Chants Of "Death To Khameini"

Have no doubt, the IRI, the Islamic Republic of Iran, is over. A leading cleric has already announced that we are no longer ruled by the Islamic "Republic" . . . but the Islamic government. . . Whether now or in a few months or years, the game is over.

Anonymous author writing from Iran, The Street Protests Mount, Salon, 15 June 2009

Yet more discussion of how serious this nascent revolt has become from an article this afternoon in Salon. As I pointed out in the post below, the challenge resulting from the perception of massive fraud in this election has fundamentally altered the relationship of the people to the regime. The challenge it poses is not to Ahmedinejad anymore, but to the theocracy itself in the person of Supreme Guide Ali Khameini. And I don't know if there is anything that Khameini can really do to stem it at this point. To admit to the fraud is suicide for the regime, and allowing it to stand is equally problematic. This is on the cusp of heading to a brutal repression, with perhaps a takeover by the IRGC, or a full scale revolution. This from Salon on the current situation:

Now, three days after the election, a pattern is emerging. There is unstructured protest on the streets beginning in the late afternoon. Then, at night, it escalates.

In my own apartment complex on Monday morning we were woken up to screams and shouts. Kids from the building and elsewhere had been engaging in political rock fights in the adjoining street and had run into the complex (a typical urban apartment "tower" found in almost all of the developing world). Families went out to the fire escape to look down to see what had happened. It turned out that special police had rushed into the complex, followed by "basijis" or paramilitary forces, basically thugs on motorbikes with helmets and batons. It also turned out that they had electric rods and, to the shock of many, machetes. Several people were wounded and taken away and much of the first floor and entrance of the complex was destroyed.

. . . The elders had done their best to mediate, to speak rationally to resolve the problem. That is unlikely to last as the situation in Tehran becomes more and more about force.

On buses and in taxes you hear voices saying, with resignation, "What's the point? They're all the same. Why fight it?" But then every night and even during the day clashes are occurring. This week will be critical. If the conflict can be sustained, if the pressure can be sustained -- Tehran is coming to a standstill -- then it is possible that the situation will enter a new phase.

Either way, have no doubt, the IRI, the Islamic Republic of Iran, is over. A leading cleric has already announced that we are no longer ruled by the Islamic "Republic" (jomhuri e Islami) but the Islamic government (hookoomat e Islami). Whether now or in a few months or years, the game is over. . . .

The man who almost certainly won the presidential election, Mir Hossein Mousavi, while known to be a man who does not back down (I know this directly from a man who worked with him directly on the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution), is also likely, like former president Mohammed Khatami, to try (at least at first) to calm the situation down, which is what we have already seen him do. This means that the movement and action out in the streets thus far lacks leadership. . . .

We are hearing word that presidential candidate Mehdi Karrobi, who received a suspiciously low vote total in the official count, has announced that he will no longer wear his clerical garb. Karrobi, who famously and loudly claimed that Dr. Ahmadinejad stole the presidential election from him four years ago, feels that he has been humiliated again. There is simply no way that he received around 400,000 votes -- his known supporters were more than this, and he received at least a dozen times that many in 2005. Focus on this stat for proof of how bogus this election has been.

In Tehran information is being passed around by phone and word of mouth. SMS is still down. Facebook is blocked, though easily accessed with a filter-buster.

Finally, and this may be the most important piece of news, I personally heard "Marq bar Khamanei" (death or down with Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei) said quickly and once last night. Someone in the neighborhood reported that it was said more than once. If true, and I don't know if it is, this marks a significant turning point. Up until now the chants had been "Marq bar dictator," with dictator meaning Ahmadinejad. To chant against the supreme leader is an incredible taboo. In 1979, everyone wanted the shah to fall, but no one believed that it was thinkable. Then, for some reason, it became so. The movement reached a moment of viability. While this did not guarantee the revolution's success, it was a necessary condition for events to move forward. Has the same happened now in Iran?

The 1979 Revolution, once in motion, took months to play out, but inside of it no one knew what was exactly happening. They didn’t know long it would take, or whether there would be a successful conclusion. The same applies to the situation now.

Read the entire article.

Prior Posts:

Iran Buys Time, Obama Votes Present, Iraq's Status Is Recognized
Heating Up In Iran
Tehran Is Burning; What Will The Iranian Army Do? (Updated)
The Mad Mullah's Man Wins Again - For Now
The Next Moves In An Existential Chess Match (Background On Iran)

Read More...

Summary only...

Amir Taheri, The NIE On Iran's Nuclear Program, And "The Usual Suspects"

Amir Taheri, an Iranian born columnist, is frustrated with the NIE and how it is being used by the "usual suspects" to justify calls for unilateral talks with Iran. As he sees it, such talks with the Iran's theocracy would be every bit as counterproductive as were Chamberlin's attempt to buy "peace in our time" by his talks with Hitler in the 1930's:

Until a few days ago, Iran's nuclear ambitions appeared destined to become the hottest issue in the current American presidential campaign. A consensus, cutting across partisan divides, appeared to be taking shape that the Islamic Republic should be confronted forcefully, contained, and in time, forced to scale down its ambitions.

However, with the publication of the new American National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) claiming that Tehran had stopped the military aspect of its nuclear programme in 2003, most presidential candidates find it hard to sustain a tough position on the Islamic Republic.

This has enabled the usual suspects of appeasement to return from the woodworks to urge "a negotiated settlement."

In the past few days, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has broken her silence to call for negotiations with Tehran. One wonders why the administration to which she belonged failed to secure any concession s from Tehran through negotiations.

We have also had former United Nations' Secretary General Kofi Annan coming out of the purdah to call for negotiations.

In this, Annan has echoed former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Bzrezinski, who has called for a "grand bargain" with the Islamic Republic.

This new wave of negotiationism, to coin a phrase, is based on a mixture of false assumptions and bad faith.

The first false assumption is that the new NIE proves that the Islamic Republic has stopped the military aspect of its nuclear programme once and for all. . . .

The only visible sign of the decision to stop the programme was the suspension of uranium enrichment. That decision was reversed by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad soon after he was sworn in, and uranium enrichment was resumed at a faster pace.

In other words, even if we accept the NIE's claim that the programme was stopped in 2003, something that we have no reason to do, there is no evidence that it has not been resumed.

There is, in fact, quite a bit of evidence to the contrary.

As already noted, the uranium enrichment project has been resumed and continues at much faster pace.

•According to official estimates in Tehran, allocations for the nuclear programme have risen by almost 40 per cent.

•The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports that all of Iran's known nuclear sites remain in full operation.

•The IAEA also reports that it has no access to a number of other industrial sites in Iran that may well be linked to the nuclear programme. In other words, we know what we don't know but don't know what we don't know.

The negotiationists forget that the EU3, Britain, Germany and France have been negotiating with the Islamic Republic on this issue for almost a decade. During his term as British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw visited Tehran more than any other capital outside Europe. Javier Solana, the EU's chief foreign policy official, has spent more time talking to envoys from Tehran than diplomats from any other nation. Tehran has also been engaged in negotiations with the five permanent members of the United Nations' Security Council plus Germany.

Not only do they ignore the history of negotiations with Tehran, the appeasers also refuse to state clearly what it is that should be negotiated. In other words, they put process in place of policy. Talking about what to do becomes a substitute for doing what needs to be done.

The Islamic Republic, of course, would love to talk to anybody for as long as it is not required to do anything it does not wish to do.

. . . The negotiationists do not say what it is that one should negotiate with President Ahmadinejad.

More than four years ago, the IAEA discovered that the Islamic Republic had been violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for almost 18 years. Such a violation should have led to sanctions spelled out in the NPT itself. Instead, the IAEA decided to "negotiate" to prevent future violations. When those negotiations failed, the matter was taken to the UN Security Council which passed two resolutions demanding that the Islamic Republic stop uranium enrichment.

The Islamic Republic has ignored those resolutions and repeatedly stated that it would never abide by their key demand. In other words, the Islamic Republic is ready to negotiate, in fact would love to negotiate, provided the talks are about everything except the one thing that could be the object of credible negotiations.

The appeasers are indirectly calling on the UN Security Council to drop its one demand and enter into "unconditional negotiations" with the Islamic Republic. This means surrendering to Tehran and may or may not be a good option.

In that case the appeasers should shed their lexicon of obfuscation and admit that they are recommending unconditional surrender to the Islamic Republic.

Once they do that, they may have an even stronger point. They would be able to say that, since the major democracies have no stomach for a fight with a power, described by Mrs. Albright as " rogue regime" before her conversion to appeasement, it is better to surrender to it in the hope that it moderates its radical temperament.

Today's appeasers, however, appear to be less courageous or more disingenuous than their predecessors in the late 1930s. This is why they are giving appeasement a bad name while increasing the possibility of war by confirming Ahmadinejad's illusion that he can do whatever he likes without risking the survival of his regime.

Read the entire article here. Our intelligence agencies have done our nation a tremendous disservice. It will, inn the long run, likely cost us bitterly since it puts off any reckoning with the single most destabilizing force in this world. Every day that reckoning is put off will increase the cost we will pay and gold and blood. And if Iran achieves a nuclear arsenal, that cost we will pay will rise exponentially.

Read More...

Summary only...

A Discordant Bell Sounds For Talks With Iran

Many believe that the deeply flawed NIE on Iran’s nuclear weapons program was the product of several State Department personnel pushing their own policy agenda and, in the process, neutering the Iranian policies of our elected leaders. They either do not perceive Iran as a threat or they do not believe that force should be an option in dealing with Iran. And now in the wake of the NIE, we begin to see other of their ilk emerging to make their beliefs known, as in today's Washington Post. The article, by Professor Vali Nasr of Tufts University, implies that we can negotiate with Iran if we understand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Guide since 1989.

Within the structure of Iran’s government, the Supreme Guide, a position created by Ayatollah Khomeini, is the true seat of power. And while Khamenei may allow President Ahmedinejad to be the public face of Iran, Khamenei has the final word to end or alter any of Ahmedinejad’s policies or to order new ones. And the military and intelligence bodies report directly to Khamenei. Khamenei, in essence, holds the strings of the entire government.

And now we have Professor Nasr presenting us a picture of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Guide, reminiscent of the picture we received of "our ally," the Soviet Union, and Uncle Joe Stalin in 1942. Indeed, the professor relies on the NIE to describe Iran as “toothless” and not a threat to the U.S. As to Khamenei, despite the fact that he is a formally trained Shia cleric, Professor Nasr paints us a picture of a secular leader unaffected by the cult of the Hidden Imam. Indeed, Professor Nasr explicitly relies on the NIE to tell us that Khamenei is a rational man who makes his decisions based on a secular, cost benefit mode. It should be noted that the NIE used a single, highly questionable inference to make that assertion, and completely ignored the history of Khamenei otherwise. For the Professor to pick that up and assert it as true is incredibly disingenuous.

But to continue, the professor describes Khamenei in favorable terms. He tells us that Khamenei has a "down-to-earth image" and "calm demeanor," and that he is far more “cautious, conservative and pragmatic than the bellowing Ahmadinejad.” The Professor even manages to stick in a Western fairy tale simile, saying that “Khamenei wants a "Goldilocks" kind of Islamic Republic -- not too hot, not too cold.” Tell us another one, Uncle Ali!

The Professor wholly ignores that Iran has delved ever deeper into terrorism - to become its single greatest source - under the watchful eye of Ayatollah Khamenei. I will assume that this professor does not have a son in the military who has been dismembered by one of Revolutionary Guard’s EFP’s that could only have found its way into Iraq with the approval of Khamenei. And I will bet none of his young nephews or nieces were blown up in the recent bombing at the pet market in Baghdad by Iran’s proxies. Nor does he have a child who died in the Khobar Towers bombing. And its doubtful he is related to any of our intelligence agents kidnapped and tortured to death by Iran’s proxies. Further, I assume he has no relatives in Israel, the Gaza Strip, or Lebanon where thousands have died as a result of decisions that trace back to this quiet, pragmatic Ayatollah. And then there are the countless thousands inside Iran who have been tortured, jailed and executed with Khamenei’s order or acquiescence.

There is a reason Sec. of Defense Gates said today:

"Everywhere you turn, it is the policy of Iran to foment instability and chaos, no matter the strategic value or cost in the blood of innocents - Christians, Jews and Muslims alike. . . There can be little doubt that their destabilizing foreign policies are a threat to the interests of the United States, to the interests of every country in the Middle East, and to the interests of all countries within the range of the ballistic missiles Iran is developing. . .

Khamenei's Allah apparently imposes no restraints on the means Khamenei can use to reach his ends. To view Khamenei as anything other than an incredibly ruthless sociopath would be a mistake of the highest order. And to see him as non-threatening when he will soon have the opportunity to be a nuclear armed ruthless sociopath is potentially suicidal. But, with the incredibly flawed NIE, the door has been kicked open for the ghosts of William Borah and Neville Chamberlin, the forerunners to Professor Nasr and his ilk, to emerge. And to borrow from Churchill, if they have their way, we shall be feeding the Iranian alligator in the hopes that it eats us last.

Read More...

Summary only...

Timeline: Iran's Nuclear Program

August 2002: Iranian exiles say that Tehran has built a vast uranium enrichment plant at Natanz and a heavy water plant at Arak without informing the United Nations. [1]

December 2002: The existence of sites at Natanz and Arak is confirmed by satellite photographs shown on U.S. television. The United States accuses Tehran of “across-the-board pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.” Iran agrees to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

February 2003: Iranian President Mohammad Khatami reveals that Iran has unearthed uranium deposits and announces plans to develop a nuclear fuel cycle. IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei travels to Iran with a team of inspectors to begin probing Tehran's nuclear plans.

June 2003: ElBaradei accuses Iran of not revealing the extent of its nuclear work and urges leaders to sign up for more intrusive inspections.

August 2003: Traces of highly enriched weapons-grade uranium found at Natanz.

September 2003: More enriched uranium is discovered, prompting urgent calls for Iran to sign a voluntary protocol formalising a tougher inspection regime.

October 2003: After meeting French, German and UK foreign ministers, Tehran agrees to stop producing enriched uranium and formally decides to sign the Additional Protocol, a measure that extends the IAEA’s ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities. No evidence is produced to confirm the end of enrichment.

November 2003: ElBaradei says there is “no evidence“ that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons. The United States disagrees.

December 2003: Iran signs the Additional Protocol at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna.

February 2004: Abdul Qadeer Khan, the godfather of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, is reported to have sold Iran nuclear weapons technology.

February 2004: An IAEA report says Iran experimented with polonium-210, which can be used to trigger the chain reaction in a nuclear bomb. Iran did not explain the experiments. Iran again agrees to suspend enrichment, but again does not do so.

March 2004: Iran is urged to reveal its entire nuclear programme to the IAEA by 1 June 2004.

June 2004: Tehran is criticised by the IAEA for trying to import magnets for centrifuges and for not offering “full, timely and pro-active“ co-operation with inspectors.

September 2004: The IAEA orders Iran to stop preparations for large-scale uranium enrichment. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell labels Iran a growing danger and calls for the UN Security Council to impose sanctions.

November 2004: Iran agrees to halt all enrichment activities during talks with the EU-3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom), but pledges to resume in the future.

January 2005: IAEA inspectors are allowed into the secretive Parchin plant near Tehran.

April 2005: Iran announces plans to resume uranium conversion at Isfahan.

May 2005: The EU-3 warn that any resumption of conversion would end negotiations linked to trade and economic issues. Iran agrees to wait for detailed proposals from the Europeans at the end of July.

August 2005: Hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is installed as Iranian president, as Tehran pledges an “irreversible“ resumption of enrichment. Iran rejects the latest European proposals for resolving the nuclear crisis. Iran appoints a hardline politician, Ali Larijani, to lead the country's nuclear talks with the EU. Iran resumes sensitive fuel cycle work at its uranium conversion facility near Isfahan.

2 September 2005: IAEA report confirms Iran has resumed uranium conversion at Isfahan. The report says that the nuclear watchdog, "after two and a half years of intensive inspections," remains unclear on "some important outstanding issues." [2]

25 September 2005: Tehran rejects the new IAEA report. Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki says his country remains committed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. [3]

12 October 2005: The EU issues a statement calling on Iran to continue negotiations with the EU-3.

24 November 2005: A meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors postpones any action on Iran's nuclear programme. The move is aimed at reopening negotiations on a Russian proposal for a compromise that would allow Iran to enrich uranium, but only in Russia and under strict controls.

25 December 2005: Tehran formally rejects an offer from Moscow to enrich uranium for its nuclear programme in Russia. Iranian officials insist upon Iran's right to enrich uranium on its own soil.

10 January 2006: Iran removes UN seals at the Natanz enrichment plant and resumes nuclear fuel research. [4]

4 February 2006: The IAEA votes to report Iran to the UN Security Council. Iran ends snap UN nuclear inspections the next day.

14 February 2006: Iran restarts small-scale feeding of uranium gas into centrifuges at Natanz after 2-1/2-year suspension.

5 June 2006: EU foreign policy chief, Secretary-General of the EU Council Javier Solana, delivers a package of incentives from world powers if Iran agrees to halt uranium enrichment.

31 July 2006: The UN Security Council demands that Iran suspend its nuclear activities by August 31.

31 August 2006: The UN Security Council deadline for Iran to halt its work on nuclear fuel passes. IAEA says Tehran has failed to suspend the programme.

25 September 2006: Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki says nuclear talks with European negotiators are "on track" and a diplomatic solution is possible. [5]

4 October 2006: EU foreign policy chief Solana says four months of intensive talks have brought no agreement on suspension of Iran's sensitive nuclear activities, and he adds that the dialogue cannot continue indefinitely.

12 November 2006: An Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman says Tehran is pressing ahead with plans to expand its programme to enrich uranium and remains determined to install 3,000 centrifuges by March 2007.

23 December 2006: The 15-member UN Security Council unanimously adopts a binding resolution that calls on Iran to suspend its uranium-enrichment activities and to comply with its IAEA obligations. Resolution 1737 directs all states to prevent the supply or sale to Iran of any materials that could assist its nuclear or ballistic-missile programmes. It also imposes an asset freeze on key companies and individuals named by the UN as contributors to Iran's nuclear and missile programmes. Iran rejects the move as an "invalid" and "extralegal act" outside the bounds of the UN's charter.

25 December 2006: President Ahmadinejad responds to UN Security Council Resolution 1737 by saying the sanctions will have "no impact" on Iran's nuclear programme.

22 January 2007: Foreign Minister Mottaki confirms reports that 38 UN nuclear inspectors have been prohibited from entering the country in a list that was reportedly delivered to the IAEA; the next day, Tehran stresses that cooperation with the IAEA continues, despite the ban. The European Union urges all countries to enforce the recently passed UN sanctions against Iran.

21 February 2007: The UN Security Council's 60-day deadline ends for Iran to halt uranium enrichment. Iranian parliamentary speaker Gholam Ali Hadad Adel warns that a delay by Russia in completing Iran’s Bushehr nuclear plant would harm bilateral ties. His comments came after Russian nuclear officials' claim that lagging payments from Tehran could delay start-up of the facility.

22 February 2007: The IAEA says in a report that Iran has expanded its uranium enrichment program instead of complying with a U.N. Security Council ultimatum to freeze it. The finding clears the way for harsher sanctions against Tehran. The agency also said the Islamic republic continues building both a reactor that will use heavy water and a heavy water production plant — also in defiance of the Security Council.[5.1]

24 March 2007: The Security Council unanimously approves a resolution broadening UN sanctions against Iran for its continuing failure to halt uranium enrichment. Iranian officials call the new measures “unnecessary and unjustified.”

9 April 2007: President Ahmadinejad says Iran can produce nuclear fuel on an industrial scale. Ten days later, the IAEA confirms Iran has begun making nuclear fuel in its underground uranium enrichment plant and has started up more than 1,300 centrifuges to enrich uranium.

10 April 2007: Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Mottaki says Iran will not accept any suspension of its uranium-enrichment activities and urges world powers to accept the “new reality” of the Islamic republic's nuclear programme.

23 May 2007: The IAEA says in a new report, issued to coincide with the expiration of a Security Council deadline for Tehran, that Iran continues to defy UN Security Council demands to halt uranium enrichment and has in fact expanded such work. The report adds that the UN nuclear agency's ability to monitor nuclear activities in Iran has declined due to lack of access to sites.

21 August 2007: Iran and the IAEA say they agreed to a work plan for answering outstanding questions about Iran's nuclear programme. [6]

4 October 2007: Diplomats say Iran has installed close to 3,000 centrifuges, enough to start refining usable amounts of nuclear fuel if they work without glitches.

20 October 2007: Saeed Jalili is named to replace Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, who resigned.

24 October 2007: The United States imposes new sanctions on Iran and accuses the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps of spreading weapons of mass destruction.

2 November 2007: The UN Security Council’s five permanent members (Britain, France, the United States, Russia and China) plus Germany discuss a third round of tougher sanctions.

15 November 2007: A report from the IAEA warned that Iran is fact decreasing its cooperation with the IAEA. “Iran has continued to shield many aspects of its nuclear program. Iran’s ‘cooperation has been reactive rather than proactive,’ the report said, adding that because of restrictions Iran has placed on inspectors the agency’s understanding of the full scope of Iran’s nuclear program is ‘diminishing.’”
The International Atomic Energy Agency report also confirmed that Tehran continued to defy the U.N. Security Council by ignoring its repeated demands to freeze uranium enrichment, a potential pathway to nuclear arms.
[7]

Update: 21 November 2007


[1] Timeline entries through August 2005 are quoted from "Timeline: Iran nuclear crisis," BBC News, 24 September 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4134614.stm.

[2] "Timeline: Irans nuclear program," Reuters, 2 November 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL0218278120071102?pageNumber=2&sp=true.

[3] Timeline entries through December 2005 are quoted from "Factbox: Timeline Of The Iranian Nuclear Dispute," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11 August 2005.
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/8/19C76894-2A3A-49D7-96A5-02039F66FD20.html.

[4] Timeline entries through August 2006 are quoted from "Timeline: Irans nuclear program," Reuters, 2 November 2007.

[5] Timeline entries through May 2007 are quoted from "Factbox: Timeline Of The Iranian Nuclear Dispute," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11 August 2005.

[5.1] Iran Nuclear Chronology, CBS News :http://www.cbsnews.com/elements/2007/02/22/in_depth_world/timeline2504696_0_main.shtml

[6] Timeline entries through 2 November 2007 are quoted from "Timeline: Irans nuclear program," Reuters, 2 November 2007.

[7] "Iran fails to resolve nuclear questions," Financial Times, 15 November 2007:http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6f5974c8-9397-11dc-a884-0000779fd2ac.html;
"Report Raises New Doubts On Iran's Nuclear Program," New York Times, 15 November 2007 :http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/16/world/middleeast/16nuke.html">

(Hattip: Right Truth)

Read More...

Summary only...