Iranian Proxies Target Shias In Major Bombing In Baghdad

The success of the surge and the rise of Iraqi forces in combatting al Qaeda has been bad news for Iran. The mad mullahs had used the threat of al Qaeda to provide cover for their attempts to weaken the Iraqi government and "Lebanize" Iraq. But with al Qaeda in full retreat, the extent of the neighboring theocracy's deadly meddling and its deeply nefarious strategy stands exposed. Iran's proxies have responded yesterday with a major car bombing against a predominantly Shia neighborhood that reportedly killed fifty innocents and wounded up to 80 more. This slaughter was designed to appear as an al Qaeda operation.
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This from the Long War Journal:

Yesterday's car bomb attack in the Shia neighborhood of Hayy Hurriyah in Baghdad's Kadamiyah district was carried out by a Mahdi Army Special Group cell, and not al Qaeda in Iraq, the US military stated.

The bombing was the largest inside Baghdad since March. . .

A Mahdi Army cell leader named Haydar Mahdi Khadum Al Fawadi was behind the attack, according to intelligence information obtained by Multinational Forces Iraq.

"We believe the attack was not conducted by AQI [al Qaeda in Iraq]," said Lieutenant Colonel Steven Stover, the chief Public Affairs Officer for Multinational Division Baghdad in an e-mail to The Long War Journal. Though vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices are a trademark of AQI, our intelligence, corroborated through multiple sources, is this atrocity was committed by a special groups cell led by Haydar Mahdi Khadum Al Fawadi."

Fawadi is behind multiple attacks on US and Iraqi forces. He uses the deadly explosively formed projectile weapons, which are manufactured in Iran, and more conventional roadside bombs in his attacks. "He intimidates the Shia population with threats of violence and murder," said Stover.

Stover said the intelligence indicates yesterday's attack was conducted to "incite Shia violence against Sunnis," and Fawadi hoped to "disrupt Sunni resettlement in Hurriyah in order to maintain extortion of real estate rental income to support his nefarious activities."

A Special Groups cell did take credit for the attack, said Stover. They claimed to have been targeting Coalition forces, but the closest forces nearby were more than 150 yards away.

While the attack has the hallmarks of an al Qaeda in Iraq strike, the type of vehicle used in the attack and the unknown origin of the explosive materials used in the attack, along with the other information, point to the Mahdi Army. . . .

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Sadr, Iran, Hezbollah and the Special Groups

Sadr's Mahdi Army is an Iranian creation along the lines of - and with ties to - Hezbollah. The U.S. military has long maintained the fiction that a portion of the Mahdi Army, the special groups directly funded and trained by Iran, are seperate and apart from the Mahdi Army and acting outside of Sadr's control. It has been an effort to provide a face saving measure that would allow for, at best, Sadr to turn from Iran, and at least, to winnow off those people in the Sadrist camp who do want to be part of the Iranian inspired violence. But it is not an accurate portrayal.
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The Long War Journal adds a piece to the Sadr/Iran puzzle today:"

IN THE PAST MONTH, Iraqi and coalition forces have succeeded in their fight against the Mahdi Army's "special groups." On May 3, the U.S. military destroyed a special groups command center in Sadr City, killing a wanted leader in the attack. On May 25, Iraqi special operations forces captured a mid-level special groups leader in the al-Shuala area of Baghdad. And on May 31, Iraqi special operations forces captured another special groups "criminal" in Baghdad who was suspected of indirect-fire attacks on coalition forces. The frequency with which the term "special groups" has been thrown around in recent months (stretching back to the fighting in Basrah that flared up in late March) highlights the confusion that exists over what these groups really are.

Much of this confusion has been created by the U.S. military. In a July 2007 press conference, for example, Major General Kevin Bergner identified the special groups as secret cells of "militia extremists, funded, trained, and armed by external sources." Bergner explained during the press conference that the special groups had "evolved over the past three years into what are largely rogue elements" that operate separately from the core Mahdi Army.

Under this analysis, which has been repeated by various military spokesmen and widely accepted by the mainstream media, these special groups operate largely independently from Mahdi Army leader Muqtada al Sadr. The U.S. military maintains this narrative for tactical and political reasons. The problem with the claim is that it obscures Sadr's actual role in some of the most important events transpiring in Iraq.

THE MAHDI ARMY, known as Jaish al-Mahdi in Arabic, was created in the summer of 2003 and is led by the radical Iraqi cleric Muqtada al Sadr. Iraq expert Toby Dodge of the University of Warwick has said that Mahdi Army's membership is comprised mainly of "those young and desperate Shia in Iraq's urban slums who have not seen any benefit to their lives from liberation." In November 2006, the Pentagon's quarterly report Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq stated that the Mahdi Army had "replaced al-Qaeda in Iraq as the most dangerous accelerant of potentially self-sustaining sectarian violence in Iraq."

The Mahdi Army's activities are often compared to those of the Hezbollah terror group in Lebanon. The comparison is apt: The late Hezbollah military commander Imad Mughniyeh likely played a substantial role in the Mahdi Army's founding, and Mahdi Army members claim to have traveled to Lebanon to train with Hezbollah (an assertion confirmed by the U.S. government). In August 2007, Muqtada al Sadr publicly confirmed Mahdi Army's relationship with Hezbollah, stating: "We have formal links with Hizbollah, we do exchange ideas and discuss the situation facing Shiites in both countries . We copy Hizbollah in the way they fight and their tactics, we teach each other and we are getting better through this." Further proof of this relationship can be seen in the United States's capture of Ali Mussa Daqduq, a senior Hezbollah operative who was in Iraq to help establish new Mahdi Army units along the lines of Hezbollah.

Sadr himself is something of an anomaly. . . . A profile of Sadr in Cairo's Al Ahram Weekly states:

The sentences he utters are awkward and incomplete, and somehow lacking in conviction--hardly what one would expect of a man for whom the spoken word is his stock in trade. The black-turbaned clergymen of Iraq are masters of rhetorical eloquence, yet it would appear that the young Moqtada does not excel in this domain. His turn of phrase is alien to his surroundings, prone to collapse into casual speech and slang. As a public speaker, he fails to rise even to the level of the average literate Iraqi.

Sadr failed to finish his seminary education. In The Shia Revival, Vali Nasr notes that "as a youth he was better at playing video games than dealing with the intricacies of Shia law and theology (in his seminary days he was nicknamed Mulla Atari, after the maker of electronic amusements)." Despite this, it would be a serious mistake to underestimate Sadr's influence among Iraq's Shias--and to underestimate the degree of control he is capable of exerting over the Mahdi Army's disparate factions.

. . . Information about the degree of division within the Mahdi Army is sparse and often contradictory, with many assumptions built upon little evidence. However, the best reading of the situation is that although Sadr frequently gives the special groups autonomy over their local actions, he maintains the ability to control them when he chooses.

There are numerous reasons that information about the Mahdi Army's special groups is contradictory, but the biggest culprit has been the U.S. military's public statements. The military has taken a carrot-and-stick approach with Sadr and the Mahdi Army, encouraging Sadr to maintain the ceasefire that he declared in August 2007. As a result of this approach, the American military sees two strategic purposes behind trumpeting divisions between Sadr and the special groups. First, it is a face-saving tool. The military is able to save face by not labeling Sadr a terrorist, and thus maintaining its ability to engage him. Sadr in turn is able to save face before the Iraqi public: Whenever he quells the special groups' violent actions, he won't be seen as backing down before the U.S. because (according to this narrative) he did not initiate the violence in the first place. Second, the military hopes to drive an actual wedge between Sadr and some of the more violent Mahdi Army factions through this rhetoric.

To be sure, there are legitimate tensions within the Mahdi Army, including with respect to the splinter groups. One intelligence source told The Observer's Peter Beaumont in September 2006: "Certain parts [of Mahdi Army] are now operating like old-fashioned mobs. In the last year or so power has been given to certain individuals. They have created their own small armies which have gained power by controlling rackets around petrol stations, and thefts from people they kidnap and kill." . . . There is also bitterness toward Sadr within some [radical] Mahdi Army ranks due to his involvement in the political process, however halting. . . .

Despite these tensions, Sadr still exercises a significant degree of control over Mahdi Army activities, including those of the "splinter groups." . . .

As you move away from the official pronouncements of military spokesmen, American soldiers on the ground see little distinction between the Mahdi Army and the special groups. Captain Ron Underwood, an intelligence officer with the unit responsible for southeastern Sadr City, told the Washington Post that "the special groups all have direct communication with OMS [the office of Muqtada al Sadr]." Colonel John Hort, commander of the brigade fighting in Sadr City, told the Post: "Of course we're fighting Mahdi Army. There are hundreds of them throughout Sadr City." . . .

In addition to Sadr, Iran has great influence over the special groups. Iran's efforts at cultivating ties with Sadr and the Mahdi Army have been evident from the time of the militia's creation. These efforts have come in two forms: direct engagement with Sadr and his senior commanders, and (in Robert Dreyfuss's words) "reaching deep into Sadr's Mahdi Army militia." Iran has maintained a constant line of communication with Sadr. In fact, a senior U.S. intelligence source told us that while Sadr controls Mahdi Army, he is in turn "controlled by Iran through religious channels." Mullah Atari, having never finished seminary, depends heavily on Iranian clerics for religious support.

THE U.S. MILITARY IS not necessarily wrong for looking for ways to engage Sadr, and creating a narrative that allows this to happen. The considerations that produced this course of action are entirely reasonable. But analysts and commentators who do not peer below the surface are likely to misread the situation in Iraq, and the complex role that Sadr plays.

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Eye On Iran

It pays to always keep one eye on Iran - and this is an update of observations of late. Iran's theocracy is continuing its efforts to bring mayhem and death throughout the Middle East. Recent reports show Iran is behind the civil war in Yemen. In Iraq, Iran's proxies are feeling the heat as Iraqi and U.S. operational tempo has accelerated. Supreme Guide Ali Khameini and his sidekick, Ahmedinejad are waging an almost humorous propaganda offensive to sabotage the SOFA agreement being negotiated between the U.S. and Iraq. Lastly, Michael Ledeen writes a thought-provoking article on the nature of Iran's theocracy and the inexcusability of our failure to squarely meet this existential evil.
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In the post Next Moves In An Existential Chess Match, I listed many of the ongoing acts of mayhem, war and destruction being committed by Iran's theocracy as it seeks to export its revolution throughout the Middle East and the world. To add to that list is Iran's role in Yemen. This from the Washington Post:

The boom of explosions swept across the high-walled compounds and minarets of this ancient Arab capital before dawn one day last week, as Shiite rebels battled for control of a mountain overlooking the city and its airport. . . .

"I believe this war is a proxy war," Yemeni lawmaker Ahmed Saif Hashed said in Sanaa, where civilians of the same Shiite sect as the rebels say they are facing increasing detentions, beatings and surveillance.

The rebellion is being mounted by Yemen's Hashemite Shiites, who ruled the country for more than a 1,000 years until an alliance of Shiite and Sunni military officers deposed them in 1962. Yemen's president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, belongs to the country's larger Shiite community, known as the Zaidis.

Giving the conflict a sectarian cast, his forces have been joined by Sunni tribesmen and extremists in battling the Hashemite rebels, whom the government says are supported by Iran. The rebels say they want only their share of development, resources and power.

"I think there is kind of a settling of accounts here against Iran," Hashed said.

This week, 22 clerics in Saudi Arabia published a statement equating the Hashemite rebels with the Shiite movement Hezbollah in Lebanon. "If they have a country, they humiliate and exert control in their rule over Sunnis," the clerics said, citing Iran and Iraq. "They sow strife, corruption and destruction among Muslims and destabilize security in Muslim countries . . . such as Yemen."

Last year, Yemen's defense minister published what was widely interpreted as a fatwa, or binding religious decree, sanctioning Sunnis to use force against the northern Shiite rebels. The largely impoverished nation of 23 million is majority Sunni. . . .

Read the entire article. This is wholly in keeping with the pronouncement of Sec. Def. Gates a few months ago, that "[e]verywhere you turn, it is the policy of Iran to foment instability and chaos, no matter the strategic value or cost in the blood of innocents - Christians, Jews and Muslims alike. . . ."

Iran's proxy forces are under extreme pressure in Iraq of late. The pace of U.S. and Iraqi attacks against Iran's proxy forces in Iraq have accelerated with the capitulation of Sadr's two main bases in Basra and Sadr City.

As to Iran's increasing agitation over the SOFA agreement, first some background. If you have not read Col. H.R. McMaster's speech on Iraq and his comments on Iranian actions in Iraq, you will find it here. Some of the highlights include:

When I traveled through the south on a last couple of visits, what I heard – and this is again on the point of militias being increasingly discredited, and this is from Iraqi Shiite leaders who were saying things like Iran is the true occupier of Iraq. They would say jokingly that the Iranians are now all Iraqi nationalists, which is a thinly-veiled swipe at some of the militias in some of these areas.

. . . In the case of what Iran is doing in Iraq, it is so damn obvious to anybody who wants to look into it, I think, that is drop the word “alleged” and say what they’re doing, which is, we know for a fact organizing and directing operations against the government of Iraq and against our forces – the government of Iraq forces and our forces – we know they have done that, certainly in the past. We know that they are supplying them with weapons and the most effective weapons that they used to attack the Iraqi people and our forces and these include the long-range high payload rockets that have been coming in from Iraq as well as the explosively formed projectile roadside bombs that come from Iran.

We know that they have trained forces in the employment of these munitions - and in pretty large numbers. . . .

We know for a fact that they have directed assassination operations. . . .

We know that they ostensibly have supported this government but have armed, equipped and trained a militia that has been attacking the very government they ostensibly support. And this is not just something in Basra, this is last year. This is in Nasariyah, this is Samwa, this is in Diwaniyahm, this is in Amarah and it was in Karbala in August 26th and 27th of last year. And now again in Basra. . . .

Iran is doing all that it can to turn Iraq into Lebanon - both to export its revolution (the raison d'etre of the theocracy) and to end the single biggest threat to Iran's theocracy - a Shia dominated with real democracy on its boder that follows the traditional Shia school of quietism. The granite wall standing in between Iran and its goal to dominate Iraq is the U.S. military. Thus Iran is conducting propaganda offensive aimed at insuring that Iraq does not consumate a SOFA agreement. A SOFA agreement would establish the legal framework for the U.S. to maintain forces in Iraq after the end of the UN mandate in January. This from the WaPo today:

Ahmad Zeidabadi, a journalist for the Tehran-based magazine Shahrvand-e Emrooz (Today's Citizen), said Iran is trying to sabotage the U.S.-Iraqi agreement. "The Iranian authorities want this pact not to be signed and to fail to prevent Iraq from turning into a fortress for anti-Iranian forces."

The propaganda offensive and "carrots" Iran's Supreme Guide Khameini and his sidekick, Ahmedinejad, are dangling are none too subtle. Indeed, it is almost as if they are trying out for open mike night at a comedy club. The Washington Post is reporting that Iran is offering Iraq a military cooperation agreement as an alternative to the American presence. One would be hard pressed to imagine non-Sadrist Iraqis, facing no military threat other than from their east, containing their laughter over that Trojan horse. And there are several other side busters.

Mahmoud the Mouth has stated that the SOFA agreement is meant "to turn the Iraqis into American slaves." That is projection on a scale that our own far left ought to recognize. And from Supreme Guide, a little more honesty, at least - "Occupiers who interfere in Iraq's affairs through their military and security might ... are [Iraq's] main problems. . . . That a foreign element gradually interferes in all Iraqi affairs and expands its domination on all aspects of life is the main obstacle in the way of progress and prosperity of the Iraqi nation." Now that is honesty. I am sure many a non-Sadrist in Iraq was nodding their head at that one also, just not in agreement with Khamenei's identification of whom the "occupier" might be.

Lastly, Michael Ledeen wrote a very thoughtful article, "Iran and the Problem of Evil" in the WSJ several days ago. He believes, as do I, that Iran's theocracy is the true and modern embodiement of evil, no different in threat or determination than the Nazis and other murderous movements of the twentieth century that saw murder, mayhem, war and genocide as acceptable tactics to attain their end. This from Michael Ledeen:

Ever since World War II, we have been driven by a passionate desire to understand how mass genocide, terror states and global war came about – and how we can prevent them in the future.

Above all, we have sought answers to several basic questions: Why did the West fail to see the coming of the catastrophe? Why were there so few efforts to thwart the fascist tide, and why did virtually all Western leaders, and so many Western intellectuals, treat the fascists as if they were normal political leaders, instead of the virulent revolutionaries they really were? Why did the main designated victims – the Jews – similarly fail to recognize the magnitude of their impending doom? Why was resistance so rare?

Most eventually accepted a twofold "explanation": the uniqueness of the evil, and the lack of historical precedent for it. Italy and Germany were two of the most civilized and cultured nations in the world. It was difficult to appreciate that a great evil had become paramount in the countries that had produced Kant, Beethoven, Dante and Rossini.

How could Western leaders, let alone the victims, be blamed for failing to see something that was almost totally new – systematic mass murder on a vast scale, and a threat to civilization itself? Never before had there been such an organized campaign to destroy an entire "race," and it was therefore almost impossible to see it coming, or even to recognize it as it got under way.

The failure to understand what was happening took a well-known form: a systematic refusal to view our enemies plain. Hitler's rants, whether in "Mein Kampf" or at Nazi Party rallies, were often downplayed as "politics," a way of maintaining popular support. They were rarely taken seriously as solemn promises he fully intended to fulfill. Mussolini's call for the creation of a new Italian Empire, and his later alliance with Hitler, were often downplayed as mere bluster, or even excused on the grounds that, since other European countries had overseas territories, why not Italy?

Some scholars broadened the analysis to include other evil regimes, such as Stalin's Russia, which also systematically murdered millions of people and whose ambitions similarly threatened the West. Just as with fascism, most contemporaries found it nearly impossible to believe that the Gulag Archipelago was what it was. And just as with fascism, we studied it so that the next time we would see evil early enough to prevent it from threatening us again.

By now, there is very little we do not know about such regimes, and such movements. . . .

Yet they are with us again, and we are acting as we did in the last century. The world is simmering in the familiar rhetoric and actions of movements and regimes – from Hezbollah and al Qaeda to the Iranian Khomeinists and the Saudi Wahhabis – who swear to destroy us and others like us. Like their 20th-century predecessors, they openly proclaim their intentions, and carry them out whenever and wherever they can. Like our own 20th-century predecessors, we rarely take them seriously or act accordingly. More often than not, we downplay the consequences of their words, as if they were some Islamic or Arab version of "politics," intended for internal consumption, and designed to accomplish domestic objectives.

Clearly, the explanations we gave for our failure to act in the last century were wrong. The rise of messianic mass movements is not new, and there is very little we do not know about them. Nor is there any excuse for us to be surprised at the success of evil leaders, even in countries with long histories and great cultural and political accomplishments. We know all about that. So we need to ask the old questions again. Why are we failing to see the mounting power of evil enemies? Why do we treat them as if they were normal political phenomena, as Western leaders do when they embrace negotiations as the best course of action?

No doubt there are many reasons. One is the deep-seated belief that all people are basically the same, and all are basically good. Most human history, above all the history of the last century, points in the opposite direction. But it is unpleasant to accept the fact that many people are evil, and entire cultures, even the finest, can fall prey to evil leaders and march in lockstep to their commands. Much of contemporary Western culture is deeply committed to a belief in the goodness of all mankind; we are reluctant to abandon that reassuring article of faith. Despite all the evidence to the contrary, we prefer to pursue the path of reasonableness, even with enemies whose thoroughly unreasonable fanaticism is manifest.

. . . None of the democracies adequately prepared for war before it was unleashed on them in the 1940s. None was prepared for the terror assault of the 21st century. The nature of Western politics makes it very difficult for national leaders – even those rare men and women who see what is happening and want to act – to take timely, prudent measures before war is upon them. Leaders like Winston Churchill are relegated to the opposition until the battle is unavoidable. . . .

Then, as now, the initiative lies with the enemies of the West. Even today, when we are engaged on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, there is little apparent recognition that we are under attack by a familiar sort of enemy, and great reluctance to act accordingly. This time, ignorance cannot be claimed as an excuse. If we are defeated, it will be because of failure of will, not lack of understanding. As, indeed, was almost the case with our near-defeat in the 1940s.

Read the entire article. We have to deal with Iran's theocracy. It is a true force for evil in the world. Doing so today will likely cost us. Doing so tomorrow will only cost us more, and more dearly Time is our enemy while Iran is the enemy of civilization.

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Taheri On Basra and Iran's Failed Gambit

Iranian columnist Amir Taheri sees the Basra operation and related uprisings in the Shia south as a bid by Iran to establish their dominance in Iraq that failed at the hands of PM Maliki, Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and the integrated Iraqi Army. It may prove to be a fatal miscalculation.
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This from Amir Taheri:

A GAMBLE that proved too costly.

That's how analysts in Tehran describe events last month in Basra. Iran's state-run media have de facto confirmed that this was no spontaneous "uprising." Rather, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) tried to seize control of Iraq's second-largest city using local Shiite militias as a Trojan horse.

Tehran's decision to make the gamble was based on three assumptions:

* Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki wouldn't have the courage to defend Basra at the risk of burning his bridges with the Islamic Republic in Iran.

* The international force would be in no position to intervene in the Basra battle. The British, who controlled Basra until last December, had no desire to return, especially if this meant getting involved in fighting. The Americans, meanwhile, never had enough troops to finish off al-Qaeda-in-Iraq, let alone fight Iran and its local militias on a new front.

* The Shiite clerical leadership in Najaf would oppose intervention by the new Iraqi security forces in a battle that could lead to heavy Shiite casualties.

The Iranian plan - developed by Revolutionary Guard's Quds (Jerusalem) unit, which is in charge of "exporting the Islamic Revolution" - aimed at a quick victory. To achieve that, Tehran spent vast sums persuading local Iraqi security personnel to switch sides or to remain neutral.

The hoped-for victory was to be achieved as part of a massive Shiite uprising spreading from Baghdad to the south via heartland cities such as Karbala, Kut and al-Amarah. A barrage of rockets and missiles against the "Green Zone" in Baghdad and armed attacks on a dozen police stations and Iraqi army barracks in the Shiite heartland were designed to keep the Maliki government under pressure.

To seize control of Basra, Quds commanders used units known as Special Groups. These consist of individuals recruited from among the estimated 1.8 million Iraqi refugees who spent more than two decades in Iran during Saddam Hussein's reign. They returned to Iraq shortly after Saddam's fall and started to act as liaisons between Quds and local Shiite militias.

In last month's operation, Quds commanders used the name and insignia of the Mahdi Army, a militia originally created by the maverick cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, as a cover for the Special Groups.

Initially, Quds commanders appeared to have won their bet. Their Special Groups and Mahdi Army allies easily seized control of key areas of Basra when more than 500 Iraqi security personnel abandoned their positions and disappeared into the woodwork.

Soon, however, the tide turned. Maliki proved that he had the courage to lead the new Iraqi Security Force (ISF) into battle, even if that meant confronting Iran. The ISF showed that it had the capacity and the will to fight.

. . . Led by Gen. Mohan al-Freiji, the Iraqi force sent to Basra was the largest that the ISF had put together since its creation five years ago. This was the first time that the ISF was in charge of a major operation from start to finish and was fighting a large, well-armed adversary without US advisers.

. . . The expected call from the Najaf ayatollahs to stop "Shiite fratricide" failed to materialize. Grand Ayatollah Ali-Muhammad Sistani, the top cleric in Iraq, gave his blessings to the Maliki-launched operation. More broadly, the Shiite uprisings in Baghdad, Karbala, Najaf and other cities that Quds commanders had counted upon didn't happen. The "Green Zone" wasn't evacuated in panic under a barrage of rockets and missiles.

After more than a week of fighting, the Iraqis forced the Quds commanders to call for a cease-fire through Sadr. The Iraqi commander agreed - provided that the Quds force directly guaranteed it. To highlight Iran's role in the episode, he insisted that the Quds force dispatch a senior commander to finalize the accord.

The Iran-backed side lost more than 600 men, with more than 1,000 injured. The ISF lost 88 dead and 122 wounded.

Some analysts suggest this was the first war between new Iraq and the Islamic Republic. If so, the Iraqis won.

. . . Tehran tried to test the waters in Basra and, as an opportunist power, would've annexed southern Iraq under a quisling administration had that been attainable at a low cost. Once it became clear that the cost might be higher than the Quds force expected, Tehran opted to back down.

Yet this was just the first round. The struggle for Iraq isn't over.

Read the entire article. I agree the struggle for Iraq is hardly over. But I think the complexion of the fight may have hit a major turning point yesterday when Grand Ayatollah Sistani called on the Mahdi Army to turn over their weapons to the government. If the special groups and Iran can not longer operate under the cover of the Mahdi Army, it will isolate them and make it much easier for the Iraqi government to target these elements. I think Iran's gambit in Basra may well prove a fatal miscalculation for their dreams of "Lebanonizing Iraq."

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Liveblogging Petraeus & Crocker Testimony Before The Sen. Foreign Rel. Committee

3 p.m.

I just caught the tale end of Biden's opening remarks that he concluded by saying that people who want an immediate withdraw from Iraq are "not defeatists," but "patriots." One wonders where he got his dictionary?

And now Richard Lugar (R) is worse than Biden. His list of assertions is incredible. One wonders if the last time he was briefed on Iraq was in December, 2006. This is really incredible. This idiot is making a speech to the left of something I would expect from Kos. I am literally speechless. This son of a bitch needs to be tarred and feathered on his way out of the Republican Party.

Biden:

Biden is asking about conditions under which we will withdraw, but does not seem to be asking much of real substance. He is posing a series of hypotheticals that really are impossible to answer. Ambassador Crocker refuses to answer as the conditions Biden poses as unlikely.

Lugar:

This man is an idiot. He is making remarks about sub-prime mortgages. Perhaps the things he is raising need to be strategic considerations about Iraq - but they have not the slightest thing to do with Petraeus or Crocker. He seems to be advocating withdraw and diplomacy with the "surrounding countries." His question is completely incomprehensible. He needs a challenge come next primary.

Petraeus - We need to do precisely what we are doing now. My hat's off to Petraeus to even attempt to answer a question that I still cannot understand.

Dodd

Making a speech that suggests we need to bring our soldiers home to be prepared to fight some other war that does not exist. And he suggests our soldiers are overstressed. Comment: The answer here is to win the Iraq war and expand the size of the military. Petraeus can do the first - the Congress is responsible for the latter.

Petraeus: Counterinsurgency operations are full spectrum operations. Their mission is not leaving them untrained and unable to do full spectrum operations elsewhere in the world. The Iraq mission is putting stress on our soldiers, but reenlistment rate goals are being met and exceeded. One unit just finishing 3rd tour in Iraq has already exceeded its 2008 reenlistment goal.

Petraeus: We are not arming Sunni militias. Each Iraqi is allowed an AK-47. They started out completely as unpaid volunteers. It marked a seismic shift in the Sunni world against al Qaeda. We started paying them only much later, in order to draw in more people.

4:13

Hagel:

Hagel is making a speech that we can't afford to stay in Iraq, reconciliation is not happening, and that it will remain a violent place. Hagel is ignoring the changes in Iraq since 2006. He has yet to ask a question after 5 minutes. Now he is asking Crocker about his September testimony of a "diplomatic surge."

Crocker: There are biannual meetings with the surrounding countries. Arabs need to be more engaged. We are prepared to have face to face talks with Iran over Iraqi security. We can't compel the neighbors to act positively.

John Kerry:

Speech telling Petraeus that the Senate is concerned with far more than Iraq. There is a sectarian power struggle that Iran is increasingly in control of. Wow. It is as if the last several months never happened in the Iraqi Parliament. Our military capability is steadilly degrading. Kerry asks - himself, rhetorically - how do we end this. No military solution - only politics and there is insufficient progress there. Petraeus tries to jump in and Kerry cuts him off. Our allegiance from the Sunnis is rented and they are not being integrated. Still not a question. Kerry finally asks whether we can get any political results with an open ended committment.

Crocker - Tries to answer that the answer is no, pressure will not work.

Petreaues - Sunnis are being integrated into Iraqi security forces. And the Iraqi Army is an integrated force with Sunnis, Kurds and Shia all mixed in units. We are not renting loyalty.

Kerry keeps interrupting. AQI did not exist in Iraq before we entered into Iraq and claims that AQI did not attack Sunnis?

Petraeus - The Anbar Awakening succeeded because of U.S. support.

4:32

Coleman

What the hell. Is every republican on the foreign relations committee to the left of Moveon.org? He is asking what pressure we can put on Maliki to force quicker political progress.

Crocker - the Anbar Awakening lessened the need for Shia to rely on militias for security. That has made progress possible and it is showing up in willingess to compromise. Basra offensive has greatly improved the political climate.

Petraeus - drawdown of forces needs to be based on conditions, not a date certain. It is all a question of risk.

GREAT Question How do we stop Iran from their proxy war?

Petraeus - there needs to be a regional and global approach with the decisions to be made above his pay grade as to what actions to take beyond simply targeting their proxies and agents in Iraq.

Feingold

Speech - Our actions in Iraq is causing al Qaeda to grow. Iraq is an Iran and Turkey problem.

Crocker - al Qaeda is our strategic threat. Al Qaeda was well on its way to a safe haven in Iraq that would have allowed them operate from Iraq as a base.

Petraeus - bin Laden and Zawahiri both have expressed that Iraq

Feingold - keeps interrupting and claims the threat from al Qaeada has increased over the past six years. Feingold suggests that we are playing into bin Laden's hands by staying in Iraq becasue he wants to bankrupt us.

Petraeus - several militias have been integrated into Iraqi security forces that had received funding in Iran per a 2004 law. But those militia elements are seperate and apart from the special group proxies.

Crocker - the heads of the major parties in Iraq all want to see a long term relationship with the U.S.

Feingold ends with claims that the majority of Iraqis want US forces out of Iraq. Crocker is not given time to respond.

Corker

Petraeus - we are gradually moving, province by province, to an overwatch / reserve position that will allow us to drawdown. In the provinces other than Basra, Iraqi forces performed quite well and were up to the task. It will be a process of risk assessment.

Petraeus - a drawdown does put pressure on the Iraqi government. Too quick a drawdown would put too much pressure on them. We have been putting pressure on them with every tool in the book. It has worked sometimes, and sometimes it hasn't.

Crocker - Iraqis want to stand on their own two feat - and Basra was a clear example of that. The Iraqis have the willingness and intention to take the lead and be indepenant.

Petraeus - over 1/4 of our combat forces will be withdrawn by July. That is a huge drawdown over a short period. At that point we need time to sit pat and take stock.

Boxer:

Petraeus: As of today, here are only a few thousand al Qaeda left and a few thousand of Sunni insurgents.

Speech from Boxer - the gains are fragile because there is no political solution - and MSNBC has just cut off. Missed the rest. Now Boxer wants to cut off funding to "militias."

Petraeus - tells her these are not militias this is how you end this type of war. Says he will ask

Boxer - Ahmedinejad given the red carpet treatment while our President has to sneak into Iraq. Iraq will only start to deal with Iran when we set a date certain for leaving. Iran is stronger and more influential in Iraq than the U.S.

Crocker - Ahmedinejad did not have to worry about security because Iran controls the special groups. As to how Iraqi government feels today about Iran, they are very upset and concerned today about what they have recently seen with the degree of Iranian acts of war in backing the extremist militias.

Boxer seems concerned with diplomatic niceties more than reality.

5:10

Voinivich

We are going broke because of the war. We need to drawdown and have a diplomatic surge. He indicates that he is responding to the anti-American polls.

Crocker - the reality is that it is hard in Iraq.

Voinivich thinks that just telling the Iraqis we are on the way out will act as some sort of light switch.

Crocker - If we decide that we want out now, than the consequences will be severe.

Petraeus - It is easy to dislike where we are, but the consequences of pulling out will be very severe. There has been extensive diplomatic activity. We are working very hard

Voinivich - This idiot thinks that Egypt and other dictatorships are not overly energized to make Iraqi democracy a success. They do not want it to succeed. Where did we get this class of Republicans?

Obama

Obama - Al Qaeda was not there before we went in. Should we be successful in driving them out of Mosul, do we anticapate that there is ever a time that they could not reconstitute themselves.

Petraeus - Al Qaeda will try to reconstitute. The question is will Iraqi alone be able to stop them from reconstituting. Over time, we will be able to draw down and Iraqis will be able to handle it alone.

Obama - Are Sons of Iraq being treated fairly

Petraues - Yes, they are. No favortism is being shown and the process to integrate Sons of Iraq is moving forward and is now routine.

Obama - when can we drawdown as regards Iran

Crocker - Iran's strategy of Lebanonization is the problem right now. It is being directed by the Iranian government.

Obama - If Iraq's government knows this, why did they welcome Iran

Crocker - Maliki knows of the problem.

Obama speech - The decision to go into Iraq was a blunder and it is the cause of al Qaeda and Iran going into Iraq. The surge has not resulted in reconciliation. Basra was done for political purposes. We need a timetable for withdraw and a diplomatic surge that includes Iran. We need Iran as partners to assisst with stabilizing Iraq. The money we are spending is breaking our budget. We have finite resources. If we had the status quo without U.S. presence in Iraq, would that be considered a success?

Crocker - I can't imagine the current status quo being sustainable with that kind of precipitous drawdown.

Obama - definition of success is too high. No traces of al Qaeda. No trace of malign Iranian influence. A functioning democracy. We need an achievable messy goal.

Crocker - Iraq is hard. When Iraq gets to the point that it can carry further its development with confidence that they will experience significant danger, than our presence will drawdown dramatically. We are not there now.

Obama cuts him off.

5:34

Murkowski

Petraeus - we are getting very good effort from multiple civilian and non-military support. More is needed.

Crocker - we are not paying for large infrastructure projects now. We are now doing capacity building measures with experts.

Missed a portion.

Petraeus - 12 month tours will work.


Nelson

Petraeus - the math in payments to Sunnis is much in our favor. The key over time is to integrate Sons of Iraq into security forces or education and alternative employment for them. And those programs are in force.

Nelson - there is no loyalty in these forces. They are beholden to local strong men.

Petraeus - tribal sheiks are the reality and we need to work through them. But the integration plan is still the key.

Petraeus - we are keenly aware of the strain and costs of the war. It is why we are drawing down 1/4 of our combat power by July and then looking after that.

Nelson - the only thing that will keep Iraq united is a long term committment by the U.S. or a new dictator.

Crocker - no one in Iraq wants to see a dictator. And all want to maintain a larger Iraqi identity, including the Kurds after seeing the Turkey invasions. Oil revenues are also a powerful part of the glue holding Iraq together.

Isakson

Crocker - the Basra offensive has had a "very positive resonance throughout Iraq." And existing Iraq law says that if you have a militia, you cannot take part in politics. Upcoming elections are critical for settling political questions by non-violent means.

Crocker - Iraqi budget execution is three times better than 2006, but still have a ways to go. They are spending 62% of their budget currently. Dept. of Treasury folks are coming out to look at this issue.


Menendez

He is accusing Maliki of fighting in Basra for purely political reasons and that Iran is funding all of them.

Crocker - Maliki went to Basra because of these special groups.

Crocker is not being given a chance to answer. Menendez is reading off a group of "facts" that claim Iraq is far worse off than before the war.

Crocker - has no clue where those "facts" came from. The BBC poll tells a very different story than those facts Menendez just read off.

Menendez doesn't identify his source, just calls it "pretty reliable" and goes into a closing speech, ignoring Crockers remarks. Shock and awe is the American people. He accuses Crocker and Petraeus of not giving specific bench marks for how we will withdraw.

Biden tells Menendez to give Crocker his figures and allow him to comment.


Barrasso

Petraeus - Iraqis require help when we turn over areas to them. In some areas we can slowly draw down, but some areas are more challenging and require we maintain a more active presence.

Petraeus - majority of Sunni communities have rejected al Qaeda and other extremist ideologies. This is important in Iraq and throughout the world. This has huge significance throughtout the region.


Cardin

This idiot claims none of the bench marks have been met (12 of 18 have been and the rest are in various stages of completion). No national leaders who are willing to make concessions. He is concerned that the SOFA agreement and the fact that it will not go through congress.

Crocker - Concessions are being made. The SOFA agreement is an executive agreement.

Cardin warns that it must go through Congress. Someone give him a copy of Article II of the Constitution.


Casey

Complaining about language such as "victory" and "defeat" in regards to Iraq. Crocker has used the phrase "sustainable security." How does that stack up to the current training levels.

Petraeus - good Iraqi units are being raided to act as the skeleton for other units. That is why only a few Iraqi units at level I readiness. He agrees with that approach.


Webb

He blames Bush for not having a strong enough diplomatic effort, implying as to Iran.

Crocker - There is a Strategic Framework Agreement and, from that, a SOFA agreement. The SFA, setting out a vision for on-going relationship in fields from security, economic, etc. That does not even rise to the level of an Executive Agreement. We have briefed Congress on this and are being transparent.

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Liveblogging Petraeus & Crocker Testimony - Senate Armd Svcs Committee

General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker gave their brieifing before the Armed Svcs Committee today, concluding at 2 p.m. They will brief Foreign Relations Committee this afternoon. My contemperanous notes of the questions and answers are below the fold. Both Petraeus and Crocker gave opening statements. General Petraeus's statement is here, and Ambassador Crocker's before the Armd Svcs Committee is here, and before the Foreign Relations Committee (not sure if they differ)is here.


Highlights and summary of the questions and answers:

1. Basra offensive was not a defeat for Maliki. The Iraqi government now control the ports in Basra and is conducting on-going operations in that city aimed at the "special groups."

2. The Iraqi military performance in Basra was uneven, partly becasue of poor planning. The Iraqi military successfully quelled Sadrist uprisings in all other cities.

3. Maliki has gained significant stature among all Iraqis for his willingness to take on all criminal elements, irrespective of their sect.

4. The biggest problem now is Iran's attempts to "Lebanonize" Iraq, creating an Iraqi "Hezbollah" militia beholden to Iran that dominates the Shia portion of Iraq. Iran's training, funding and arming of "special groups" culled from Sadr's Mahdi Militia is the primary vehicle for that strategy. Within the past month, this has become both completely clear and a point of great concern for the Iraqi government.

5. Taking control of Iraq remains al Qaeda's ultimate goal, and that if we leave Iraq precipitously, we can expect al Qaeda to make a resurgance and we can expect Iran to make a determined effort to dominate the Shia portion of Iraq. Allowing this to happen would drastically effect our national security.

6. As to diplomacy, Iran is refusing to take part in talks about Iraqi security and Iran's proxy war. Each time a meeting is scheduled, the Iranian side cancels due to scheduling conflicts. Another meeting is scheduled for next week.

7. Petraeus believes that the ultimate key to defanging membership in the Mahdi militia is getting employment prospects for the young and often illiterate members of the militia.

8. Sadr's popularity was predicated on Iraqi and Arab nationalism. His ever closer relationship with Iran and the gangsterism of his militia has severely damaged any nationalist appeal he might have had. There is wide support for disarming and disbanding his militia.

9. Somebody check to see if Evan Bayh has recovered yet. If you did not see it, Bayh was the last person to question Petraeus and Crocker, he approached them like a laywer on cross examination, and he got his ass handed to him in a very respectful way. Specifically:

Petraeus - Explicitly says that he does not agree with Bayh that leaving Iraq precipitously would be reasonable.

Crocker - bin Laden recently referred to Iraq as the perfect base for al Qaeda - Bayh cuts him off and says that we should not believe bin Laden because what he may be saying is disinformation.

Crocker - putting pressure on Iraqis to do more by threatening to leave and pull out is counterproductive. If they sense that U.S. is wavering and looking to pull out, than the Iraqis will be moving away from compromise as they consider what comes after the U.S. pulls out.

Petraeus - does not agree that we are creating more terrorists globally by our actions in Iraq. Takes issue with Bayh on his assessment that bin Laden may be giving us disinformation. Further, it is not responsible to say that we will draw down troops on a date certain. It must be conditions based if it is to be done while sustaining the progress made to date.


Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing

9:35 - Carl Levin opens with a 5 minute speech - the surge has failed because of Basra, there has been no reconcilliation (based on a 5 month old State Dept. paper) and we can only win by retreating

Petraeus Opening Remarks:

Iranian proxies are the greatest threat long-term to Iraqi security

Al Qaeda is successfully being dealt with, and this is in and outside of Iraq.

Really hammering home about the Qods Force and their meddling in Iraq.

Some forces performed well in Basra, others did not. Many of the problems were staff problems of command and control, etc.

Will draw down surge forces by the summer, but any further reduction may jeapordize security gains and must be done on a case by case basis.

Crocker Operning Remarks:

Progress being made with reconcilliation and political development.

Iraq's parliament has gone from frozen to much more fluid and willingness to compromise

The decision to take on Mahdi militia in Basra was important to reconcilliation. Sunni, Shia and Kurd.

The surge has worked. We are in the midst of developing an agreement for long term contacts - the SOFA agreement.

Iran has a choice to make.

Success in Iraq is quite possible. If we stop our support for Iraq, than it will fail and al Qaeda and Iran will move in to fill the vacuum.

Levin Questions:

- Asks Petraues to commit to hard numbers of troops to draw down. Petraeus doesn't bite.

- Levin asks whether the Basra operation could have been better planned. After Petraeus agree, Levim implies U.S. forces were called to support in large numbers because of Iraqi incompetence.

Chapaquidick Ted:

What an utter asshole he is. Few questions, long on wind. He states that Maliki had no business going into Basra, they should only be fighting al Qaeda, and that this may lead to civil war. This man is clueless.

Warner:

Asks P and C whether the costs of Iraq have been and will be worth it in terms of providing greater security to Americans in the 50 states. Petraeus is prepared this time. Saddam is gone and a nascent democracy is in place. Petraeus answers yes.

Lieberman:

Petraeus says Iran is a serious concern. Qods force and Hezbollah are deeply involved in training and support of special groups. They are responsible for deaths of hundreds of Americans and thousands of Iraqis. Crocker says Maliki's decision to go into Basra has a very positive message - that they will go after extremists regardless of sectarian identity. Iraqi national security council is calling for all militias to be disarmed and warns against "outside" interference.

Inhofe:

Petraeus says detainee operations have been very successful, with training and education offered to all detainees. The irreconcilables are taken out of the general population. Low recidivism and 100 have asked to stay in detention to complete their studies and education.

Crocker says Iran is pursuing a "Lebanization" strategy to co-opt local Shia community. And says that Iran would step in if U.S. pulled out.

Petraeus says people in Basra gave much support to the recent offensive. Operations are continuing in Basra and increasing.

Jack Reed:

Petraeus - the ultimate key to defanging Mahdi militia is more of an employment problem just as with Sunnis.

Basra went much quicker than we expected.

Reed is another ass who asks a question, gets an answer, than spins it and moves on without allowing Petraeus to respond.

11:32

Sessions:

Crocker - Maliki's Basra offensive has drastically changed the tone of the other members of government and they perceive Maliki as a nationalist leader.

Petraeus - In Basra, Sadrists were armed by the Iranians.

Crocker - the militia actions were very unpopular amongst the Iraqi populace. Iranian influence is malign and destablizing, but is also limited by the Persian / Arab divide.

Akaka:

Let's lose the Iraq war so we can have an army not ready to fight in the next war. That is not quite what he says, but it certainly is what he means.

Collins:

She asks why Iraqi troops are not fully taking over operations and why they did not do so well in Basra.

Petraues - This is a process, not a light switch. We did not take the lead in Basra. Basra were criminal gangs and militias threatening the population. The U.S. provided air support.

12 p.m.

Nelson:

Petraeus - there has been important movements of top-down reconciliation in terms of de-baathification, amnesty, pensions, etc.

Another ass. Nelson is asking if the laws have been implemented yet. They were passed in the last month.

Crocker - they are moving in the right direction towards reconciliation.

Graham:

Petraeus - al Qaeda came to Iraq to establish an extremist caliphate in the heart of the Middle East, and the change of Iraqi Sunnis against al Qaeda is the most important event to date.

Crocker - Iran wants a Lebanization of Iraq. Iran is concerned about a functioning Shia democracy on its border. Iran and Syria are working against the creation of a stable Iraqi state.

Petraeus - The success of the surge has led to an improved Iraqi economy. If Iraq fails, it will effect our national security. Graham is trying to get Petraues to say the drawdown of a brigade a month will be a disaster. Petraeus doesn't bite and says he disagrees very tactfully.

Ben Nelson:

He wants to see Iraq bear more of the costs.

Thune:

Petraeus - The original cease fire was by Sadr militia that refused to disarm before going into Karbala. That was the general militia. Iran is clearly in control of the special groups. Iraqi political leaders have become very concerned about Iran and Qods Force in the past month.

Petraeus - Congress needs to fully fund Commander's Emergency Response program. Uses small funds in local areas to meet immediate needs. It is making a critical difference. Also being used to fund Sons of Iraq security personnel.

12:40

Clinton

At least she does not claim that she is having to suspend disbelief this time. Instead she is making a speech that reconciliation has been sufficient. She really does come off a witch. She is also trying to portray the SOFA agreement as requiring Congressional approval.

Petraeus - Maliki directed the rapid deployment to Basra because of the increasing problems with criminal gangs associated with the militia.

Martinez:

Crocker - Explains that SOFA agreements are essentially always executive agreements that do not determine troop levels, etc., and thus 79 of the 80 we have in force do not require congressional approval. The only one that has was the one with NATO becasue it contains security guarantees that were unique.

Crocker - U.S. has agreed to talks with Iran about the security situation. Iran keeps refusing to talk, claiming scheduling problems.

Petraeus - Iran is arming the special groups. We have detailed intelligence on this. There is clear evidence of direction, though it is unclear whether Iranians are providing on the ground leadership.

Crocker - Sadr touched a deep vein of Iraqi and Arab nationalism that he has since lost because of Iranian contacts.

Pryor -

Great question. Is Sadr setting himself up to be the Supreme Guide of Iraq?

Crocker - Crocker doesn't answer. Given the nationalist roots of the Sadr movement, Sadr is losing support.

Wicker -

He starts with a dig at Hillary - "it would take a major suspension of disbelief" to believe that the situation in Iraq has not substantially improved.

McCaskill -

Petraeus - repeating his testimony that Iraqi govt. has just kicked in $300 million to fund the Sons of Iraq.

Crocker - SOFA talks are underway.

Crocker - Maliki did not lose in Basra at all. Maliki now has broad ranging political support as a result of the Basra offensive.

Chambliss:

Petraeus - CER program allows U.S. to generate tremendous good will in local areas and provide much needed services long before the government can get into a cleared area to provide services.

Petraeus: In 2006, al Qaeda had a substantial presence throughout large areas of Iraq.

Crocker - Iraq and Iran have major economic ties.

Webb:

Makes the point that the Anbar Awakening began before the surge was announced. He does not ask whether the Awakening would have succeeded without U.S. support. Minimizes the threat of Iran and criticizes Bush for failing to open diplomatic ties with them.

1:35

Bayh:

Petraeus - Explicitly says that he does not agree with Bayh that leaving Iraq precipitously would be reasonable.

Crocker - bin Laden recently referred to Iraq as the perfect base for al Qaeda - Bayh cuts him off and says that we should not believe bin Laden because what he may be saying is disinformation.

Crocker - putting pressure on Iraqis to do more by threatening to leave and pull out is counterproductive. If they sense that U.S. is wavering and looking to pull out, than the Iraqis will be moving away from compromise as they consider what comes after the U.S. pulls out.

Petraeus - does not agree that we are creating more terrorists globally by our actions in Iraq. Takes issue with Bayh on his assessment that bin Laden may be giving us disinformation. Further, it is not responsible to say that we will draw down troops on a date certain. It must be conditions based if it is to be done while sustaining the progress made to date.

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Iraq News

Muktada al Sadr is reported hospitalized in a coma. Front page reports of a major terrorist bombing in Baghdad come amid significant long term decrease in violence and costs of the war in Iraq. U.S. and Iraqi forces continue to engage al Qaeda in northern Iraq.

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MEMRI has posted a Kuwaiti new story that Moqtada al-Sadr is comatose and in a hospital in Iran. Authorities are ostensibly blaming his condition on food poisoning - something normally not a serious illness unless its of the potentially fatal variety of e-coli or botulism. I have not yet seen any confirming reports. (H/T Dr. Sanity)

As to the trend in casualties and costs associated with Iraq, there is this from an exceptional post at Gateway Pundit:

Truly- The Surge Is Historic in Its Success--
The mainstream media has absolutely refused to report on the excellent news coming out of Iraq so Dean's World reported the great news today.
Here are a few charts to go with his excellent report on Iraq:

The last 4 months have seen the lowest US fatalities recorded over any 4-month period since the war began:

The last 4 months have also seen the lowest number of Iraqi civilian fatalities recorded over any 4-month period since the war began:

. . . And, the cost of this war-- something the Democrats are focusing on now that Iraq is stabilizing-- is lower than Vietnam or the Cold War:

Read the entire post.

And from the NY Times, a major terrorist bombing at a market in Iraq. According to the NYT:

Two bombs struck a bustling shopping district in the heart of Baghdad on Thursday evening, turning display windows and cabinets and glass shelves into deadly shrapnel, and killing 54 people and wounding 123, the Iraqi authorities said.

The attack, in the Karada neighborhood, was the worst here in the capital since early February, when bombings killed almost 100 people at two pet markets, and it reinforced fears that insurgents could still carry out devastating attacks in well-guarded areas. While violence has declined sharply from last year, bomb attacks in Baghdad have increased in recent weeks.

No one claimed responsibility. But the attackers used an old tactic to maximize casualties: detonating one bomb, then setting off a second blast to kill passers-by and emergency workers who rushed to the scene to aid the victims. . . .

Read the entire article. It is unclear whether this was a suicide bombing, but double bombings such as this are a common al Qaeda tactic. It is unclear whether this is an action by al Qaeda or Iranian backed special groups. In other Iraq news, this from the AP:

. . . U.S. and Iraqi forces killed 13 suspected insurgents and detained 44 others in raids targeting al-Qaida in central and northern Iraq, the U.S. military said Thursday. Three Iraqi troops were killed in one of the operations.

The Tal Afar Special Weapons and Tactics team, made up of U.S. forces and Iraqi SWAT teams, on Sunday targeted a cell responsible for assassinations and bombing attacks in the Tal Afar area in Iraq's Ninevah province, the military said in a statement.

During the raid, several fighters opened fire on the Iraqi and U.S. troops, killing the three Iraqi soldiers and wounding three others.

The U.S.-Iraqi team killed nine suspected insurgents. Three Iraqi civilians were wounded and treated at the scene and eight suspected cell members were detained for questioning, including two who were wounded and evacuated to a military hospital for treatment, the military said.

During the operation, the team found bomb-making materials, a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, rifles, grenades, a land mine and ammunition, according to the statement.

The Americans and their Iraqi allies are pushing to take control of the Ninevah region, where insurgent fighters are making a stand after their influence diminished in Baghdad and other areas last year. Tal Afar is located about 260 miles northwest of Baghdad.

In another operation, U.S. soldiers shot and killed a man who drew a pistol on them and then tried to detonate a bomb-laden suicide vest. Three suspected al-Qaida members were also detained during the operation near the central city of Samarra, 60 miles north of Baghdad.

Another al-Qaida suspect who was also killed near Samarra was allegedly involved in racketeering and embezzlement to fund the extremist organization.

Read the entire article.

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Sadr, Iran, and A Special Groups Commander Captured

Whether Sadr is Iraq's Nasrallah is open to debate, but seems probable. While the remenants of al Qaeda are still the main concern of U.S. forces, Iran poses the most significant threat to Iraq. Sadr is supposed to rule on whether to continue the "Mahdi Army" cease fire beyond February 23. As the date approaches, Iran is significantly increasing its infiltration into Iraq and U.S. forces are conducting high level raids on Iran's Special Groups, with the latest being the capture of a high level Special Group commander along with other members of Sadr's clique.

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This today from the Long War Journal:

With Muqtada al Sadr set to decide on the status of the Mahdi Army ceasefire on Feb. 23, US and Iraqi security forces continue to step up operations against the Iranian-backed Special Groups and Sadr's Mahdi Army. The latest raid netted a senior regional Special Groups leader and ten others. According to the Iraqi press, two senior members of the Sadrist current were detained in the raid.

The senior Special Groups leader was captured in Hillah during a raid conducted by a joint Coalition Special Forces team and elements of Iraqi police. The leader is believed to be a regional commander of Special Groups teams in Wasit, Babil and Najaf provinces, as well as a coordinator for weapon shipments, and a planner and operational leader of attacks against Iraqi Security Forces and Coalition Forces. Eleven Special Groups operatives were reported captured in the raid.

Two of those captured were senior leaders in Muqtada al Sadr's political movement, according to Voices of Iraq. A raid by "joint Iraqi Scorpion forces and U.S. troops arrested Basim al Kilabi, the tribal affairs official at al Sadr's office, and ten others following a raid on one of Hilla's villages on Sunday," a member of Sadr's media office told the Iraqi newspaper. Also captured was Qassem al Fatlawi, another member of the Sadrist current.

While it is unclear if either Kilabi or Fatlawi are the captured senior Special Groups operative, it is likely Kilabi was the target of the raid. As tribal affairs officer, Kibali would have contacts cutting across the provincial boundaries, and his position would mask his movements and contacts.

The Special Groups was created by Iran's Qods Force, the special operations branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, to destabilize the Iraqi regime, strike at US and Coalition forces, and extend Iran's sphere of influence in southern and central Iraq. Iran established the Ramazan Corps as a sophisticated command structure to coordinate military, intelligence, terrorist, diplomatic, religious, ideological, propaganda, and economic operations. The Special Groups falls under Qods Force's Ramazan Corps.

. . . The US and Iraqi military commands have stepped up pressure on Sadr to extend the ceasefire beyond the February deadline by increasing raids on Mahdi Army and Special Groups operatives throughout central and southern Iraq.

Read the entire article.

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Iran's Special Groups In Iraq Now The Major Concern

In terms of who we are fighting in Iraq, the war against al Qaeda is going very successfully, the war against Sunni insurgents is over for the moment, but the Shia groups operating with Iranian support are now center stage as the most significant threat to U.S. soldiers in Iraq. The question of course is when is our federal government going to make Iran pay a price for their acts of war?



The Iranian theocracy, according to a senior State Department official speaking less then two months ago, "has decided 'at the most senior levels' to rein in the violent Shiite militias it supports in Iraq." That surreal statement was apparently not forwarded to Iran's Supreme Guide. At this point in Iraq, the Iranian backed Shia "special groups" are "the most worrisome, according to the commander and senior staff of the U.S. Army division patrolling Baghdad." This from the Washington Post.

The U.S. government believes that the special groups are heavily supported by Iran. The groups have been especially effective in using explosively formed projectiles, or EFPs, sophisticated bombs designed to destroy armored vehicles. "It's high-end technology," said Rainey, the division's operations chief. "It's not four dudes making them in a basement."

Attacks using those bombs were a near-daily occurrence in mid-2007 as the groups reacted to the U.S. military counteroffensive known as "the surge." From April through October, detonations of the powerful weapons happened nearly every day, on average, with a peak of 36 in July.

The U.S. military's ability to find the bombs has not notably improved. In January 2007, before the surge began, 31 such bombs were planted. U.S. troops found 14 before they were detonated; the other 17 went off. Last month's numbers were similar: The same number were planted, and U.S. troops detected 16, with 15 exploding.

The continuing success of those attacks is forcing U.S. troops to attempt to look two ways at once. Al-Qaeda in Iraq's car bomb attacks against civilians "are the biggest threat to our mission," which is to protect the population, Rainey said. But, he added, "the biggest threat to our soldiers is the EFPs." . . .

Read the entire article. How long will we go on with what amounts to no response against acts of aggression by a foreign enemy. Indeed, Iran's deadly meddling in Iraq is pervasive:

"The Iranians, in fact, have taken over all of south Iraq," said a senior tribal leader from the south who spoke on condition of anonymity because he feared for his life. "Their influence is everywhere."

Seriously bad things need to be happening inside Iran to mad Mullahs, the IRGC commanders, and Iranian infrastructure. Pacifism does nothing to stop the mad Mullahs. We do not need to talk to, nor should we be talking to an enemy responsible for killing our soldiers and fomenting violence, nor to one competing to turn southern Iraq into an Iraqi Hezbollah beholden to Iran. We need to be sending covert or overt messages that are impossible to ignore.

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The State Department's Unilateral Foreign Policy

Until a few weeks ago, I was under the misapprehension that our State Dept. existed to further the foreign policy of the Executive Branch. The first major clue as to how wrong I was came with the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Through the disingenuous use of labels and some incredible sleight of hand in their very selective choice of inferences – see here - three State Department personnel who oversaw the writing of that NIE managed to turn what should have been an objective intelligence assessment into a policy document undercutting the President by positing:

1) Iran’s current nuclear enrichment is part of a "civilian" program - despite the fact that Iran has no possible use for the fuel its enriching;

2) Iran’s theocracy is rational by western standards; and

3) The use of force or threat of the same is not necessary to effect Iran’s decision making process. Talks with Iran, if accompanied by other diplomatic measures, is the appropriate way to proceed.

It was a successful coup that portrayed Iran as far less of a threat than that country actually is. And now we have our State Department acting similarly to portray the Iranian theocracy’s actions as peaceful and cooperative as regards Iraq. This is in contradiction of the facts on the ground. The only possible explanation is that this is an attempt to set the stage for unilateral talks with Iran.

What Iran has been doing for some time now is to duplicate in Iraq the same basic game plan that Iran has followed in Lebanon, Gaza and elsewhere. Iran develops a group of proxies - trains them, arms them, funds them - and then turns them loose to cause as much murder and mayhem as possible in the host country. Based on the models in Lebanon and Gaza, it can be assessed that the ultimate goal of Iran is to have their proxies become a political and military force in the host country beholden to Iran. Iran’s actions have been incredibly destabilizing – and deadly - in Iraq and throughout the greater Middle East. There is a phrase that appropriately describes Iran's actions in Iraq, though it does not appear to be in the State Dept. lexicon. That phrase is "acts of war."

According to General Petraeus in an interview on December 17, 2007:

. . . Q: Another factor that has seriously threatened the formation of a stable and secure Iraq is Iran. Lately Tehran seems to have decreased its interference in Iraq. Would you agree to that assessment?

P: There may be Iranian reduction in exporting violence to Iraq. I say "may" because it really is a may. There is not an apparent reduction in training because we have detained individuals in recent months and weeks who recently received training in Iran as late as late October or early November. . .

And from our Dept. of Defense assessment issued earlier this month:

. . . There has been no identified decrease in Iranian training and funding of illegal Shi’a militias in Iraq. Tehran’s support for Shi’a militant groups who attack Coalition and Iraq forces remains a significant impediment to progress towards stabilization. The Iranian Islamic Revolu-tionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) provides many of the explosives and ammunition used by these groups, to include Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM). Although Sadr’s late August 2007 freeze on JAM activity is still in effect, some elements continue to attack Coalition forces with Iranian weapons. The GoI and the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq have made it clear to the Iranian Government that IRGC-QF’s lethal activities must cease.

But none of this is true according to the senior State Department official on Iraq, David Satterfield. He is claiming as fact the very dubious inference that Iran’s mullaocracy has somehow decided to put the hold on its deadly meddling in Iraq.

The Iranian government has decided "at the most senior levels" to rein in the violent Shiite militias it supports in Iraq, a move reflected in a sharp decrease in sophisticated roadside bomb attacks over the past several months, according to the State Department's top official on Iraq.

Tehran's decision does not necessarily mean the flow of those weapons from Iran has stopped, but the decline in their use and in overall attacks "has to be attributed to an Iranian policy decision," David M. Satterfield, Iraq coordinator and senior adviser to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, said in an interview.

. . . Satterfield agreed that Iran was not acting out of "altruism" but rather from "alarm at what was being done by the groups they were backing in terms of their own long-term interests."

At a news conference Friday, Rice sidestepped an opportunity to criticize Iran. The United States, she said, remains "open to better relations" with Iran, adding, "We don't have permanent enemies."

. . . But "we have seen such a consistent and sustained diminution in certain kinds of violence by certain kinds of folks that we can't explain it solely" by internal factors in Iraq, Satterfield said. "If you add those all together, your calculus doesn't come out unless you also add in that the Iranians at a command level must have said or done something, as well."

He declined to discuss specific evidence. "We are confident that decisions involving the strategy pursued by the IRGC are made at the most senior levels of the Iranian government," Satterfield said, referring to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The administration has used that formulation in the past to insist that IRGC training and supplies for militias in Iraq were ordered by Tehran's highest clerical leaders.

Read the article here. As to Sec. of State Rice's statement that we have "no permanent enemies," that's a great soundbite, but highly naive. The Iranian theocracy defines the core of its legitimacy by its enmity to the U.S., and the theocracy has been at war with the U.S. since its inception in 1979. While wanting better relations with Iran is laudable, ignoring the history of our relations with Iran's theocracy will do absolutely nothing to advance those relations.

As mentioned in this blog previously, that decline in Iranian sponsored mayhem and murder can be attributed to the effects of the surge, including the targeting of IRGC agents inside Iraq, the targeting of Iran's "special groups" proxies, and the interdiction of Iran's supply channels. See this report by Bill Roggio specifically addressing this issue. All of that is ignored by our State Department who prefer, solely on the basis of a dubious inference, to paint Iran’s mullaocracy as peaceful and cooperative.

This is suicidal insanity. Whether we should hold unilateral talks with Iran is open to legitimate debate. But we have no chance of dealing with Iran, whether in such talks or by any other means, if our State Department is falsely portraying Iran's actions and intentions. It is akin to justifying the handling of rattle snakes by simply asserting that they are really not dangerous. If one wants to survive an encounter with such a snake, the first thing that must happen is to approach it with the full acknowledgment of its nature.

We now have multiple people at the highest level's of the State Department who have acted to utterly minimize the very real threat posed by Iran. The only conceivable purpose for these acts is to set the stage for unilateral talks. Our State Department is advancing its own unilateral foreign policy agenda. The first step to dealing effectively with Iran is to reign in an out-of-control State Department.

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An Interview With General Petraeus

This from a recent interview of the Weekly Standards Man of the Year General David Petraeus by the Swiss weekly Weltwoche and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung:

Q: General Petraeus, since February you have been the Commanding General of the Multi-National Force in Iraq. You have implemented a new strategy and earned a great deal of credit for your accomplishments. What is your overall assessment of the mission so far?

P: Well, it's really more the last five or six months, I think, during which we have seen progress in about every different respect and in almost every area of Iraq with the exception of the Mosul-Ninawa area which has remained about the same in terms of violence because of the enormous importance of that area to al Qaeda. And we know that as al Qaeda has been thrown out of the Euphrates River Valley, killed, captured, or pushed out of Anbar Province, the southern belts, although there are still some areas. In fact, we have some work to do in the Salman Pak-Medina area, and that's one reason that attacks went up a bit last week is we think that we hit a pocket of them down there and they really are fighting back. In the Baghdad neighborhoods, by and large, there's been enormous progress, in Ghazaliyah, Amariyah, Doura, Adhamiyah, Arab Jabour, Nafiyas. We had had progress by September. In fact, that's what the ambassador and I reported when we went back to Capitol Hill.

Q: What progress has been made since you have come back from Capitol Hill?

P: Till September it was still the early stages. What we have seen now for a sustained period of five or six months, since about mid-June, has been a steady reduction in violence. There was a little up-tick during Ramadan. There have been a couple of up-ticks in the past, say, ten weeks, but we've generally had a period of about ten weeks of levels of violence that have not been seen on a sustained basis like that since the late spring of 2005. So we are actually almost on a two-and-one-half year low in terms of violence.

Q: After many mistakes in the past years the US Mission in Iraq under your command seems to have found the right strategy. What is the reason for this success?

P: . . . So what we want to do is very much try to keep al Qaeda on the run, recognizing that it remains lethal, dangerous, and capable of regenerating and they're constantly trying to do that.

. . . Q: Then there was the ceasefire declared by the Shia firebrand Mullah Muqtada al-Sadr in August. How did that contribute to the stabilization of Iraq?

P: Clearly Sadr's Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) ceasefire does result in a reduction of violence. Although there are certainly elements associated with the Sadr Militia that have broken that ceasefire and have carried out attacks on the Iraqi forces, Iraqi civilians, and Iraqi infrastructure. . . .

Q: What made Sadr declare a ceasefire in the first place?

P: We believe that Muqtada al-Sadr is trying to clean up this kind of rogue activity and the special groups that have been trained, equipped, funded and, in some cases, directed by Iran but which are giving his movement a bad name. And he's right to be concerned about it. It is good that he's concerned about it. Everyone would welcome the Sadr-trained participating as a political organization in the Iraqi political dialog and activity. And you see that in certain areas. I think the accommodations that people made in Basra, for example, the negotiations between Fadilah, the Supreme Council and the Sadrists there are encouraging, albeit, certainly against the backdrop of various militia activities and, certainly, growing Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). It's a very complex situation, to be sure. There's no shortage of enemies still out there. Nobody at all is celebrating any kind of successes or anything like that. You know, what we are doing is keeping our head down and continuing to move forward and to pursue the different security challenges with our Iraqi partners.

Q: There has been a great deal of attention paid to the surge of the U.S. forces. How are the Iraqi troops performing in the ongoing campaign?

P: The Iraqi surge has been much greater than our surge. And actually, it is being felt. Yes, there's an uneven quality to Iraqi forces but they brought in some over 160,000 this year in terms of police, soldiers, border police and other assorted Iraqi security force members. That's huge. My own country is really working very hard to add between 5,000 and 10,000 soldiers a year to the U.S. Army, for example. It's really an enormous.

Q: How reliable are the Iraqi Security Forces?

P: There's an uneven quality to them, certainly. There are certainly concerns about sectarian allegiances of some of them still, although a number of them have been cleaned up over the course of the past six months as well. There are, for example, national police units that are really quite good in our estimation. There are some about which we still have concerns. But the Wolf Brigade commander was just replaced early December as an example. So there is movement in these areas. We are concerned though also about campaigns to kill and intimidate some of the more nonsectarian and more successful leaders like General Qais down in Hilla. So again, the trajectory is never consistently up. It's sort of up in bumps and downs and sometimes it's a pretty big down and then we'll recover. What you're hoping to do is keep it generally on a positive trajectory. And I think that's generally true. I think if you look at, for example, attack trends. It really has been pretty steadily downward ever since June. Even if it were to stay at the level that it is now, that would be a level that we've not seen since, certainly, prior to the Samarra Mosque if not in the late spring of 2005. And you can feel it and see it in Baghdad in terms of markets. If to protect the civilian population is our purpose and it is, civilian deaths should come down and they have been. And this is, by the way, Iraqi data--not all of which is verified. We are working more and more with them. And you can see it does converge as we have worked more closely with them. There's some sectarian influence even on the reporting of data not to mention everything else. And there are corruption problems and there are lack of capacity issues and everything else. Ethno-sectarian is actually quite down. You'll remember what it was like last year and it's very different now. And that's a result of a number of factors. Some of it, again, is al Qaeda is on the run. Jaish al-Mahdi has a ceasefire. Special groups are in turmoil, really, among themselves. All the intelligence sources we have tell us that the special groups are literally fighting among themselves. Some want to honor the ceasefire, some are opposing it, others are trying to impose on them. The chain of command is by no means clear.

Q: When you returned to Iraq last February as the Commanding General, you came with a brand new Counterinsurgency Field Manual that you co-authored. Could you explain how this new strategy helped to turn the page in Iraq?

P: It is a result of the employment of the forces, the additional forces and the way that they go into neighborhoods and to live with the people that you're securing. The platoons are all out; they're not on big bases except for the maintenance and city intelligence and headquarters. They're in the patrol bases, the Joint Security Stations (JSS), the Combat Outposts (COP). And that's where they need to be to secure the population. We watched this process as the first one went into Ghazaliyah in Western Baghdad and it was a ghost town. And gradually life has come back to some of these areas. US troops have done it not by themselves, but with Iraqi Security Forces. Increasingly in those areas that had no security, that had no police in particular, we are supported by Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) who give us the intelligence that comes from locals who want to defeat al Qaeda and want al Qaeda out of their neighborhoods because of the damage that they've done. It's the additional forces on the Iraqi side with the Georgian brigade in addition to the U.S. forces. It's how they've been used by our commanders. It's the fact that our commanders, in many respects get it in a way that we never have before as a result of changes in our doctrinal manuals, changes in the way we prepare forces for Iraq, the experience that they've all had over here before, the study that they've done back in the United States and the preparation before they come back over.

. . . Q: Up to today there are 72,000 Concerned Local Citizens helping US troops and the Iraqi government to stabilize the country. Many among them are former insurgents. How stable is the coalition with these former enemies?

P: In Anbar in particular they have been able to be integrated into the police, into the Army. We've worked the same kind of arrangement in Baghdad although, to be frank, it has been much tougher because of very legitimate and understandable concerns on the part of the government, the Shi'a-majority government, that what is largely a Sunni Arab phenomenon will turn one day on the government. So they have to get integrated into the legitimate forces. They have to be vetted. They have to be carefully reviewed. And I think we're up to about 6,000 now or so including about 1,700 in Abu Ghraib and then thousands from the western part of Baghdad in particular that have been all the way through the process and have either gone through the police academy or are in line to go to the police academy and some of that fairly recently. And it does take an effort to do that because, again, there have been, as I said, legitimate concerns about some of these individuals.

. . . Q: Another factor that has seriously threatened the formation of a stable and secure Iraq is Iran. Lately Tehran seems to have decreased its interference in Iraq. Would you agree to that assessment?

P: There may be Iranian reduction in exporting violence to Iraq. I say "may" because it really is a may. There is not an apparent reduction in training because we have detained individuals in recent months and weeks who recently received training in Iran as late as late October or early November. So it may have stopped since then but it did not stop immediately after the Iranian senior leaders promised their Iraqi counterparts that they would stop the training, funding, arming, and equipping and directing of Shi'a militias.

Q: What is the reason for Iran's reduction of its interference in Iraq?

P: Well, the Iraqi leaders asked them to. I mean one Iraqi leader after another went to Tehran and said, "This is very damaging to Iraq. The al Qaeda threat is gradually being beaten back. How about laying off? Let the Iraqi and coalition focus on al Qaeda so they're not having to fight Shi'a militias at the same time." The Iranian interference was damaging. We saw certain ministries hijacked by militias. The Ministry of Health was really overtaken to a degree, certain elements of it, by militia elements and a couple of other ministries as well. There are certain segments, certain of these government-owned companies that run various elements of the governmental structure that were hijacked by militia interests. Just in the same way that certain elements of the national police were heavily influenced by sectarian interests and carrying out horrific activities. But when the al Qaeda threat is diminished, there's not the big need for militias to protect neighborhoods. And, in fact, the population is starting to ask, "Why do we need these guys on the street who are extorting money? They're vicious, they're emotional, they're uneducated, and they're not responsive to anybody except, it seems, to local thugs." So there is a rejection in many cases of these individuals as well. They see what Shi'a militias do shoot rockets. They hit the Rusafa Rule of Law Complex. Those are Shi'a prisoners in there just as well as Sunni prisoners.


. . . Q: Would you say it's too early to assess whether the Counterinsurgency Field Manual actually holds true?

P: I would say it holds true.

Q: Because you need to say that?

P: No. I mean, I'd be the first to say it. As I mentioned earlier, there's nobody doing victory dances in the end zone. There is nobody talking about lights at the end of the tunnel or having turned corners or anything like that. The progress is tenuous. The situations are fragile. They have to be solidified or cemented, if you will, by true political and economic progress. We can in a sense achieve short-term improvements in security and local security and local stability, but the long-term has to be the result of national reconciliation as embodied by legislation, governmental actions, economic growth and opportunities, reconstruction, if you will, of education systems, health systems, basic services, and all the rest of that.

Q: Would you agree that it is also one of the major tasks to weave together, so to speak, the patchwork of Iraqi security forces? Iraqi Army, National Police, Local Police, Concerned Local Citizens - all those seem to overlap somehow.

P: Yeah, absolutely. Although they are actually fairly comfortable with a less clear chain of command than we are. They actually construct a slight degree of ambiguity.

Q: Which might be prone to fall apart?

P: Well, some of it is an Iraqi way of doing things. Their approach, for example, is to have a checkpoint for which there are police, there are soldiers, and there maybe National Police or now, Concerned Local Citizens, so you get them all. And their thinking is we're all keeping an eye on each other and the result will be something that is reasonable. I mean over time what you want to get to is local police policing local areas. And that has actually been achieved in, of all places, Fallujah. Fallujah has now just police; there's no Iraqi Army left in there. They've all been able to move out and move up to the north by Lake Tharthar and that area over by the rock pile or the quarries area. And in Fallujah there are basically ten police precincts. Each is a gated community. Each has population access control to varying degrees. And each has a single Marine squad with it to ensure situational awareness, good coordination, communications and an intelligence flow. But you're absolutely right. Not only that, we actually have a slide in our campaign plan that shows, in fact, sort of a patchwork quilt. Actually, first it's a quilt. First, it's missing patches. Then you have a patchwork quilt, and then you have a quilt that's sort of semi coherent. And so there's no question about that is more showing how you have to knit pieces of the country together in truth. You know, it's more about that's the fabric of society. But you have to do the same thing with the fabric of security forces.

Q: Among Iraqis and Americans, frustration about the country's political elites is high. Can the gains in security you have achieved be sustained without ending the political deadlock within the Iraqi government?

P: The Iraqi political leaders themselves are not pleased with the level of progress at the national political level, the leaders themselves. In fact, they're all, right now, doing some very serious behind-the-scenes dialog about making the processes work that they agreed on during September. In early September, you'll recall they published this declaration about how they would function. And so there's a lot of discussion ongoing about that. But the one factor that is very important to remember is that there are centripetal forces here in Iraq as well as centrifugal forces. I think we tend to focus perhaps rightly on the centrifugal forces because there are some serious ones, the ethno-sectarian differences foremost among them. Religious sect differences. And political party differences that are serious. This is a full-contact sport here when it comes to politics in Iraq. But there are also some forces that keep Iraq together.

The most important is the central government's role in the distribution of oil revenues. And they are doing that, by the way. Even in the absence of a law on oil revenue-sharing, the budget does share the oil revenue. And that's a huge function of the central government. Beyond that, they are distribution those oil revenues about the way it should be. It's 17% for the Kurdish regional government. The provinces are getting an increasing share in the draft 2008 budget. And we think that budget will be done fairly early in 2008 which will, again, be a sign of some progress. We think there's a chance that the justice and accountability law could be voted on again early in 2008 which would be very significant. The pension law has already passed which is a reconciliation achievement as well for Iraq although not that focused on for some reason, I'm not sure why, but it extends pension benefits to tens of thousands of Iraqis who were shut out for the first few years after liberation. So, as I mentioned, the Iraqi leaders are not satisfied with the progress that's been made. But there has been this halting or very slow progress that has taken place in those respects. And we'll have to see in the new year, can those senior leaders come together and reach agreement on some of these very, very important but very challenging issues that the Iraqi people want them to resolve? But they are fundamental issues. It took our country years to resolve States' Rights. Arguably it took us centuries. We're still not done with it.

Q: General Petraeus, there is one final topic we would like to touch upon. Traveling around Baghdad we witnessed an increased level of security. We walked through markets and that's huge progress. But to some degree, of course, this is because of the walls that were built to separate Sunni from Shia areas.

P: Yes. Good T-walls make good neighbors.

Q: But the question is: Isn't there a danger that Baghdad is becoming a new Jerusalem in terms of being a divided city?

P: Now, to be sure, there has been a degree of Balkanization of neighborhoods. Over time that's where there have to be stitches back in. Some areas are very complex, such as Ghazaliyah in Western Baghdad for example. But even there are hopeful signs. We literally had a Ghazaliyah south-Ghazaliyah north soccer game, which means Sunni-Shi'a soccer game, the other day. And they're actually, at local level, talking about helping people go back to their homes because Shi'a moved north, Sunni moved south. It's a metaphor for Iraq that what sometimes is very difficult at national level because of the magnitude of the problem sometimes can be resolved at local level because the problem's a little bit more bite-sized. The same as for Ghazaliyah could be said of northwest Rashid. There's a similar sort of coming back together. But you can't come back together until the violence is stopped. And as long as people are shooting at each other, they're not going to be talking. And until you can get the climate of fear to subside just a bit at least, really playing soccer with one another instead of throwing each other out of houses, you can't get to that point. So, I mean, we hope to see the day when some of those concrete walls come down. But interestingly, many Iraqis will say privately that they are very happy to have the walls. There's this public sort of complaint, "All of the walls going up, that's terrible". And then they'll tell you right after that they didn't really mean what they said. I mean I've had this at the highest level of the Iraqi Government where I ask the individual did you really mean what you said on television about that wall in Adhamiyah? And I was assured, "Don't worry about what was said in public. Worry about what's said in private. Leave the wall there."

Read the entire interview here.

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