Refocusing McCain's Message After The Maliki Embrace of Obama

PM Maliki undercut McCain's stance on Iraq by embracing Obama's call for short timelines. Obama, a man who narcissim and arrogance clearly outweighs his judgment, has given McCain an incredible gift by denigrating the surge and claiming, incredibly, that his own plan for withdraw might have had the same impact as the surge. In light of all this, McCain can still eviscerate Obama on the issue of judgement, he merely needs to make the focus of his arguments less about Iraq in particular and more about the larger challenges we face.
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I am not sure what game Iraq PM Maliki is playing by inserting himself into U.S. politics with his comments in Der Spiegel that, in essence, though unlcear, seem to be an embrace of a 16 month timetable for withdraw of all combat forces from Iraq. Whether or not this was a mistranslation is near meaningless as it has already had whatever impact it will in the U.S. Joshua Pundit speculates that this is an attempt by Maliki to play both ends against the middle in order to extract the maximum concessions from Pres. Bush in a high stakes game of chicken over the SOFA Agreement. It JP is correct, then Maliki has made a foolish move. He would do well to remember what happened to South Vietnman and how that country was treated by its neighbors and the the U.S. after the U.S. withdrew. If you don't recall the story, you can find it in the Arthur Hermann article here.

But Iraq is a sovereign and democratic country. If the elected government at any time asks for us to remove our troops, then out we should go, posthaste. That is not the central point of this post. The question is, how is McCain to regain his footing. The "time horizons for victory" versus "time tables for defeat" is still a valid argument. Even Obama admits that General Petraeus is strongly opposed to time lines as putting all of our gains in Iraq in danger. But because of Maliki, it no longer has the importance to make it alone the decisive issue.

We still have wars going on. There is still the war in Afghanistan. There is still the problem of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan which is only going worse by the day - and which at the moment we are watching from the sidelines. There is still the problem of Iran, which could very easily become a major shooting war. Even if we finish Iraq in uncontested victory and depart that nation, we are still a nation at war.

While Maliki may have undercut McCain, Obama has provided the gift of all gifts - Kerryesque nuance on the surge. Specifically, Obama said that knowing what he knows now, he still would not vote for the surge. He is defending the indefensible. He does so by denigrating the success of the surge, he credits the Anbar Awakening and Sadr's ceasefire as the unforseeable keys to the success in Iraq and he posits that these two acts where unrelated to the U.S. actions in Iraq. Finally, he just throws up his arms saying who knew what would have happened had his plan been followed. I've spelled out the utter gaping holes in Obama's positions here.

Obama could not have given McCain more ammunition. McCain's message needs to transcend Iraq. He needs to shift the focus from 16 months or time horizons in Iraq to a combination of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and the Global War on Terror generally. The arguments will be the same, he merely needs to make them more global - and mine Obama's "nuance" for all it is worth.

As an aside, Americans are hardly a stupid people. Even as the entirity of the MSM has gone in the tank for Obama, the rest of America seems not to be falling in behind the MSM like lemmings. Amazingly, even as the MSM holds a wall to wall Obamathon, the Washington Post is reporting that McCain is significantly closing the gap in major battleground states. If Obama can't improve his numbers under these absolutely most favorable of conditions, he is going to have a lot of problems when the debates come around and McCain is able to finally press him eye to eye for the nation to watch.

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Iraq Speech Part IV: Obama's Plan For Withdraw - Contradictions & Stealth Refinements

Having finally paid a visit to Iraq but mere days after announcing his findings and conclusions, the Chameleon Candidate gave us more insight into his "strategic vision" for Iraq.

I. Obama notes that Petraeus has strongly advised against timelines because they will harm our military effort, but Obama intends to disregard the military advice of his highest commander.




Part II Obama Outlines his 16 month timeline to drawdown all combat brigades from Iraq and, in the next breath, says he will listen to his commanders.



Part III - Stealth redefining of his plan. Notable Is Obama's claim that he has "said before" that he will reenter Iraq if there is genocide.



1. Obama now presents his plan as a conditions based 'flexible timeline,' claiming that it is a "strategic vision" as opposed to an "open ended commitment" or a "rigid timetable." In doing so, he implies that McCain's plan - conditions based - is not but an open ended committment, despite the fact that we are now down to pre-surge levels in our troops. Is this a stealth refinement?

2. Timelines are the same thing Obama railed against in 2006 as being wholly inappropriate because they would hamper commanders. He explicitly notes above that General Petraeus has warned against using any timelines because of the effect that will have on security and then admits that he fully intends to disregard that military advice so he can use the money for his domestic programs. But then he says, a few minutes later, that his timeline will be flexible based on the advice of his military commanders. Is there any way of interpreting Obama's speech where those two elements are not completely contradictory.

3. Obama has spoken before about genocide - but not as a justification for reinvading Iraq. This is an outright lie by Obama. His only prior mention of genocide was that it was insufficient justification to continue with the surge.

4. Obama was unable to see that the surge would work in January, 2007. Obama was calling for an end to surge in July, 2008. Obama was calling for an end to the surge in November, 2008. So how much trust do you place in his "strategic vision"?

5. If we transition to a sixteen month drawdown, by about four months into that, the vast majority of our soldiers will have transitioned form active combat and security operations to nothing more than force protection. The Iraqis will essentially be on their own. We, for the first time since 2006, will be on the strategic defensive as we try to perform the largest retreat since Dunkirk.

6. Obama has never flushed out his plan to leave a residual combat force in Iraq to "attack al Qaeda and perform counterinsurgency operations." This man will get a lot of U.S. soldiers killed. It is taking 140,000 soldiers to perform "counterinsurgency operations" right now. A portion of that force is no longer required because we have been so successful. But drop all the way down to a division or less and they will be magnets for Iran's proxies. And, as Iran comes to dominate Iraq, all U.S. forces will be asked to leave. We will go. And we will have lost Iraq to Iran. It will be the the most costly defeat ever pulled from the jaws of an and important victory.

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Maliki & Obama Have Something Common

It appears that Maliki and Obama have something in common, but despite what Obama has written in the NYT today, that something is not the desire for a precipitous withdraw of U.S. troops from Iraq based on a negotiated timeline. Rather, the similarity begins and ends at having to correct "inartful" statements by their subordinates. Obama has made a cottage industry of disowning "inartful" comments by his campaign. Maliki apparently has now had to do the same - specifically, the claim by his office that he was seeking to negotiate a timeline for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq.

I refrained from blogging over the past week on the claim that Maliki was seeking to negotiate a timetable for U.S. troops to withdraw from Iraq because it was out of character for Maliki, at least as I assessed his character over the past two years. I waited, expecting a clarification. The clarification has come. This from the BBC:

US presidential contender Barack Obama has repeatedly seized on statements attributed to Iraqi leaders to support his call for a troop withdrawal deadline.

The key statement cited by Mr Obama and others was made by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki last Monday in his address to Arab ambassadors in the United Arab Emirates.

The prime minister was widely quoted as saying that in the negotiations with the Americans on a Status of Forces Agreement to regulate the US troop presence from next year, "the direction is towards either a memorandum of understanding on their evacuation, or a memorandum of understanding on a timetable for their withdrawal".
That was the version of Mr Maliki's remarks put out in writing by his office in Baghdad.

It was widely circulated by the news media, and caught much attention, including that of Mr Obama.

There is only one problem. It is not what Mr Maliki actually said.

In an audio recording of his remarks, heard by the BBC, the prime minister did not use the word "withdrawal".

What he actually said was: "The direction is towards either a memorandum of understanding on their evacuation, or a memorandum of understanding on programming their presence."

Mr Maliki's own office had inserted the word "withdrawal" in the written version, replacing the word "presence".

Contacted by the BBC, the prime minister's office had no explanation for the apparent contradiction. An official suggested the written version remained the authoritative one, although it is not what Mr Maliki said.

The impression of a hardening Iraqi government line was reinforced the following day by comments from the National Security Adviser, Muwaffaq al-Rubaie.

He was quoted as saying that Iraq would not accept any agreement which did not specify a deadline for a full withdrawal of US troops.

Significantly, Mr Rubaie was speaking immediately after a meeting with the senior Shiite clerical eminence, Ayatollah Ali Sistani.

But in subsequent remarks, Mr Rubaie rode back from a straightforward demand for a withdrawal deadline.

He said the talks were focused on agreeing on "timeline horizons, not specific dates", and said that withdrawal timings would depend on the readiness of the Iraqi security forces.

Militant elements

The confusion reflects the dilemma facing Iraqi government leaders.
On the one hand, many of them - particularly among the Shia factions - face a public which regards the US presence as a problem rather than a solution.

With provincial elections coming up soon, they could be outflanked by more militant elements such as the supporters of cleric Moqtada Sadr, who wants American forces out now and opposes negotiations that would cover their continued presence.

Yet the government knows that its own forces are not yet in a position to stand on their own against the two major challenges they face - the Sunni radicals of al-Qaeda and related groups, and the militant Shia militias which were partly suppressed in fierce battles this spring in Basra and Baghdad.

Both groups could simply bide their time awaiting the American withdrawal before making a comeback drive.

. . . The indications are that the talks are now focusing not on deadlines for a complete withdrawal - but on phasing US troops out of Iraqi cities, and into a role providing logistical backing, firepower and air support, with a reduction of front-line troops.

"On substantive issues, there's not much daylight between the two sides," said a US official close to the troop talks with the Iraqi government.

"The troops will leave when the Iraqis are ready to take over. But they [Iraqi leaders] need to get what they need, and to get cover for it.

It is politics - how you package it, how you sell it to your people. They want our support, but they also want to show that there's progress towards sovereignty."
What the Iraqis see as issues of sovereignty have been a sticking-point in the talks, especially such items as a US demand for operational freedom and immunity from prosecution for US troops.

Officials admit that the negotiations are in a state of flux, and that the Status of Forces Agreement, which was to have been concluded this month, may end up being a simple protocol or memorandum of understanding giving some sort of legal basis for a continued US presence after the current UN mandate expires at the end of the year. . . .

Iraqi leaders will no doubt continue to make ambiguous statements. And US presidential contenders will no doubt continue to construe them to their own advantage.

But when Mr Obama visits Baghdad, as he is expected to later this month, he is unlikely to find that the Iraqi government is quite as set on demanding deadlines for US withdrawal as he would like to think.

Read the entire article.

(H/T Hot Air, Gateway Pundit)

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Timeline: Iran's Nuclear Program

August 2002: Iranian exiles say that Tehran has built a vast uranium enrichment plant at Natanz and a heavy water plant at Arak without informing the United Nations. [1]

December 2002: The existence of sites at Natanz and Arak is confirmed by satellite photographs shown on U.S. television. The United States accuses Tehran of “across-the-board pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.” Iran agrees to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

February 2003: Iranian President Mohammad Khatami reveals that Iran has unearthed uranium deposits and announces plans to develop a nuclear fuel cycle. IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei travels to Iran with a team of inspectors to begin probing Tehran's nuclear plans.

June 2003: ElBaradei accuses Iran of not revealing the extent of its nuclear work and urges leaders to sign up for more intrusive inspections.

August 2003: Traces of highly enriched weapons-grade uranium found at Natanz.

September 2003: More enriched uranium is discovered, prompting urgent calls for Iran to sign a voluntary protocol formalising a tougher inspection regime.

October 2003: After meeting French, German and UK foreign ministers, Tehran agrees to stop producing enriched uranium and formally decides to sign the Additional Protocol, a measure that extends the IAEA’s ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities. No evidence is produced to confirm the end of enrichment.

November 2003: ElBaradei says there is “no evidence“ that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons. The United States disagrees.

December 2003: Iran signs the Additional Protocol at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna.

February 2004: Abdul Qadeer Khan, the godfather of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, is reported to have sold Iran nuclear weapons technology.

February 2004: An IAEA report says Iran experimented with polonium-210, which can be used to trigger the chain reaction in a nuclear bomb. Iran did not explain the experiments. Iran again agrees to suspend enrichment, but again does not do so.

March 2004: Iran is urged to reveal its entire nuclear programme to the IAEA by 1 June 2004.

June 2004: Tehran is criticised by the IAEA for trying to import magnets for centrifuges and for not offering “full, timely and pro-active“ co-operation with inspectors.

September 2004: The IAEA orders Iran to stop preparations for large-scale uranium enrichment. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell labels Iran a growing danger and calls for the UN Security Council to impose sanctions.

November 2004: Iran agrees to halt all enrichment activities during talks with the EU-3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom), but pledges to resume in the future.

January 2005: IAEA inspectors are allowed into the secretive Parchin plant near Tehran.

April 2005: Iran announces plans to resume uranium conversion at Isfahan.

May 2005: The EU-3 warn that any resumption of conversion would end negotiations linked to trade and economic issues. Iran agrees to wait for detailed proposals from the Europeans at the end of July.

August 2005: Hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is installed as Iranian president, as Tehran pledges an “irreversible“ resumption of enrichment. Iran rejects the latest European proposals for resolving the nuclear crisis. Iran appoints a hardline politician, Ali Larijani, to lead the country's nuclear talks with the EU. Iran resumes sensitive fuel cycle work at its uranium conversion facility near Isfahan.

2 September 2005: IAEA report confirms Iran has resumed uranium conversion at Isfahan. The report says that the nuclear watchdog, "after two and a half years of intensive inspections," remains unclear on "some important outstanding issues." [2]

25 September 2005: Tehran rejects the new IAEA report. Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki says his country remains committed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. [3]

12 October 2005: The EU issues a statement calling on Iran to continue negotiations with the EU-3.

24 November 2005: A meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors postpones any action on Iran's nuclear programme. The move is aimed at reopening negotiations on a Russian proposal for a compromise that would allow Iran to enrich uranium, but only in Russia and under strict controls.

25 December 2005: Tehran formally rejects an offer from Moscow to enrich uranium for its nuclear programme in Russia. Iranian officials insist upon Iran's right to enrich uranium on its own soil.

10 January 2006: Iran removes UN seals at the Natanz enrichment plant and resumes nuclear fuel research. [4]

4 February 2006: The IAEA votes to report Iran to the UN Security Council. Iran ends snap UN nuclear inspections the next day.

14 February 2006: Iran restarts small-scale feeding of uranium gas into centrifuges at Natanz after 2-1/2-year suspension.

5 June 2006: EU foreign policy chief, Secretary-General of the EU Council Javier Solana, delivers a package of incentives from world powers if Iran agrees to halt uranium enrichment.

31 July 2006: The UN Security Council demands that Iran suspend its nuclear activities by August 31.

31 August 2006: The UN Security Council deadline for Iran to halt its work on nuclear fuel passes. IAEA says Tehran has failed to suspend the programme.

25 September 2006: Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki says nuclear talks with European negotiators are "on track" and a diplomatic solution is possible. [5]

4 October 2006: EU foreign policy chief Solana says four months of intensive talks have brought no agreement on suspension of Iran's sensitive nuclear activities, and he adds that the dialogue cannot continue indefinitely.

12 November 2006: An Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman says Tehran is pressing ahead with plans to expand its programme to enrich uranium and remains determined to install 3,000 centrifuges by March 2007.

23 December 2006: The 15-member UN Security Council unanimously adopts a binding resolution that calls on Iran to suspend its uranium-enrichment activities and to comply with its IAEA obligations. Resolution 1737 directs all states to prevent the supply or sale to Iran of any materials that could assist its nuclear or ballistic-missile programmes. It also imposes an asset freeze on key companies and individuals named by the UN as contributors to Iran's nuclear and missile programmes. Iran rejects the move as an "invalid" and "extralegal act" outside the bounds of the UN's charter.

25 December 2006: President Ahmadinejad responds to UN Security Council Resolution 1737 by saying the sanctions will have "no impact" on Iran's nuclear programme.

22 January 2007: Foreign Minister Mottaki confirms reports that 38 UN nuclear inspectors have been prohibited from entering the country in a list that was reportedly delivered to the IAEA; the next day, Tehran stresses that cooperation with the IAEA continues, despite the ban. The European Union urges all countries to enforce the recently passed UN sanctions against Iran.

21 February 2007: The UN Security Council's 60-day deadline ends for Iran to halt uranium enrichment. Iranian parliamentary speaker Gholam Ali Hadad Adel warns that a delay by Russia in completing Iran’s Bushehr nuclear plant would harm bilateral ties. His comments came after Russian nuclear officials' claim that lagging payments from Tehran could delay start-up of the facility.

22 February 2007: The IAEA says in a report that Iran has expanded its uranium enrichment program instead of complying with a U.N. Security Council ultimatum to freeze it. The finding clears the way for harsher sanctions against Tehran. The agency also said the Islamic republic continues building both a reactor that will use heavy water and a heavy water production plant — also in defiance of the Security Council.[5.1]

24 March 2007: The Security Council unanimously approves a resolution broadening UN sanctions against Iran for its continuing failure to halt uranium enrichment. Iranian officials call the new measures “unnecessary and unjustified.”

9 April 2007: President Ahmadinejad says Iran can produce nuclear fuel on an industrial scale. Ten days later, the IAEA confirms Iran has begun making nuclear fuel in its underground uranium enrichment plant and has started up more than 1,300 centrifuges to enrich uranium.

10 April 2007: Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Mottaki says Iran will not accept any suspension of its uranium-enrichment activities and urges world powers to accept the “new reality” of the Islamic republic's nuclear programme.

23 May 2007: The IAEA says in a new report, issued to coincide with the expiration of a Security Council deadline for Tehran, that Iran continues to defy UN Security Council demands to halt uranium enrichment and has in fact expanded such work. The report adds that the UN nuclear agency's ability to monitor nuclear activities in Iran has declined due to lack of access to sites.

21 August 2007: Iran and the IAEA say they agreed to a work plan for answering outstanding questions about Iran's nuclear programme. [6]

4 October 2007: Diplomats say Iran has installed close to 3,000 centrifuges, enough to start refining usable amounts of nuclear fuel if they work without glitches.

20 October 2007: Saeed Jalili is named to replace Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, who resigned.

24 October 2007: The United States imposes new sanctions on Iran and accuses the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps of spreading weapons of mass destruction.

2 November 2007: The UN Security Council’s five permanent members (Britain, France, the United States, Russia and China) plus Germany discuss a third round of tougher sanctions.

15 November 2007: A report from the IAEA warned that Iran is fact decreasing its cooperation with the IAEA. “Iran has continued to shield many aspects of its nuclear program. Iran’s ‘cooperation has been reactive rather than proactive,’ the report said, adding that because of restrictions Iran has placed on inspectors the agency’s understanding of the full scope of Iran’s nuclear program is ‘diminishing.’”
The International Atomic Energy Agency report also confirmed that Tehran continued to defy the U.N. Security Council by ignoring its repeated demands to freeze uranium enrichment, a potential pathway to nuclear arms.
[7]

Update: 21 November 2007


[1] Timeline entries through August 2005 are quoted from "Timeline: Iran nuclear crisis," BBC News, 24 September 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4134614.stm.

[2] "Timeline: Irans nuclear program," Reuters, 2 November 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL0218278120071102?pageNumber=2&sp=true.

[3] Timeline entries through December 2005 are quoted from "Factbox: Timeline Of The Iranian Nuclear Dispute," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11 August 2005.
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/8/19C76894-2A3A-49D7-96A5-02039F66FD20.html.

[4] Timeline entries through August 2006 are quoted from "Timeline: Irans nuclear program," Reuters, 2 November 2007.

[5] Timeline entries through May 2007 are quoted from "Factbox: Timeline Of The Iranian Nuclear Dispute," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11 August 2005.

[5.1] Iran Nuclear Chronology, CBS News :http://www.cbsnews.com/elements/2007/02/22/in_depth_world/timeline2504696_0_main.shtml

[6] Timeline entries through 2 November 2007 are quoted from "Timeline: Irans nuclear program," Reuters, 2 November 2007.

[7] "Iran fails to resolve nuclear questions," Financial Times, 15 November 2007:http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6f5974c8-9397-11dc-a884-0000779fd2ac.html;
"Report Raises New Doubts On Iran's Nuclear Program," New York Times, 15 November 2007 :http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/16/world/middleeast/16nuke.html">

(Hattip: Right Truth)

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