The Kurdish Problem

This is an issue I have been blogging about since the inception of this blog - Iraq's problem with an adventurous Kurdish north that wants to establish what amounts to a separate state. One of the aspects of that was the "Article 140" problem - the drive by the Kurds to claim Kirkuk, with its giant oil basin, as their own. As the NYT notes today, this has developed into a "powder keg."
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This from the NYT:

The phone rang, and it was answered by a Kurdish security commander, Hallo Najat, sitting in his office in this deeply divided city. On the line, he said, was a United Nations official wanting to know whether it was true that the Kurdish militia, the pesh merga, had left its bases in northern Iraq and was occupying Kirkuk.

No, Mr. Najat told the caller. But after hanging up, he wryly revealed the deeper truth about Kirkuk, combustible for its mix of ethnicities floating together on a sea of oil: the Kurds already control it.

“It’s true,” Mr. Najat said. “What is the need for the troops?”

Of all the political problems facing Iraq today, perhaps none is so intractable as the fate of Kirkuk, a city of 900,000 that Kurds, Arabs and Turkmens all claim as their own. The explosive quarrel over the city is one major barrier to creating stable political structures in the rest of Iraq.

Beyond that, it demonstrates that despite a recent decline in violence, Iraq’s unsettled ethnic and regional discord could still upend directives emanating from Baghdad and destabilize large swaths of the country — or even set off a civil war.

This month, legislation in the national Parliament to set the groundwork for crucial provincial elections collapsed in a bitter dispute over Kirkuk, as Arabs and Turkmens demanded that the Kurds be forced to cede some of their power here. But with the Kurds having already consolidated their authority in Kirkuk, there seemed little chance — short of a military intervention — of that happening.

Kurdish authority is visible everywhere in the city. In addition to the provincial government and command of the police, the Kurds control the Asaish, the feared undercover security service that works with the American military and, according to Asaish commanders, United States intelligence agencies.

Asaish officers are often the first to the scene of an attack and, other Kurdish officials concede, seem always to have the best intelligence. The leaders of the Asaish report only to the dominant Kurdish political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.

“He’s my boss,” said Mr. Najat, the commander of the K.D.P. Asaish force in Kirkuk, glancing at a picture of Masrur Barzani, the head of intelligence for the K.D.P. and the son of the party’s leader, Massoud Barzani.

. . . Under Saddam Hussein, tens of thousands of Kurdish families were ousted from Kirkuk, replaced by Arabs as part of his drive to obtain a firmer political grip on the enormous oil reserves here. But after the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Kurdish militiamen reversed the process, driving out Arabs and bringing in Kurds. Arabs and Turkmens now make up about 40 percent of Kirkuk’s population, according to American military estimates.

The Kurds want to fold Kirkuk into the neighboring Kurdistan region. They also warn that any plan stripping them of power will be harshly contested.

. . . Colonel Paschal blames all the political parties for inflaming tensions to serve their interests. But he said it was difficult to comprehend the level of mistrust.

“Negotiations here are, ‘You give me everything I want, and I will walk away happy,’ ” he said. “It is hard for us to appreciate the level of ethnic hatred.”

Read the entire article.

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Assessing The Road To A Stable Iraq

Ann Gildroy and Michael O'Hanlon, writing in the Washington Post, do a good job of assessing how we get from today's reality to a stable and secure Iraq. There is much to do, and it requires America to maintain its committment, but they see the end goal as achievable within the next few years.

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This from Ann Gildroy and Michael O'Hanlon today:

Last week, in testimony before Congress, Gen. David Petraeus had a chance to answer the half-rhetorical question he coined at the start of the Iraq war: "Tell me how this ends?" Appropriately, he chose not to answer. In fact, he declined to speculate whether U.S. combat force reductions beyond those planned through July would be possible later this year.

At one level, we know what the answer should be -- an Iraq democratic and stable enough to hold together on its own once we leave. If politicians can resolve major differences without escalating bloodshed, and if they oppose terrorism, eschew nuclear weapons, and avoid blatant aggression against their neighbors or their own people, we will have achieved our core goals.

But how to get there and on what timeline? . . .

We believe that, after a 75 percent reduction in the rate of violence in Iraq over the past year, and significant accomplishments by Iraqi leaders on at least half a dozen key political matters, there is a reasonable prospect of achieving a sustainable stability there within the next few years. That said, continued progress will be far more likely if major reductions in U.S. forces beyond those currently planned await early 2010. There are six key reasons that such strategic patience is appropriate:

· Basra and the south. As events in March showed, Iraq's south has a long way to go. Competing Shiite militias, with varying ties to Iran and the Iraqi government, pursue the spoils of power and oil wealth there. Basra is a virtual mafia land. Over time, the Iraqi government cannot leave this region, which accounts for 70 to 80 percent of the country's oil wealth, in the hands of criminals. We may not need large U.S. forces in the south, but we will need greater, not less, engagement in the coming year or two.

· Local and national elections. This fall, Iraq is scheduled to have local elections in its 18 provinces. Next fall, it will have parliamentary elections at the national level. Election sites, political offices and campaign events all require physical protection. We do not want to make Iraqi politicians worry so much about security that they behave as they did in the 2005 elections, watching out for their own sectarian groups (and affiliated militias) out of sheer survival instinct. Those who claim that accelerating our drawdown will foster greater Iraqi political compromise and reconciliation do not, in our experience, understand the motives and the reasoning of most Iraqis.

· Refugee return. Since 2003, more than 2 million Iraqis have fled their country, and a comparable number have been internally displaced. With security now far better, many will be interested in going home. But as their homes are generally occupied by others, doing so could reignite an ethnic cleansing dynamic. There is no organized process in place to handle this problem. Nor is there an international or Iraqi program to help people relocate elsewhere in Iraq (with, for example, housing grants to build new homes, which could also help create jobs). Pulling American forces out before such a policy can be developed and implemented would ask far too much of Iraqi Security Forces, given the incendiary nature of this issue.

· Kirkuk. The problem of disputed property is most acute in Kirkuk, an oil-rich city in northern Iraq that Kurds feel to be rightly theirs but where many Sunni Arabs reside as well (having been relocated there by Saddam Hussein in recent decades). A referendum was supposed to have been held last year to resolve Kirkuk's status. But the United States rightly discouraged the vote from happening then because there was no adequate mechanism to compensate those who would have lost at the polls (whoever they might have been). Until a referendum can be written, voted upon and initially implemented, Kirkuk will remain a powder keg. We will be asking for trouble if we expect Iraqis to handle this on their own so soon.

· A national oil law. Related to Kirkuk is the question of how Iraq's future oil resources will be developed and shared. . . .

· "Overwatch" of Iraqi security forces. The Iraqi army and police are much larger, better equipped and more proficient than ever. But they are still not a dependable force. Just last year, we had to ask Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to purge well over half the brigade and battalion commanders of each organization in the Baghdad area. Another round of purges, maybe two, may be necessary. . . .

There is real hope for major progress on most of these matters in the coming two years. If this does not happen, or if backsliding occurs on other key political and strategic issues where progress has been made recently, the case for a continued American presence in Iraq will weaken. Either way, we can aspire to major additional reductions in U.S. force levels come 2010. But alas, probably not before.

Read the entire article. They bring up a point here that bears emphasis. Yes, we can and do need a national discussion on Iraq and how to go forward. But the meme that somehow drawing down our forces will increase the chances of reconcilliation is dangerously ludicrous. Assertions such as that are not part of a reasoned debate. They are far left screed.

(H/T IraqPundit)

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Kurdistan Looming

The problem of Kurdish seperatism and obstructionism still looms as the sleeper issue that could tear apart Iraq.





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I wrote here that the problem of Kurdistan promises to be the biggest problem facing the nation building process in Iraq. Michael O'Hanlon and Omer Taspinar write in the Washington Post today, highlighting this issue:

Increasingly, Iraq's Kurds appear to be interfering with efforts to foster political accommodation among their country's major sectarian groups. Since Iraq's future hinges on establishing such a spirit of compromise, this trend has potentially grave implications for Iraq, its neighbors and the United States.

Two key issues stand out. First, Kurds are beginning to develop oil fields on their territory with foreign investors but with no role for Baghdad, claiming cover under Iraq's 2005 constitution. But the relevant sections of the Iraqi constitution (articles 109 through 112, among others) state that future oil wells will be developed by Iraq's provinces and regions in conjunction with the central government.

Second, Kurds want to reclaim the city of Kirkuk and its surrounding oil fields, which may hold about 15 percent of Iraq's total reserves. Kurds claim, with considerable justification, that many properties in the city were taken from them under Saddam Hussein's "Arabization" programs. Kurds want the homes back. More broadly, they want to control the politics of Kirkuk and environs, up to and including the possibility of Kirkuk and its oil joining the region of Iraqi Kurdistan (which many Kurds hope will ultimately become independent). Because of these ambitions, it has been difficult to hold a referendum on Kirkuk's future; a referendum was supposed to have taken place by the end of 2007.

The Kurds are making a major mistake. They should rethink their approach both out of fairness to the United States, which has given them a chance to help build a post-Hussein Iraq, and in the interests of the Kurds and their neighbors. Baghdad needs a role in developing future oil fields and sharing revenue; Kirkuk needs to remain where it is in Iraq's political system, or perhaps attain a special status. It should not be muscled away into Kurdistan.

It is hard to be sure, but the Kurds seem to believe that if Iraq fails, they will be okay. Under this theory, even if the country splits apart, the United States will stand by its Kurdish friends, establish military bases in Iraqi Kurdistan, and ultimately ease the way toward its independence. . . .

To be sure, many Americans admire the democratic, prosperous, resilient Kurds. Americans also feel a moral debt after allowing Hussein to oppress the Kurds so many times in the past. But after protecting the Kurds since 1991 and spending hundreds of billions of dollars and thousands of American lives in Iraq over the past five years, that moral debt has been partially repaid. If the Kurds will not now help the United States in stabilizing Iraq, is there really a sense of common purpose, and a set of shared interests, between the two peoples?

Instead of pursuing a maximalist agenda in Kirkuk and a dream of independence, the Kurds should opt for realism. This means recognizing that if Iraq falls apart, they will be on their own. It also means recognizing that Turkey, with its 15 million Kurds, is very nervous about Kurdish independence. Yet the Kurds of Iraq should also know that a Turkish-Kurdish war is not destiny. In fact, with visionary leadership in Ankara and Irbil, Turkish-Kurdish economic, political and military cooperation -- starting with joint operations against the terrorist Kurdish group, the PKK -- could lead to genuine friendship. After all, Turkey is the most democratic, secular and pro-Western of Iraq's neighbors, attributes that Iraqi Kurdistan shares.

Iraq's Kurds have a remarkable future almost within their grasp. But they face a crucial choice: They can attain that future by compromising with their fellow Iraqis, forming a partnership with Turkey and strengthening their bond with the United States. Or they can continue to pursue their own agenda in a way that ultimately shatters their country and destabilizes the broader region.

Read the article here.

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The Biggest Threat To Iraq

The biggest threat to Iraq in the long is not al Qaeda, and arguably, not Iran. It is the seperatism and adventurism of the Kurds that threatens to destroy the central government of Iraq and be the cause of a true civil war.




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As I have written previously:

Under our umbrella of protection after the first Gulf War, the Kurds became a separate country and, after the fall of Saddam, made clear that they had no desire to reintegrate into a larger Iraq. They have tried to stay out of the ambit of national laws, attempted to exercise control over oil assets in the north - including the passage of their own hydrocarbon laws in August in direct opposition to the Iraq central government - and manuevered to take control of Kirkuk and Mosul. They have played against our efforts over the past several years to create a united Iraq, . . .

See here.

With that in mind, there is this today from the NYT:

As a minority group in Iraq, the Kurds have enjoyed disproportionate influence in the country’s politics since the ouster of Saddam Hussein in 2003. But now their leverage appears to be declining as tensions rise with Iraqi Arabs, raising the specter of another fissure alongside the sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shiites.

The Kurds, who are mostly Sunni but not Arab, have steadfastly backed the government, most recently helping to keep it afloat when Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki lacked support from much of Parliament.

With their political acumen, close ties to the Americans and technical competence at running government agencies, the Kurds cemented a position of enormous strength. This allowed them to all but dictate terms in Iraq’s Constitution that gave them considerable regional autonomy and some significant rights in oil development.

But now the Kurds are pursuing policies that are antagonizing the other factions. The Kurds’ efforts to seize control of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk and to gain a more advantageous division of national revenues are uniting most Sunnis and many Shiites with Mr. Maliki’s government in opposition to the Kurdish demands.

For the United States, the diminution in Kurdish power is part of a larger problem of political divisiveness that has plagued its efforts to build a functioning government in Iraq. While several political parties can come together to address a particular issue, none can seem to form the lasting allegiances needed for actual governance.

The Kurds, with their pro-American outlook, were a natural ally. But now the Americans are increasingly placed in the uncomfortable position of choosing between the Kurds, whom they have long supported and protected, and the Iraqi Arabs, whose government the Americans helped create.

One major Shiite group, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, has not publicly taken sides, but powerful people within the party have been openly critical of the Kurds. Others expressing frustration are leading members of Parliament and Hussain al-Shahristani, the oil minister and a prominent Shiite politician, who calls Kurdish oil contracts with foreign companies illegal.

Humam Hamoudi, a leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, said, “They are no longer the egg in the balance,” using an Arabic proverb that refers to the item that tips the scale. Mr. Hamoudi added, “The Kurds are not so powerful.”

Independent analysts largely back that assertion. “There’s a strong feeling that the Kurds have overreached,” said Joost Hiltermann, a senior analyst for the Middle East at the International Crisis Group who is based in Istanbul.

“The Kurds had their eye on independence in the long term, and they wanted to use the current window to increase the territory they hold and the powers they exercise within the territory,” he added. “They’ve done well on the powers, but not so well on the territory. They now face real restrictions.”

The jousting threatens to undermine much of what the Kurds have achieved in political influence and to supersede, at least temporarily, the far deeper divide between Sunnis and Shiites.

And by helping unite Sunnis and Shiites, the Kurds’ overreaching has strengthened the hand of Mr. Maliki despite widespread doubts about his ability to govern effectively. The tensions could even persuade the central government to further postpone an already delayed referendum on whether to make Kirkuk part of the Kurds’ semiautonomous region.

. . . In a signal of its displeasure, Parliament has refused to approve a new budget because it awards the Kurds 17 percent of the total revenues, which many representatives say is more than their share based on population. Because Iraq has not had a census in decades, it is impossible to know the true size of the Kurdish population. Some Kurdish leaders say it could be 23 percent; some Arabs say it is 13 percent.

The Kurds are also believed to collect millions of dollars in duties on goods coming into Iraq but they neither send the money to Baghdad nor share accounts of the income, according to the International Monetary Fund.

Parliament members are also angered that the Kurds want Baghdad to pay salaries of their militia, the pesh merga, from the Defense Ministry’s budget. The pesh merga operate primarily in Kurdistan rather than serving the country as a whole.

However, the Kurds contend that in the event of an invasion they would be on the front lines. Such a situation seems all too real to the Kurds, because Turkey has recently threatened to invade to rout the rebel Kurdistan Workers Party. The rebels have been mounting attacks over the border into Turkish territory.

Perhaps most grating for Iraqi Arabs, the Kurds have refused to back down on the oil exploration contracts they have signed with foreign companies. Arabs view the central government as the only entity empowered to approve contracts, albeit in consultation with the regions where the oil is located.

The Kurds argue that the central government has been dragging its feet on an oil law and that they cannot afford to defer oil exploration and development further, said Ros Shawees, a former vice president of Iraq and point man in Baghdad for Massoud Barzani, the president of the semiautonomous Kurdistan Regional Government.

The Kurds acknowledge that they are worried by the opposition that has developed, although they are reluctant to concede that they may have overplayed their hand. “It is necessary to keep such feelings to a minimum,” Mr. Shawees said. “We have to work in different respects to show that the Kurdish region doesn’t just make demands and take things, but that the region is an example for all regions and it can benefit all Iraq.”

For now, however, the budget has yet to be approved, the oil law and revenue sharing laws are in limbo, and there is a new and visible fault line on the Iraqi political scene.

Read the article. The Kurds have in fact significantly overreached. There can be little doubt that the U.S. sent a message to the Kurds when it began providing actionable intelligence to Turkey about the location of PKK forces across the Iraqi border. The question is whether the Kurds are listening?

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