods force is one branch of the IRGC - the two are not the same thing. The IRGC is not outside the control of the central government. It reports directly to the Supreme Guide, Ali Khamenei. Both the Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigades were creations of Iran. The Badr Brigades are the military arm of the SICI, an organization whose loyalties now run to the Iraqi government. As far as I know, the Badr Brigades have not been involved in any of the anti-U.S. or anti-government activity that is the hallmark of the Mahdi Army.

Read More...

Summary only...

Iran's Proxy War In Basra

Britain failed in its mission to secure Basra between 2003 and 2008. The failure was not for lack of effort or, indeed, for any lack of military capability among the British soldiers in Basra. Their soldiers were under daily attack from the locals. Now a leaked report reveals that the attackers were Mahdi Army members being paid with hundreds of thousands of dollars and drugs by Iran - through an Iranian finance team in Basra.

__________________________________________________________

This from the Telegraph:

Iran has secretly paid Iraqi insurgents hundreds of thousands of American dollars to kill British soldiers, according to a leaked government document obtained by The Telegraph.

The allegations are contained in a confidential "field report" written by a British officer who served in Basra during one of the most dangerous periods of the conflict. The report, which has never been made public, shows the full level of Iran's involvement in the insurgency for the first time.

The document states that the Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) – also known as the Mahdi Army – one of the most violent insurgent groups operating in Basra, used money from Iran to recruit and pay young unemployed men up to $300 (£150) a month to carry out attacks against the British. The findings have been passed to the highest levels in the military.

The leak comes at a time of rising tension between Iran and the international community, as Tehran continues to stonewall UN inquiries into allegations that it has carried out research to develop a nuclear weapon.

The report, "Life Under Fire in the Old State Building", details the activities of British troops under the command of Major Christopher Job, of the 2nd Lancashire Regiment, between November 2006 and March 2007.

In the report, Major Job discloses that in the course of five months his base was attacked 350 times. Old State Building, which is in the centre of Basra, is the most-attacked British base in recent history.

In an attempt to discover who was behind the attacks, the officer says he established a network of informers, who supplied him with detailed intelligence on the actions of the insurgents and who was behind their funding.

The officer states that the reports of Iran's involvement came from a network of 25 sources, which included a former Iraqi army general, prominent businessmen, local sheikhs and council leaders.

He writes: "We learnt from a number of our Key Leadership Engagements [local contacts] that the source of the problem was the level of unemployment in Basra.

"JAM, using funding from Iran, paid the unemployed youths in the region of $300 per month to attack Multi National Forces. We also learnt that JAM had a drugs culture and that youths literally got hooked on being associated with JAM."

Twenty-seven members of the Armed Forces died and dozens were seriously injured in southern Iraq between November 2006 and May 2007, the period that Major Job covers in his report.

A senior British officer who has recently returned from southern Iraq said that the existence of "Iranian finance teams" in Basra was widely known by the British military and Foreign Office, although always officially denied.

He said: "It suited Iran to arm JAM in order to allow them to have the means to hit us." . . .

Read the entire article.

Read More...

Summary only...

Iraq, Iran and Coverage of the Iraqi War - Ralph Peters Does Not Go Far Enough

Ralph Peters, retired Army officer and now NY Post columnist, has severe criticism of the media for underreporting the Iraq War as significant gains are being made. The truth is that his criticism is nowhere near as biting as is warranted. FDR's warning to the press not to repeat enemy propaganda and not to take a position contrary to the government without a reasonable basis has been shredded. Bereft of any shred of journalistic ethics, the MSM is doing all it can to negate good news from Iraq where they can and, indeed, is giving a good deal of its reporting over to the enemy perspective.

________________________________________________________

Ralph Peters, in his column today, Success In Iraq, A Media Blackout, rightly takes the MSM to task today for its minimalist coverage of the Iraq War, its downplaying of success, and its heavy coverage of anything negative:

. . . As in Basra the month before, absent-without-leave (and hiding in Iran) Muqtada al Sadr quit under pressure from Iraqi and US troops. The missile and mortar attacks on the Green Zone stopped. There's peace in the streets.

Today, Iraqi soldiers, not militia thugs, patrol the lanes of Sadr City, where waste has replaced roadside bombs as the greatest danger to careless footsteps. US advisers and troops support the effort, but Iraq's government has taken another giant step forward in establishing law and order.

My fellow Americans, have you read or seen a single interview with any of the millions of Iraqis in Sadr City or Basra who are thrilled that the gangster militias are gone from their neighborhoods?

Didn't think so. The basic mission of the American media between now and November is to convince you, the voter, that Iraq's still a hopeless mess. . . .

Read the entire article. Ralph Peters is correct, but his criticism goes nowhere near far enough. Perhaps the most damning indictment of the press is their willingness to report the spin from the enemy perspective and to, in many cases, report that spin as an objective statement of truth.

Consider just the last two months of reporting. The fight for Basra was portrayed by the media as nothing more than internicine Shia violence undertaken for political purposes. No mention was given to the incredible importance of Basra to Iraq's economy, nor the fact that the Sadrists, supported by Iran, were terrorizing the population of Basra and had taken over, running the city as a mini-caliphate and a cash cow for theft, extortion and graft - all of which are fully documented here. No mention was given of the necessisty of the government to stamp out an armed militia contesting government control. So where did the media get that idea that this was simply internicine Shia violence? It originated from Sadr days before the MSM picked it up and ran with it as their main theme.

Subsequent reporting for weeks afterwards was one negative story after another about the Basra offensive, all studded with quotes from Sadrists - the same folk who, elsewhere throughout Iraq, are killing American soldiers. It wasn't until six weeks after the fact that the NYT ran a story heavy with qualifiers reporting the success in Basra and how the people are overjoyed to be out from under the tyranny of the Sadrists.

The same thing is occurring now as regards the events in Sadr City and the degree of Iranian involvement with Sadr. Time ran an atrocious piece of agenda journalism two weeks accusing the military of being dishonest about whether Iran is actually supporting Sadrists in Iraq. It is a common theme in the MSM now, repeated again by WaPo in their reporting today, complete with several bald quotes of Sadrists to the contrary. Reporting leading up to the capitulation of Sadr emphasized Sadr's strength and emphasized the narrative from the Sadrist viewpoint.

Compare and contrast our media of today to that of WWII and what FDR asked of them in wartime. On the eve of WWII, in his radio speech to the nation, FDR did not ask the press to shill for the U.S., but rather asked them not to contradict U.S. government sources unless they were convinced that the U.S. government was not being truthful with them.

To all newspapers and radio stations-all those who reach the eyes and ears of the American people-I say this: You have a most grave responsibility to the Nation now and for the duration of this war. If you feel that your Government is not disclosing enough of the truth, you have very right to say so. But-in the absence of all the facts, as revealed by official sources-you have no right to deal out unconfirmed reports in such a way as to make people believe they are gospel truth. Every citizen, in every walk of life, shares this same responsibility. The lives of our soldiers and sailors-the whole future of this Nation- depend upon the manner in which each and every one of us fulfills his obligation to our country.

Read the entire speech. Today, our press regularly reports the enemy narrative as a counterpoint without any factual belief in its truth, but merely to suggest that the U.S. is not being honest. It really is an atrocity.

When all is said and done, there needs to be a review of the role the press has played in twisting coverage of the Iraq War and how they have made use of the enemy narrative. Reporting on the Iraq war has been the moral and ethical lowpoint of modern journalism.

Read More...

Summary only...

A Success Story In Basra

Its taken seven weeks, but the success of the Iraqi Army in securing Basra and taking it back from the Sadrists is finally being told - on page 1 of the New York Times. Of course there are plenty of qualifiers, but this is all the more incredible after the NYT's recent effort to spin 180 degrees the great leap forward of the Iraqi government with Sadr turning over the keys to Sadr City. At any rate, in yet another a related report, a massive blizzard has been reported in hell as temperatures there continue to plummet.
_______________________________________________________

This today from the NYT:

Three hundred miles south of Baghdad, the oil-saturated city of Basra has been transformed by its own surge, now seven weeks old.

In a rare success, forces loyal to Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki have largely quieted the city, to the initial surprise and growing delight of many inhabitants who only a month ago shuddered under deadly clashes between Iraqi troops and Shiite militias.

Just as in Baghdad, Iraqi and Western officials emphasize that the gains here are “fragile,” like the newly planted roadside saplings that fail to conceal mounds of garbage and pools of foul-smelling water in the historic port city’s slums.

Among the many uncertainties are whether the government, criticized for incompetence at the start of the operation, can maintain the high level of troops here. But in interviews across Basra, residents overwhelmingly reported a substantial improvement in their everyday lives.

“The circle of fear is broken,” said Shaker, owner of a floating restaurant on Basra’s famed Corniche promenade, who, although optimistic, was still afraid to give his full name, as were many of those interviewed.

. . . The principal factor for improvement that people in Basra cite is the deployment of 33,000 members of the Iraqi security forces after the March 24 start of operations, which allowed the government to blanket the city with checkpoints on every major intersection and highway.

Borrowing tactics from the troop increase in Baghdad, the Iraqi forces raided militia strongholds and arrested hundreds of suspects. They also seized weapons including mortars, rocket-propelled grenades and sophisticated roadside bombs that officials say were used by Iranian-backed groups responsible for much of the violence.

Government forces have now taken over Islamic militants’ headquarters and halted the death squads and “vice ‘enforcers’ ” who attacked women, Christians, musicians, alcohol sellers and anyone suspected of collaborating with Westerners.

Shaker’s floating restaurant stands as one emblem of the change since then.

Just two months ago, he said, masked men in military uniforms walked into the packed dining room and abducted a businessman at gunpoint. The man was never seen again, and the restaurant closed.

Now, however, customers who fled that evening are pressing the 34-year-old owner to stay open later at night, so they can enjoy their unaccustomed freedom from the gangs, which once banned the loud Arabic pop music now blaring from Shaker’s loudspeakers.

“Now it is very different,” he said. “After we heard that the lawless people have been arrested or killed, we have a kind of courage.”

Even alcohol, once banned by the extremists, is discreetly on sale again in some areas.

Nevertheless, few Basra residents trust that the change is permanent or that the death squads have been vanquished.

Asked how long it would take for Basra to slip back into lawlessness if the army departed, Afrah, a 20-year-old theater student at Basra’s College of Fine Arts, replied, “One day.”

. . . An overwhelmingly Shiite city of more than three million people, Basra sits atop huge oil reserves, which, Western officials say, provide 40 percent of Iraq’s annual oil revenue of $38 billion.

Thus, stability in a city that could be Iraq’s economic engine room is a major priority for the Shiite-led government. However, the Basra experience may not translate to other cities like Mosul or Kirkuk in the north, with a much more complicated religious and ethnic mix.

. . . Iraqi commanders acknowledge that the American and British support helped them wrest control of Mahdi Army strongholds like Hayyaniyah — a slum that is Basra’s equivalent of Sadr City — and other poor districts that are fertile recruiting grounds for militias.

But a majority of the military presence on the streets is Iraqi.

From the moment motorists drive through the huge arch at the city’s northern entrance, they are confronted with a ragtag but daunting collection of armored police vehicles, Iraqi Army Humvees, cold war-era tanks, pickup trucks with turret-mounted machine guns and bullet-riddled personnel carriers.

Canal bridges are guarded by head-high steel pyramids, from which soldiers observe bustling markets through a bulletproof window.

Maj. Tom Holloway, a British military spokesman, conceded that the Iraqis would have “struggled” without the warplanes available to coalition forces. But he said: “I don’t think it’s a crutch. I think they would have tackled it in their own way and possibly, probably, achieved the same result.”

And the result, whoever is ultimately responsible, is in many ways remarkable.

At the College of Fine Arts, female students said they felt more, but not entirely, free to wear the clothes they liked.

“I used to be challenged for what I wear,” said Athari, a 19-year-old student wearing heavy makeup and a bright orange headscarf pushed high back on her head in the liberal fashion disapproved of by Islamic radicals. “Makeup was forbidden; short skirts were forbidden. I will not mention their name, but they were extremists. They are still here, but quieter now.”

Qais, a music student, spoke of his relief at no longer having to hide his violin in a sack of rice in his trunk.

. . . It was not an uncommon sentiment. In his city center office, Yahya, a wealthy businessman said he had just begun going onto the streets without his customary 10 bodyguards. Insisting that he was not a political supporter of the prime minister, he said he was nevertheless so grateful for the security improvements that he and colleagues had downloaded Mr. Maliki’s face onto their mobile telephones as screensavers.

. . . Gen. Mohan al-Freiji, the Iraqi commander in Basra, said the city was “75 percent” under control. He said the principal threat stemmed from rogue elements of the Mahdi Army and factions like the Iraqi Hezbollah (Party of God), Thairallah (Revenge of God) and Fadhila (Virtue).

Emphasizing the urgent need to address decades of poverty and neglect, he said the government had to provide jobs and investment to convert short-term military gains into long-term political and economic ones.

“This is a city which sits on top of oil, but its young people are unemployed,” he said.

Sadrists protest that the Basra operation is a cynical exercise to weaken Mr. Maliki’s Shiite rivals ahead of provincial elections in the fall.

At Friday prayers in Kufa last week, the Sadrist preacher, Sheik Abdul Hadi al-Muhamadawi, said, “There is a large-scale conspiracy to remove the Sadr movement from the government’s way by all means, because it refuses the presence of the occupier in Iraq.”

Such words underscore the widespread belief here that the Mahdi army has its own reasons for lying low and is by no means eliminated.

During one Iraqi Army patrol in Hayyaniyah at dusk, the soldiers, elsewhere relaxed, became jittery. Belying the local commander’s insistence that the Sadrist stronghold was “90 percent or more secure,” some pulled up face masks that they had not worn in other districts. They also fired bullets into the air at the slightest delay in traffic, an aggression unlikely to endear them in an area that, although calm, was noticeably less welcoming.

Haider, a policeman at a checkpoint outside the Sadrists’ former headquarters, said his family had been threatened, even at his home in the capital.

“I have spent 60 days in Basra and haven’t been home to Baghdad,” he said. “I will be killed if I go now. My family have received dozens of fliers with threats from the Mahdi Army.”

Nevertheless he, like many others, said the evacuation of the factions from their once-untouchable headquarters had brought about a psychological shift. Outside the Sadr office, Iraqi soldiers now sit atop the roof, their tripod-mounted machine guns overlooking the tin-roofed Sadrist prayer hall, which lies half-demolished.

“The Mahdi Army used to use this office like the Baathists when they were The Party,” Haider said. “They were ruling like the government of a state. They stopped police doing their duty, from implementing the law.”

Noting that the Baath Party of Saddam Hussein, once much stronger than the Mahdi Army, had been routed, he said, “The Mahdi Army will meet the same fate exactly, and worse.” . . .

Read the entire story.

Read More...

Summary only...

More Steps Towards Reconciliation In Iraq

Within the past month, the NYT proclaimed Maliki's Basra offensive a disasterous, politically motivated act that had weakened his deeply sectarian government. The NYT proclaimed Sadr the victor. Sufice it to say, that narrative was exposed as a canard within days. Today, Basra is in Iraqi government control, Sadr is throwing an impotent tantrum from somewhere inside Iran, and Maliki has earned vast new respect as a national leader. And today, the NYT reports that members of Iraq's largest Sunni bloc are returning to Parliament, lured back by the willingness of Maliki to take on Sadr's militia and his amnesty to low-level Sunni prisoners.


_______________________________________________________

This from the NYT:

Iraq’s largest Sunni bloc has agreed to return to Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki’s cabinet after a boycott that lasted nearly a year, several Sunni leaders said on Thursday, citing a recently passed amnesty law and the Maliki government’s crackdown on Shiite militias as reasons for the move.

The Sunni leaders said they were still working out the details of their return, an indication that the deal could still fall through. But such a return would represent a major political victory for Mr. Maliki in the midst of a military operation that has at times been criticized as poorly planned and fraught with risk. The principal group his security forces have been confronting is the Mahdi Army, a powerful militia led by Moktada al-Sadr, the radical Shiite cleric. Even though Mr. Maliki’s American-backed offensive against elements of the Mahdi Army has frequently stalled and has led to bitter complaints of civilian casualties, the Sunni leaders said that the government had done enough to address their concerns that they had decided to end their boycott.

“Our conditions were very clear, and the government achieved some of them,” said Adnan al-Duleimi, the head of Tawafiq, the largest Sunni bloc in the government. Mr. Duleimi said the achievements included “the general amnesty, chasing down the militias and disbanding them and curbing the outlaws.”

The recently passed amnesty law has already led to the release of many Sunni prisoners, encouraging Sunni parties that the government is serious about enforcing it. And the attacks on Shiite militias have apparently begun to assuage longstanding complaints that only Sunni groups blamed for the insurgency have been the targets of American and Iraqi security forces.

Exactly which ministries will be given to which Sunni politicians is still under negotiation, . . .

. . . The official government television channel, Iraqiya, appeared to confirm the deal, following a meeting between Mr. Maliki and David Miliband, the visiting foreign secretary of Britain. Iraqiya said the prime minister “said that reconciliation has proved a success and all political blocs will return to the government.” . . .

Read the entire article.

Read More...

Summary only...

Stepping Up The Pressure On Sadr

The US and Iraqi forces are increasing the pressure on Sadr and his militia while PM Maliki's decision to give the Sadrists a choice between dismantling their militia or being kept out of politics is creating real problems in the Sadr movement. We now know that the murder of Sadr's brother-in-law and senior Mahdi operative in Najaf the other day came shortly after he had written to Sadr recommending that the militia be disbanded.

___________________________________________________________

This from Bill Roggio at the Long War Journal:

The senior-most Iraqi general in charge of the security operation in Basrah has issued an ultimatum for wanted Mahdi Army leaders and fighters to surrender in the next 24 hours as the Iraqi and US military ignore Muqtada al Sadr's threat to conduct a third uprising. US troops killed 15 Mahdi Army fighters in Baghdad yesterday and have killed 56 fighters since Sadr issued his threat last weekend.

In Basrah, General Mohan al Freiji, the chief of the Basrah Operational Commander and leader of the security operation in the province, has given issued warrants "for 81 people, including senior leaders of the Mahdi militia, and they have 24 hours to give up," The Associated Press reported.

Iraqi troops continue to clear Basrah, although the fighting has been sparse since security forces cleared the Mahdi Army-controlled Hayaniyah neighborhood in Basrah last weekend. Iraqi forces "seized a cache containing huge amounts of weapons and ammunition" in the Al Tanuma neighborhood in eastern Basrah, Voices of Iraq reported. "The cache contains more than (1000) mortar rounds of different calibers, explosive equipment, and improvised explosive devices," a source told the Iraqi newspaper.

Iraqi and US forces have not stopped its operations against The Mahdi Army in Baghdad and the South despite Sadr's threat to conduct a third uprising. US forces in Baghdad alone have reported 56 "criminals" killed since Sadr issued his warning. The US military refers to the Mahdi Army as criminals in an effort to marginalize and delegitimize the group.

Twenty-seven Mahdi Army fighters were killed during clashes in Sadr City and Baghdad on April 20. . . .

. . . The Iraqi government's political pressure on the Mahdi Army to disband combined with the Coalition and Iraqi military offensive against the Mahdi Army has appeared to cause some deep rifts within the Sadrist ranks. Sadrist politicians have complained about being politically isolated, and some appear to be working to disband the Mahdi Army and conduct negotiations with the US to end the fighting.

The assassination of Riyad al Nouri, Sadr's brother-in-law and a senior aide in Najaf, continues to spark reports that his death was carried out from within the Sadrist movement. On April 17, The Long War Journal reported that Nouri was pushing for the Sadrist movement to disband the Mahdi Army lest the party be shut out from the political process, and US military officers believe he was killed because of this. . .

Read the entire article.

Read More...

Summary only...

Sadr Threatens "Open War" As Iraqi Offensives Continue

The Iraqi government is is in the midst of operations to clear Sadr City and Basra. Sadr and his militia are clearly looking at destruction and, today, Sadr threatened "open war" with the Iraqi government if they did not end their assaults and set a date for withdraw of U.S. forces from Iraq.








___________________________________________________

Sadr is looking at the end game as far as his militia is concerned, and may well find himself starting a conflict that he will not walk away from if he continues his current path. The Iraqi government clearly has no intention of allowing the Mahdi Army to continue its criminal reign in Iraq, and things are rapidly moving towards a climax. As Iraqi military and joint U.S. operations continue in Baghdad and Basra, Sadr has issued a threat to the Iraqi government, as reported in the Boston Globe today:

Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr on Saturday threatened an "open war" against the Iraqi government unless it halted a crackdown by Iraqi and U.S. security forces on his followers.

. . . "I'm giving the last warning and the last word to the Iraqi government -- either it comes to its senses and takes the path of peace ... or it will be (seen as) the same as the previous government," Sadr said, referring to Saddam Hussein's fallen regime, without elaborating.

"If they don't come to their senses and curb the infiltrated militias, then we will declare an open war until liberation."

Sadr's movement accuses other Shi'ite parties of getting their militias into the Iraqi security forces, especially in southern Shi'ite Iraq where various factions are competing for influence in a region home to most of Iraq's oil output.

"Do you want a third uprising?" Sadr said, adding that he wanted Iraq's Shi'ite clerical establishment to set a date for the departure of American troops.

In Sadr's Baghdad stronghold of Sadr City, one Mehdi Army commander said he was "thrilled" about the statement.

"We will wait until tomorrow to see the response of the government. Otherwise they will see black days like they have never seen before in their life."

. . . In Baghdad, police described battles between security forces and gunmen that began on Friday in Sadr City as among the heaviest in the capital since Maliki launched a crackdown on the Mehdi Army in the southern city of Basra late last month.

Police said 12 people had been killed in the Shi'ite slum. Hospitals said they received more than 130 wounded overnight.

Late on Saturday, Ali Bustan, head of the health directorate in the eastern section of Baghdad, said three rockets hit the Sadr Hospital in the slum. It was unclear if there were any casualties. The U.S. military said it was not to blame.

Bustan said the bodies of three women had been brought in along with 40 wounded people following fresh clashes.

Maliki has threatened to ban Sadr's movement from provincial elections this year if the cleric does not disband his militia.

In response, Sadr has threatened to formally scrap a ceasefire he imposed on the Mehdi Army last August, which has already been hanging by a thread given recent clashes.

In his statement, Sadr did not refer to the truce, but his spokesman in the holy city of Najaf, Salah al-Ubaidi, said the cleric was not bluffing.

"We mean every word," Ubaidi told Reuters.

Sadr issued his warning after Iraqi soldiers swooped on the Mehdi Army's stronghold in Basra. Iraqi officials said they now controlled the bastion, known as the Hayaniya district.

The dawn raid by government troops there was backed by a thunderous bombardment by U.S. warplanes and British artillery.

. . . Major-General Abdul-Karim Khalaf, an interior ministry spokesman, described the Basra operation as a major success.

Read the entire article. Sadr is reacting the latest major offensive in Basra this morning in which Iraqi troops took control of one of the three major strongholds of the Mahdi Army in Basra, the Hayaniyah neighborhood. This from the The Long War Journal:

The Iraqi Army, backed by Coalition advisers and airpower, has launched an assault on the Mahdi Army-controlled neighborhood of Hayaniyah in the port city of Basrah, sparking heavy fighting. Multinational Forces Iraq described the action as "a new phase of operations" as part of the overall operation, called Knights' Charge, which was launched on March 25.

The fighting in Basrah is said to be intense. The assault began at 6 AM local time when "British artillery and US aircraft released ordnance against known criminal rocket and mortar sites west of Hayaniyah," the Multinational Forces Iraq press release stated.

"There were violent clashes with gunmen there," Captain Chris Ford, a British military spokesman in Basrah, told The Los Angeles Times. An Iraqi witness said Coalition airstrikes blunted a Mahdi Army attack and allowed Iraqi forces to take control of the main streets in Hayaniyah.

Iraqi troops are now said to be in control of the neighborhood. "Our troops deployed in all the parts of the (Hayaniyah) district and controlled it without much resistance," Major General Abdul Karim Khalaf, a spokesman for the Ministry of the Interior told Reuters. "Now we are working on house-to-house checking. We have made many arrests."

Elements from at least two Iraqi Army divisions are involved in the Hayaniyah operation. The newly formed 14th Division is operating in conjunction with the 1st Division, one of the most seasoned divisions in the Iraqi Army. "This remains an Iraqi led, planned and executed mission," said Major Tom Holloway, the British Army’s spokesman in southern Iraq. A brigade from the 1st Division was moved into Basrah to support the operation after the military met tougher than expected opposition at the onset of Knights' Charge. The 1st Division is based out of Anbar province and has seen action in Fallujah, Ramadi, Baghdad, Baqubah, Mosul and elsewhere.

. . . Iraqi troops wrested control of Taymiyyah and Qiblah from the Mahdi Army over the past several weeks.

. . . Today's operation is the latest in a series of actions designed to wrest Basrah from the grip of the Mahdi Army. On April 18, the Iraqi security forces detained 35 "wanted men" in Basrah, Al Faw, and Al Qornah. One of those captured included an "accused suspected of being involved in the attempt on the life of one of top Shiite Cleric Ali al Sistani's representatives in Basrah." The Sistani representative was seriously wounded in the assassination attempt.

Also on April 18, Iraqi troops surrounded an office of the Sadrist movement in the heart of the city. The building complex is owned by the Iraqi Olympic Committee and was occupied by other political parties, all of whom left after receiving notice from the government. The Iraqi military has been ordered to eject political parties from state-owned buildings, but the Sadrist party is refusing to leave. A 48-hour deadline has been issued for the Sadrists to leave. The Sadrists have said they have begun to leave the premises and will be out of the buildings today. . . .

Read the entire article. And this from the Washington Post:

. . . "We confiscated many cars with no license plates that were used in kidnappings and assassinations," said Maj. Gen. Jalil Khalaf, the Basra police chief. "And we found thousands of roadside bombs in Hayaniyah."

Faiz Mohammed, 41, who lives in Hayaniyah, said, "We feel safer now."

In a news conference, the Iranian ambassador to Iraq said his government supported Maliki's recent Basra offensive, saying the Iraqi government has a right to target "criminal groups." But the ambassador, Hassan Kazemi Qomi, said the U.S. military operations in Sadr City were ill-conceived.

"The American forces bombed the homes of innocent people," he said. "Many people are also being forced to leave their homes." The U.S. military said it targets fighters, not civilians.

Qomi's remarks are sure to renew speculation about the ties between Iran and both the Sadrists and the Maliki-led government. His strong endorsement of the Basra operation suggests that Iran may be choosing sides in the Shiite-on-Shiite fighting. It may also bolster the view of some Iraqis that Iran, which the United States has accused of supplying Sadrists with weapons, no longer supports Sadr as strongly as it once did.

Read the entire article. As to Oomi, he is a known Qods Force member. I would not take any of his remarks at face value. One wonders how this will all play in Tehran.

Read More...

Summary only...

Assessing The Road To A Stable Iraq

Ann Gildroy and Michael O'Hanlon, writing in the Washington Post, do a good job of assessing how we get from today's reality to a stable and secure Iraq. There is much to do, and it requires America to maintain its committment, but they see the end goal as achievable within the next few years.

_________________________________________________________

This from Ann Gildroy and Michael O'Hanlon today:

Last week, in testimony before Congress, Gen. David Petraeus had a chance to answer the half-rhetorical question he coined at the start of the Iraq war: "Tell me how this ends?" Appropriately, he chose not to answer. In fact, he declined to speculate whether U.S. combat force reductions beyond those planned through July would be possible later this year.

At one level, we know what the answer should be -- an Iraq democratic and stable enough to hold together on its own once we leave. If politicians can resolve major differences without escalating bloodshed, and if they oppose terrorism, eschew nuclear weapons, and avoid blatant aggression against their neighbors or their own people, we will have achieved our core goals.

But how to get there and on what timeline? . . .

We believe that, after a 75 percent reduction in the rate of violence in Iraq over the past year, and significant accomplishments by Iraqi leaders on at least half a dozen key political matters, there is a reasonable prospect of achieving a sustainable stability there within the next few years. That said, continued progress will be far more likely if major reductions in U.S. forces beyond those currently planned await early 2010. There are six key reasons that such strategic patience is appropriate:

· Basra and the south. As events in March showed, Iraq's south has a long way to go. Competing Shiite militias, with varying ties to Iran and the Iraqi government, pursue the spoils of power and oil wealth there. Basra is a virtual mafia land. Over time, the Iraqi government cannot leave this region, which accounts for 70 to 80 percent of the country's oil wealth, in the hands of criminals. We may not need large U.S. forces in the south, but we will need greater, not less, engagement in the coming year or two.

· Local and national elections. This fall, Iraq is scheduled to have local elections in its 18 provinces. Next fall, it will have parliamentary elections at the national level. Election sites, political offices and campaign events all require physical protection. We do not want to make Iraqi politicians worry so much about security that they behave as they did in the 2005 elections, watching out for their own sectarian groups (and affiliated militias) out of sheer survival instinct. Those who claim that accelerating our drawdown will foster greater Iraqi political compromise and reconciliation do not, in our experience, understand the motives and the reasoning of most Iraqis.

· Refugee return. Since 2003, more than 2 million Iraqis have fled their country, and a comparable number have been internally displaced. With security now far better, many will be interested in going home. But as their homes are generally occupied by others, doing so could reignite an ethnic cleansing dynamic. There is no organized process in place to handle this problem. Nor is there an international or Iraqi program to help people relocate elsewhere in Iraq (with, for example, housing grants to build new homes, which could also help create jobs). Pulling American forces out before such a policy can be developed and implemented would ask far too much of Iraqi Security Forces, given the incendiary nature of this issue.

· Kirkuk. The problem of disputed property is most acute in Kirkuk, an oil-rich city in northern Iraq that Kurds feel to be rightly theirs but where many Sunni Arabs reside as well (having been relocated there by Saddam Hussein in recent decades). A referendum was supposed to have been held last year to resolve Kirkuk's status. But the United States rightly discouraged the vote from happening then because there was no adequate mechanism to compensate those who would have lost at the polls (whoever they might have been). Until a referendum can be written, voted upon and initially implemented, Kirkuk will remain a powder keg. We will be asking for trouble if we expect Iraqis to handle this on their own so soon.

· A national oil law. Related to Kirkuk is the question of how Iraq's future oil resources will be developed and shared. . . .

· "Overwatch" of Iraqi security forces. The Iraqi army and police are much larger, better equipped and more proficient than ever. But they are still not a dependable force. Just last year, we had to ask Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to purge well over half the brigade and battalion commanders of each organization in the Baghdad area. Another round of purges, maybe two, may be necessary. . . .

There is real hope for major progress on most of these matters in the coming two years. If this does not happen, or if backsliding occurs on other key political and strategic issues where progress has been made recently, the case for a continued American presence in Iraq will weaken. Either way, we can aspire to major additional reductions in U.S. force levels come 2010. But alas, probably not before.

Read the entire article. They bring up a point here that bears emphasis. Yes, we can and do need a national discussion on Iraq and how to go forward. But the meme that somehow drawing down our forces will increase the chances of reconcilliation is dangerously ludicrous. Assertions such as that are not part of a reasoned debate. They are far left screed.

(H/T IraqPundit)

Read More...

Summary only...