Hang 'Em . . . Hang "Em High

Two years ago, I excoriated the drafters of the NIE on Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program - Thomas Fingar, Kenneth Brill, and H. Van Diepen - for drafting what was clearly then a highly politicized document that ignored the great weight of publicly available facts and, moreover, came to ridiculously unsupportable conclusions. Those conclusions included that Iran had ceased its nuclear weapons program in 2003, that Iran's nuclear program since was civilian in nature, that Iran would respond "rationally" to carrots and sticks, and that Iran was amendable to negotiations. It was a document drafted with the intent of tying Bush's hands in dealing with the mad mullahs.

What we have learned since is that our intelligence agencies had known for years that Iran had built a secret enrichment plant near Qom that was too small for commercial use, but the correct size for enriching uranium to weapons grade quality. That was known at the time that the NIE was released but was held in confidence by the U.S. Now we learn that Iran has been working on a critical component of atomic weapons since 2007 - in addition of course to enriching vast amounts of uranium for which they had no other use than to make atomic weapons. This from the Washington Post:

Western and U.N. nuclear officials are evaluating a secret Iranian technical document that appears to show the country's nuclear scientists testing a key component used in the detonation of a nuclear warhead, according to intelligence officials and weapons experts familiar with the document.

The document, if authenticated, could rank as one of the strongest pieces of evidence pointing to a clandestine Iranian effort to build nuclear weapons, said former intelligence officials and weapons experts. They were responding to a published report of alleged sophisticated research by Iran on one of the final stages in the construction of a nuclear device.

Excerpts from the technical paper, first reported on the Times of London Web site late Sunday, detail a four-year program by Iranian scientists to develop and test a neutron initiator, a device used to trigger a nuclear explosion.

Although the document is undated, the Times quoted foreign intelligence officials as saying it was written in 2007, more than four years after U.S. intelligence agencies believe Iran stopped research on a nuclear warhead.

"It looks bad -- there is no doubt about it," said David Albright, a former inspector with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. nuclear watchdog, who reviewed the document and other papers for the London newspaper. He said work on a neutron initiator is a "very strong indicator of nuclear work." . . .

To say this comes as no surprise is an understatement. Anyone who for a second believes that Iran's nuclear program is for civilian use is naive to the point of suicidal. Bush had a window of opportunity to deal with the mad mullahs by force or the credible threat of force through 2007. When the NIE came out, it wholly emasculated the Bush regime in as much as they could no longer even credibly threaten force against Iran. As I wrote at that time, the NIE's effect would give Iran far more time to procure a nuclear arsenal, thus meaning that what we might have been able to stop with little cost would instead, eventually, require an exponentially greater cost in American blood and gold to end. Shades of Nazi Germany, circa 1937 to 1939.

In light of the revelations subsequent to the release of the NIE, it is becoming increasingly clear that what the authors of that document did amounted to treason. When Republicans again take control of Congress, one of their first acts should be to investigate the troika of Fingar, Brill and Van Diepen. Then they should be treated accordingly. I will donate the rope.

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Europe Not Buying the US NIE Labeling Iran's Nuclear Program "Civilian"

This is rather an interesting turn of events. Europe has consistently embraced "soft power" to deal with Iran. But that was changing as the crescendo rose to do something about Iran’s ongoing nuclear weapon’s program that clearly presents an existential threat to Europe and the entire West. The push was on for at least one round of very biting sanctions to convince Iran to verifiably end their nuclear program as the last alternative to our use of overwhelming force. At least, the crescendo was rising until the internal coup by our intelligence agencies who drafted an NIE that labeled Iran’s ongoing nuclear enrichment as "civilian" and claimed that Iran had stopped its nuclear weapons program in 2003.

I will admit that, given the past history of our European allies, I fully expected that they would use our NIE as an excuse to once again refuse to implement any meaningful sanctions that would bite into the extensive trade they have with Iran. Perhaps I was wrong, but I still have very deep doubts that are only marginally placated by the statements below. But if not else, readers should take note of just how ridiculously inexplicable it is to label Iran’s enrichment program "civilian:"

On December 13, 2007, Neil Crompton, Hans-Peter Hinrichsen, and Nicholas Roche addressed a Policy Forum at The Washington Institute. Mr. Crompton is a political counselor at the British embassy who served until recently as Iran coordinator and head of the Iraq Policy Unit at the British Foreign Office. Dr. Hinrichsen, first secretary for political affairs at the German embassy, has long worked on non-proliferation issues. Mr. Roche is a counselor at the French embassy who has focused extensively on the Iranian nonproliferation file. The following is a rapporteur's summary of their remarks.

NEIL CROMPTON: Much of the reporting in the United States about the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) has been misleading. The European and international concern about Iran's nuclear ambitions has never been about weaponization, but rather the other elements essential to having nuclear weapons, namely uranium enrichment and missiles. Iran is actively pursuing enrichment, which is the most complicated and time-consuming part of the nuclear program. Also, it proudly displays missiles that are too inaccurate to be useful with conventional warheads.

International concern over Iran's nuclear program is also not based on highly sensitive intelligence material. The concern reflects the activities surrounding the declared program, the fact that Iran concealed that program for eighteen years, and that Iran has not resolved significant questions about its past activities. There has been some speculation that the NIE will weaken pressure for sanctions. Actually, the NIE could have the opposite effect. There has been much concern in Europe that sanctions will inevitability lead to military action. However, now that the prospects of a military strike have been reduced, there might be more willingness in some countries to pursue more sanctions. . .

HANS-PETER HINRICHSEN: The NIE has not had a significant impact on Germany's policy towards Iran. German policy has never been based on Iran's hidden nuclear program, but on its large enrichment program and the heavy water reactor it is building. That reactor has no civilian use, and it is very instructive to look around the world to see who has such reactors and what have they have done with them. Considering Iranian behavior is one of the crucial factors when judging whether Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for civilian purposes. Ahmadinezhad's aggressive rhetoric towards Israel gives the international community basis to be concerned about whether Iran's intentions are peaceful -- a test set out by the UN Security Council resolutions.

There is a misconception that there is not enough communication with the Iranians, and a related misconception that the United States is not involved in discussions with the Iranians. In fact, Javier Solana has met repeatedly with the Iranians. He is inaccurately described in the American media as speaking for the Europeans. In fact, he is talking with Iran on behalf of the EU 3 + 3, that is, the United States, Russia, and China, plus Britain, France and Germany. He speaks for all six countries. The UN sanctions are reflective of world unity on this issue and a clear message needs to be sent to Tehran through another round of sanctions. The EU will take measures to reinforce and complement the UN sanctions so that they can be more effective, and will take care to ensure that its actions do not substitute for or undermine the sanctions. Sanctions on Iran have so far proven effective. They have induced Tehran to answer some of the open questions with the International Atomic Energy Agency because the sanctions have made business life difficult in Iran. For example, German exports to Iran dropped 7 percent in 2006 and 16 percent in 2007.

NICHOLAS ROCHE The NIE has made more noise in Washington than in Europe. France's strategy has always been based on certain simple facts, not intelligence judgments.

First, the Iranians have possessed a clandestine nuclear program for eighteen years, procuring technology from the A.Q. Khan network, which is not known for its expertise in electricity production. Second, the Iranians have developed an enrichment program with no foreseeable civilian use. It is worth emphasizing that the Iranians have not mastered the technology for producing fuel rods. Russia, which will provide the fuel for the Bushehr power reactor, will not under any circumstances provide Iran with the information it would need for Iran's fuel to be used in that reactor. This begs the questions, why is Iran enriching uranium, and what will it do with the material?

The appropriate course now is to continue the sanctions and to finalize a third UN resolution. Although at some point it may become necessary to reconsider this strategy, France does not see any particular "red line" that would force a change in approach. That said, there is always room for maneuvering on the current policy, such as on the modalities of negotiation. Enrichment suspension is the key element to regain confidence in Iran's peaceful intentions. There cannot be negotiations while Iran continues to advance its nuclear program. Without suspension, the ongoing Iranian program would give Iran the capability to build nuclear weapons very quickly.

Read the entire article. I do not believe that the European's embrace of soft power will force a change in the theocracy's actions. Then again, at least they are honest about the threat Iran poses. That puts them a step ahead of our intelligence agencies and those on the far left who are embracing the NIE as if it was carved on stone by fire coming from a burning bush.

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Krauthammer on Iran, the NIE, Iraq and North Korea

Charles Krauthammer takes stock of our record on the Axis of Evil: Iraq, Iran and North Korea. Krauthammer's scorecard: Iraq we've won, Iran we've lost to an internal coup, and North Korea is a draw:

. . . Iran. Bush has thrown in the towel on Iran's nuclear program because the intelligence bureaucracy, in a spectacularly successful coup, seized control of the policy with a National Intelligence Estimate that very misleadingly trumpeted the claim that Iran had halted its nuclear program. In fact, Iran halted only the least important component of its nuclear program, namely weaponization.

The hard part is the production of nuclear fuel. Iran continues enriching uranium with 3,000 centrifuges at work in open defiance of U.N. Security Council resolutions. Once you have the necessary fuel, you can make the bomb in only a few months.

Thus to even speak of the Iranian program as having been stopped while enrichment continues is absurd. And that is true even if you discount recent dissidents' reports that the weaponization program, suspended in 2003, in fact resumed the following year -- contrary to the current NIE finding, offered with only "moderate confidence," that it has never been restarted.

The administration had to immediately release and accept the NIE's sensational conclusions because the report would have been leaked and the administration then accused of covering up good news to justify going to war, the assumption being that George Bush and Dick Cheney have a Patton-like lust for the smell of battle.

The administration understands that the NIE's distorted message that Iran has given up pursuing nukes has not only taken any military option off the table but also jeopardized any further sanctions against Iran. Making the best of the lost cause, Bush will now go through the motions until the end of his term, leaving the Iranian bomb to his successor.

North Korea. We did get Kim Jong Il to disable his plutonium-producing program. The next step is for Pyongyang to disclose all nuclear activities.

. . . Disabling the plutonium reactor is an achievement, and we do gain badly needed intelligence by simply being there on the ground to inspect. There is, however, no hope of North Korea giving up its existing nuclear weapons stockpile and little assurance that we will find, let alone disable, any clandestine programs. But lacking sticks, we take what we can.

Iraq is a different story. Whatever our subsequent difficulties, our initial success definitively rid the world of Saddam Hussein and his monstrous sons. The Hussein dynasty will not -- as it would have, absent the U.S. invasion -- rebuild, rearm and threaten the world.

. . . It took Bush three years to find his general (as it did Lincoln) and turn a losing war into a winnable one. Baghdad and Washington are currently discussing a long-term basing agreement that could give the United States a permanent military presence in the region and a close cooperative relationship with the most important country in the Middle East heartland -- a major strategic achievement. . . .

Read the entire article. Unfortunately, the true existential threat is Iran. And in this game, we cannot afford to lose one out of three.

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More Peaceful Nuclear Work By Iran

Iran received the first fuel shipment from Russia for its light water nuclear power plant at Bushehr. Simultaneously, Iran announced that it will build another nuclear power plant, "360-megawatt indigenous power plant in Darkhovein." Iran is using this claim to justify their continued enrichment of nuclear fuel at Natanz.

No word yet if they have broken ground on such a plant, which would be years in contruction, and whether it would be a heavy water reactor. That would add a bare patina of justification for Iran’s operational heavy water plant. Nor is there any word as to why they need to be continuing to enrich fuel now when the earliest need to fuel at Darkhovein will be many years in the future. Fuel enriched to about 5% HEU for use in a power plant only has a three to four year life when it comes through the enrichment process. The same enrichment process for fuel rods can be continued, however, and used to enrich uranium to weapons grade 85% or greater HEU.

No matter. We have been assured by our intelligence community that this is legitimate civilian work and that there is no need for any force, Iran's theocracy being rational. Let us hope they are right, because there is nothing we can do now that will stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. And because of that, we will be unable to stop nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. God help us.

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