Posts
"2009 will be the year of decision. The Taliban and a greatly enhanced foreign fighter presence will: strike decisive blows against selected NATO units; will try to erase the FATA and Baluchi borders with Afghanistan; will try to sever the road networks and stop the construction of new roads (Route # 1 -- the Ring Road from Kabul to Kandahar is frequently now interdicted); and will try to strangle and isolate the capital. Without more effective and non-corrupt Afghan political leadership at province and district level, Afghanistan may become a failed state hosting foreign terrorist communities with global ambitions. Afghan political elites are focused more on the struggle for power than governance." You can find the full report here.
Today is links from our mil-bloggers and anything of interest to them. There are also links from military, national security and counter-terrorism sites.
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Art: Soldiers Fighting, Emanuel Gottlieb Leutze, circa 1860
Blackfive is blogging that Sadrist literature is now calling for disaramament. That is called a win-win. Also at Blackfive, if you happen to like military history, see the argument on whether Von Clausewitz, author of "On War," is still applicable to today's strategy and tactics.
Mark Grimsley is a blogger and Military History prof at the U.S. Army War College. His blogging has been slow of late as he has been doing a PCS move. But do check out his blog - its good. His latest is on the poor writing coming out of the DOD.
At Strategy Page, a post on "the sniper revolution."
CIDC has a very informative post on triablism in Afghanistan and the problems it poses for creation of a nation state. While we will succeed in Afghanistan, success will look nothing like Iraq.
Michael Yon and Andrew Cochran at Counterterrorism Blog both blog on Gen McCaffery's report on Afghanistan. Cochran has posted excerpts from LTG (ret). Barry McCaffery's just issued report on Afghanistan. Here is a portion of it:
At LWJ, they are mapping the rising violence in Afghanistan.
Greyhawk at Mudville Gazette gives his thoughts on the British in Iraq after the revelation that British intelligence made a secret deal with Sadr.
Pat Dollard is blogging on the recently arrested Aafia Siddiqui, a Pakistani mother of three with a degree from MIT and a doctorate in behavioural neuroscience from Brandeis University. She is married to the nephew of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.
Major John at Miserable Donoughts is having to readjust to the presence of plant life in his immediate environs.
Ace of Spades has a fascinating post up on how Democrats are trying to game the energy debate and how Minority Leader John Boehner just upped the anti. On a related note, Shield of Achilles has a post on the Progressive's Profiles In Shame. You might recognize a few of the names.
In the closing the barn door after the horses leave department, the U.S. Army, responding to the revelations that Dr. Ivens at Fr. Dietrich may have been the person who mailed the anthrax, just issued new regs saying psychopathic people can no longer work with our most deadly pathogens. Nice of them to establish a standard.
At MG Valley's site, a post on the CIA's "dysfunctional intelligence culture."
At 7.62mm Justice, an Aussie blogger discusses how Kevin Rudd and the socialist Labour Party took over the country at the last election and is now proceeding to put the screws to it. The campaign promises turned out to be nothing more than saying what the electorate wanted to hear to get elected. Boy do I hope I am not foreshadowing in writing this.
Lastly, don't miss the superb roll-up of military news at Thunder Run.
Showing posts with label Sadr. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sadr. Show all posts
Tuesday, August 5, 2008
Interesting Posts From The Bivouac - 5 August 2008
Friday, August 1, 2008
Iraq Continues to Improve - But Why?
Five American troops died in July as a result of combat in Iraq, by far the lowest monthly U.S. death toll of the five-year war. Read the entire article. As to the WaPo author's gratuitous attribution of the success in Iraq to events other than the surge, I would suggest reading Michael O'Hanlon's articulate assessment. That is the WaPo author inserting a pro-Obama political opinion into what is supposed to be a news article. I do hope Petraeus or some of our soldiers who have fought in Iraq so valiantly weigh in on this before the left can repeat their new myth so often it becomes accepted as reality. It is a tremendous disservice to our soldiers.
The success of the surge cannot be denied - only spun now. With security improving and with U.S. deaths now decreasing to their lowest monthly total since the war began, President Bush has announced that he is reducing the length of combat tours for soldiers deploying to Iraq from 15 months to 12 months. He also indicated that, as security conditions improves, he will begin drawing down more units. All of the additional combat brigades sent over as part of the surge have now redeployed from Iraq, leaving 140,000 soldiers in country, 10,000 more than prior to the surge. These additional forces are logistics.
July was the lowest month for casualties - 5 combat deaths and 8 non-combat deaths - recorded in Iraq since the start of the war. This tracks with ever reducing violence throughout Iraq that has fallen to levels not seen since 2004. To their credit, both the Washington Post and the NYT run their stories on this on page 1. Unfortunately, WaPo also takes the line that the security improvements are due in part to events unrelated to the surge - i.e., the good will of Sadr and the Awakening movements. To call that partisan and demonstrably false is an understatement.
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This from the Washington Post:
The number of Iraq-related American troop fatalities in July -- a total of 13 when noncombat deaths and the discovered bodies of two missing soldiers are included -- is a dramatic drop from just over a year ago, when more than 100 troops a month were confirmed dead for several months in a row.
In a brief statement at the White House early Thursday, President Bush suggested that the decreasing violence in Iraq would allow him to withdraw additional U.S. troops before he leaves office. He said that the top American commander in Iraq, Gen. David H. Petraeus, would make recommendations in September for "future reductions in our combat forces, as conditions permit."
"The progress is still reversible," Bush said he was told by top U.S. officials in Iraq. "But they report that there now appears to be a degree of durability to the gains we have made."
Bush struck a delicate rhetorical balance between asserting his view that sending additional troops to Iraq has been a success, while at the same time cautioning that withdrawing troops too rapidly could jeopardize security improvements.
. . . Starting Friday, Bush said, troop deployments in Iraq will shorten from 15 months to 12. The policy, first announced in April, applies to troops heading to Iraq but not those already stationed there.
The decline in American deaths highlights improvements in security that are widely attributed to three factors: a cease-fire by the country's largest Shiite militia, the decision of former Sunni insurgents to join with U.S. troops and the buildup of American forces. [emphasis added]
"It just feels so much safer than I ever thought it would," said Sgt. Daniel Ochoa, 26, of Highland Park, Calif., who is based in southern Baghdad. "We don't really go out anymore looking to go and fight the enemy. Things are stabilized, so now we're working more on helping the economy and getting people on their feet."
Despite the increased sense of security, deep-rooted tensions remain that continue to provoke violence. This week, more than 50 people were killed in a series of attacks related to a power struggle over control of the oil-rich and ethnically mixed city of Kirkuk in northern Iraq.
The situation grew more tense on Thursday when the Kurdish majority on the council of Tamim province, which includes Kirkuk, voted to join the neighboring Kurdish regional government.
The move is largely symbolic, because the Iraqi parliament would have to approve it, but it provoked denunciations by representatives of rival ethnic communities, who said they would fight to prevent the Kurds from taking over the city.
"The fires of Kirkuk will eat all Iraq's cities and even the Americans," said Hussein Ali al-Jubouri, the head of the largest Sunni Arab political bloc in Kirkuk.
. . . At military bases across Iraq, American soldiers have been paying close attention to the security situation and what it might mean for the timing of their return home.
"My soldiers ask me that every day: I heard a rumor they're reducing our deployment! Is it true?" said 1st Lt. Matthew Linton, 24, of Florida, N.Y., a platoon leader based in the once volatile Sadr City district of Baghdad. "Everybody wants to come home early."
Linton's troops spent Thursday distributing $2,500 grants to merchants in Sadr City's Jamila Market and chatting with the owner of a candy store.
"When we used to walk the streets in April, they were empty and we would be destroying buildings used by enemy positions," he said. "Now we walk the same streets that were covered in sewage and rubble and utter destruction, and they are vibrant and full of people.
"As the situation improves, it feels more like the race is almost finished," Linton said, "compared to you're in the middle of the race and you have a long way to go."
As to Kirkuk, I've written many times before that Kurdish seperatism and adventurism could well be the flashpoint for a true civil war in Iraq. The U.S. weighed in on this issue by supporting Turkey's incursions into the Kurdish north. That seemed to cow the Kurds somewhat, though clearly the underlying issues are divisive and still extant.
Monday, July 28, 2008
Michael O'Hanlon - Assessing Success In Iraq
What was the most important factor in the dramatic turnaround in Iraq over the past year or so (a period during which violence rates have declined by at least 75 percent and about half of key legislative goals have been partially or fully satisfied, even if much remains to be done?) There is room for some debate in this matter, to be sure, but only so much. It seems incontrovertible to me that several major factors, including certainly the surge, were hugely important--and also synergistically important, in that the sum of effects was much greater than the sum of the parts. Yeah. What he said.
At the American Prospect, the editors ask "how important was the surge?" This after Obama who, in order to suggest that his judgement in opposing the surge was not as grossly poor as in reality it was, has shown the even worse judgment in denigrating the importance of the surge, crediting the lions share of the success to the Anbar Awakening and Sadr's cease fire, as if both were unrelated to the surge. I've answered this question several times, but Michael O'Hanlon has the most articulate and accurate answer to date.
Certainly the Sunni Anbar Awakening gets high marks. It was the first thing to happen in the last two years of major note. It brought much of the core of the insurgency into alliance with the United States and Iraqi government, and over time it spread to the Baghdad belts and increasingly to the north of Iraq.
However, it was the United States that organized the Awakening tribes into a coherent military and policing effort.
It was the United States, with Iraqi Security Forces, that cleared cities like Ramadi -- and unlike in past efforts, kept forces there afterwards to preserve the stability and keep extremists like al-Qaeda in Iraq out of the places from which they had been driven. It was the United States that sufficiently intimidated Muqtada al-Sadr into realizing a ceasefire better served his interests than would a renewal of battle. It was American and Iraqi security forces that, in larger numbers than before and with new operational guidelines and tactics, built blast barriers near markets, put up concrete dividers along sectarian fault lines in Baghdad, created joint security stations and started walking the streets to protect the Iraqi population, and conducted raids on insurgent safehouses and weapons caches at two to three times the rate of previous years (largely due to improved intelligence made possible by a safer, friendler, better protected population). And through all these combined efforts, it was largely the United States that was able to figure out which Iraqi commanders needed to be purged -- and that then put pressure on the Iraqi government to replace them.
On balance, many things were important, but the surge and the associated emphasis on better protection for the Iraqi population were crucial -- and absolutely necessary to the huge progress that has been made.
Sunday, July 27, 2008
NYT Acknowledges The Decline Of The Sadrists
The militia that was once the biggest defender of poor Shiites in Iraq, the Mahdi Army, has been profoundly weakened in a number of neighborhoods across Baghdad, in an important, if tentative, milestone for stability in Iraq. Read the entire article.
On top of the AP article of the other day stating the judgement that we are winning the war in Iraq, todays NYT article must have swine across the globe filing flight plans. After over a year of spinning Sadr and his Mahdi Army as all powerful and all popular Iraqi nationalists, the NYT finally acknowledges that Sadr and his militias are anything but - though there is still the spectre of it arising from the dead.
That said, the NYT still puts its old spin on it all. They refuse to acknowledge that the Mahdi Army were Iranian proxies from inception. The Mahdi Army was a creation of Iranian sponsorship and organized by Hezbollah uber-terrorist Imad Muginayah. The NYT, like the rest of the far left, is quite willing to ignore reality in order to argue against any use of force against the Western world's most existential threat, Iran.
Further, the NYT gives no credit to U.S. forces or the surge for the decline in Sadr's fortunes. Prior to the surge, PM Maliki had been protecting Sadr. Half the reason for the surge was to target Sadr's militia and to break its hold on power. PM Maliki, faced with a rebellion that saw other Shia elements in the government talking with Sunnis and Kurds about forming a ruling coalition and ousting Maliki in Dec. 2007 finally brought Maliki around. He removed his protection from Sadr. At that point, Sadr ran for Iran and his Mahdi Army - having been decimated twice before by U.S. forces - went underground and has been methodically weeded out by U.S. forces. Add to that, beginning in March, Iraqi forces.
This article, moreso than the AP article of yesterday, could qualify as an effort to give support to the Obama narrative that the defeat of Sadr/Iran might well have occurred irrespective of the surge. But perhaps not intentionally, as it is done with more subtelty than is usually seen in the NYT's agenda journalism.
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This from the NYT:
It is a remarkable change from years past, when the militia, led by the anti-American cleric Moktada al-Sadr, controlled a broad swath of Baghdad, including local governments and police forces. But its use of extortion and violence began alienating much of the Shiite population to the point that many quietly supported American military sweeps against the group.
Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki struck another blow this spring, when he led a military operation against it in Baghdad and in several southern cities.
The shift, if it holds, would solidify a transfer of power from Mr. Sadr, who had lorded his once broad political support over the government, to Mr. Maliki, who is increasingly seen as a true national leader.
. . . The Mahdi Army’s decline also means that the Iraqi state, all but impotent in the early years of the war, has begun to act the part, taking over delivery of some services and control of some neighborhoods.
“The Iraqi government broke their branches and took down their tree,” said Abu Amjad, a civil servant who lives in the northern Baghdad district of Sadr City, once seen as an unbreachable stronghold for the group.
The change is showing up in the lives of ordinary people. The price of cooking gas is less than a fifth of what it was when the militia controlled local gas stations, and kerosene for heating has also become much less expensive. In interviews, 17 Iraqis, including municipal officials, gas station workers and residents, described a pattern in which the militia’s control over the local economy and public services had ebbed. Merchants say they no longer have to pay protection money to militiamen. In some cases, employees with allegiances to the militia have been fired or transferred. Despite the militia’s weakened state, none of the Iraqis interviewed agreed to have their full names published for fear of retribution.
In a further sign of weakness, Shiite tribes in several neighborhoods are asking for compensation from militia members’ families for past wrongs.
The changes are not irreversible. The security gains are in the hands of unseasoned Iraqi soldiers at checkpoints spread throughout Baghdad’s neighborhoods. And local government officials have barely begun to take hold of service distribution networks, potentially leaving a window for the militia to reassert itself.
The militia’s roots are still in the ground, Abu Amjad said, and “given any chance, they will grow again.”
At the peak of the militia’s control last summer, it was involved at all levels of the local economy, taking money from gas stations, private minibus services, electric switching stations, food and clothing markets, ice factories, and even collecting rent from squatters in houses whose owners had been displaced. The four main gas stations in Sadr City were handing over a total of about $13,000 a day, according to a member of the local council.
“It’s almost like the old Mafia criminal days in the United States,” said Brig. Gen. Jeffrey W. Talley, an Army engineer rebuilding Sadr City’s main market.
. . . A spokesman for the movement in Sadr City, Sayeed Jaleel al-Sarkhy, defended the Mahdi Army, saying in an interview that it was not a formal militia and denying the charges that it had taken control of local services. He said the militia had been infiltrated by criminals who used the name of the Mahdi Army as a cover.
“The Mahdi Army is an army of believers,” he said. “It was established to serve the people.”
An employee in the Sadr City local government who oversees trash collectors — daily laborers whose salaries he said were controlled by the militia — said that had long stopped being true.
“I am sick all over,” he said. “I am blind. I’ve got a headache. I’ve got a toothache. My back hurts. All of this is from the Mahdi Army.”
. . . A month after Mr. Maliki’s military operation, strange things started to happen in Shuala, a vast expanse of concrete and sand-colored houses in northern Baghdad that was one of the Mahdi Army’s main strongholds. Militia members suddenly stopped showing up to collect money from the main gas station, a worker there said.
A member of the Shuala district council said: “They used to come and order us to give them 100 gas canisters. Now it’s, ‘Can you please give me a gas canister?’ ”
Then, several weeks later, 11 workers, guards and even a director, all state employees with ties to the militia, were transferred to other areas. Employees’ pictures were posted so American and Iraqi soldiers could identify impostors.
The Iraqi Army now occupies the militia’s old headquarters in Shuala. Soldiers set up 18 checkpoints around the neighborhood, including at the gas station. When the militia opened a new office, soldiers put a checkpoint there, too, said an Iraqi major from the unit based there. Iraqi soldiers recently distributed warning notices to families squatting in houses whose rent had been collected by the Mahdi Army until May.
In Sadr City, the authorities closed the militia’s radio station. The leader of the district council was arrested by the American military. Cooking gas delivery documents must now be approved by three officials, not just one, the council member said.
Another sign of weakness is the growing number of financial settlements between powerful Shiites and Mahdi Army members’ families over loved ones who were killed by the militia. In Topchi, a Shiite neighborhood in western Baghdad, a handwritten list of militia members’ names was taped up in the market this month, with the warning for their families to leave town. Several of their houses were attacked.
Some militia members’ families went to the local council to ask for help. They found none. Mahdi militiamen killed four local council members over several weeks last fall.
“I told them this isn’t good, they must not be blamed,” the council member said. Even so, “if your brother has been killed, this is the time for revenge.”
Now neighborhoods are breathing more freely. A hairdresser in Ameen, a militia-controlled neighborhood in southeast Baghdad, said her clients no longer had to cover their faces when they left her house wearing makeup. Minibuses ferrying commuters in Sadr City are no longer required to play religious songs, said Abu Amjad, the civil servant, and now play songs about love, some even sung by women.
“They lost everything,” said the Sadr City government employee. “The Sadr movement has no power now. There is no militia control.”
The Mahdi Army might be weak, but it is not gone.
Majid, a Sadr City resident who works in a government ministry, said several Iraqi Army officers in his area had to move their families to other neighborhoods after Mr. Maliki’s military operation because the militia threatened them. Bombs are still wounding and killing American soldiers in the district. And early this month, one Iraqi officer’s teenage son was kidnapped and killed, his body hung in a public place as a warning, said Majid, who gave only his first name because he feared reprisals.
. . . The militia is painting its response on Sadr City walls: “We will be back, after this break.”
The Iraqi Army is painting over it.
Saturday, July 26, 2008
AP Weighs In On Iraq, Saying We Are Winning The War
Limited, sometimes sharp fighting and periodic terrorist bombings in Iraq are likely to continue, possibly for years. But the Iraqi government and the U.S. now are able to shift focus from mainly combat to mainly building the fragile beginnings of peace — a transition that many found almost unthinkable as recently as one year ago. Read the entire article, there is much more. AP's coverage of war has been, til this article, unrelentingly negative. Indeed, they put the "agenda" in "agenda journalism" with their reporting on Iraq over the past three years. But this is a fair report and I cannot perceive any hidden agenda. My hat's off to the AP on this one.
Two heavyweights at AP, Robert Burns, chief military reporter, and Robert Reid, chief of bureau in Baghdad have reviewed the situation in Iraq and concluded: "The United States is now winning the war that two years ago seemed lost." They finally report the obvious. Admittedly, they toss in a backhanded slap towards Bush and a mischaracterization of McCain's position on Iraq, but for the AP, those are nothing more than boilerplate.
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This from AP:
Despite the occasional bursts of violence, Iraq has reached the point where the insurgents, who once controlled whole cities, no longer have the clout to threaten the viability of the central government.
That does not mean the war has ended or that U.S. troops have no role in Iraq. It means the combat phase finally is ending, years past the time when President Bush optimistically declared it had. The new phase focuses on training the Iraqi army and police, restraining the flow of illicit weaponry from Iran, supporting closer links between Baghdad and local governments, pushing the integration of former insurgents into legitimate government jobs and assisting in rebuilding the economy.
Scattered battles go on, especially against al-Qaida holdouts north of Baghdad. But organized resistance, with the steady drumbeat of bombings, kidnappings, assassinations and ambushes that once rocked the capital daily, has all but ceased.
This amounts to more than a lull in the violence. It reflects a fundamental shift in the outlook for the Sunni minority, which held power under Saddam Hussein. They launched the insurgency five years ago. They now are either sidelined or have switched sides to cooperate with the Americans in return for money and political support.
Gen. David Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, told The Associated Press this past week there are early indications that senior leaders of al-Qaida may be considering shifting their main focus from Iraq to the war in Afghanistan.
Ryan Crocker, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, told the AP on Thursday that the insurgency as a whole has withered to the point where it is no longer a threat to Iraq's future.
. . . Shiite militias, notably the Mahdi Army of radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, have lost their power bases in Baghdad, Basra and other major cities. An important step was the routing of Shiite extremists in the Sadr City slums of eastern Baghdad this spring — now a quiet though not fully secure district.
Al-Sadr and top lieutenants are now in Iran. Still talking of a comeback, they are facing major obstacles, including a loss of support among a Shiite population weary of war and no longer as terrified of Sunni extremists as they were two years ago.
Despite the favorable signs, U.S. commanders are leery of proclaiming victory or promising that the calm will last.
. . . People are expressing a new confidence in their own security forces, which in turn are exhibiting a newfound assertiveness with the insurgency largely in retreat.
. . . Statistics show violence at a four-year low. The monthly American death toll appears to be at its lowest of the war — four killed in action so far this month as of Friday, compared with 66 in July a year ago. From a daily average of 160 insurgent attacks in July 2007, the average has plummeted to about two dozen a day this month. On Wednesday the nationwide total was 13.
Beyond that, there is something in the air in Iraq this summer.
In Baghdad, parks are filled every weekend with families playing and picnicking with their children. That was unthinkable only a year ago, when the first, barely visible signs of a turnaround emerged.
Now a moment has arrived for the Iraqis to try to take those positive threads and weave them into a lasting stability.
The questions facing both Americans and Iraqis are: What kinds of help will the country need from the U.S. military, and for how long? The questions will take on greater importance as the U.S. presidential election nears, with one candidate pledging a troop withdrawal and the other insisting on staying.
Iraqi authorities have grown dependent on the U.S. military after more than five years of war. While they are aiming for full sovereignty with no foreign troops on their soil, they do not want to rush. In a similar sense, the Americans fear that after losing more than 4,100 troops, the sacrifice could be squandered.
U.S. commanders say a substantial American military presence will be needed beyond 2009. But judging from the security gains that have been sustained over the first half of this year — as the Pentagon withdrew five Army brigades sent as reinforcements in 2007 — the remaining troops could be used as peacekeepers more than combatants.
. . . Although Sunni and Shiite extremists are still around, they have surrendered the initiative and have lost the support of many ordinary Iraqis. That can be traced to an altered U.S. approach to countering the insurgency — a Petraeus-driven move to take more U.S. troops off their big bases and put them in Baghdad neighborhoods where they mixed with ordinary Iraqis and built a new level of trust. . . .
Thursday, July 24, 2008
Refocusing McCain's Message After The Maliki Embrace of Obama
PM Maliki undercut McCain's stance on Iraq by embracing Obama's call for short timelines. Obama, a man who narcissim and arrogance clearly outweighs his judgment, has given McCain an incredible gift by denigrating the surge and claiming, incredibly, that his own plan for withdraw might have had the same impact as the surge. In light of all this, McCain can still eviscerate Obama on the issue of judgement, he merely needs to make the focus of his arguments less about Iraq in particular and more about the larger challenges we face.
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I am not sure what game Iraq PM Maliki is playing by inserting himself into U.S. politics with his comments in Der Spiegel that, in essence, though unlcear, seem to be an embrace of a 16 month timetable for withdraw of all combat forces from Iraq. Whether or not this was a mistranslation is near meaningless as it has already had whatever impact it will in the U.S. Joshua Pundit speculates that this is an attempt by Maliki to play both ends against the middle in order to extract the maximum concessions from Pres. Bush in a high stakes game of chicken over the SOFA Agreement. It JP is correct, then Maliki has made a foolish move. He would do well to remember what happened to South Vietnman and how that country was treated by its neighbors and the the U.S. after the U.S. withdrew. If you don't recall the story, you can find it in the Arthur Hermann article here.
But Iraq is a sovereign and democratic country. If the elected government at any time asks for us to remove our troops, then out we should go, posthaste. That is not the central point of this post. The question is, how is McCain to regain his footing. The "time horizons for victory" versus "time tables for defeat" is still a valid argument. Even Obama admits that General Petraeus is strongly opposed to time lines as putting all of our gains in Iraq in danger. But because of Maliki, it no longer has the importance to make it alone the decisive issue.
We still have wars going on. There is still the war in Afghanistan. There is still the problem of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan which is only going worse by the day - and which at the moment we are watching from the sidelines. There is still the problem of Iran, which could very easily become a major shooting war. Even if we finish Iraq in uncontested victory and depart that nation, we are still a nation at war.
While Maliki may have undercut McCain, Obama has provided the gift of all gifts - Kerryesque nuance on the surge. Specifically, Obama said that knowing what he knows now, he still would not vote for the surge. He is defending the indefensible. He does so by denigrating the success of the surge, he credits the Anbar Awakening and Sadr's ceasefire as the unforseeable keys to the success in Iraq and he posits that these two acts where unrelated to the U.S. actions in Iraq. Finally, he just throws up his arms saying who knew what would have happened had his plan been followed. I've spelled out the utter gaping holes in Obama's positions here.
Obama could not have given McCain more ammunition. McCain's message needs to transcend Iraq. He needs to shift the focus from 16 months or time horizons in Iraq to a combination of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and the Global War on Terror generally. The arguments will be the same, he merely needs to make them more global - and mine Obama's "nuance" for all it is worth.
As an aside, Americans are hardly a stupid people. Even as the entirity of the MSM has gone in the tank for Obama, the rest of America seems not to be falling in behind the MSM like lemmings. Amazingly, even as the MSM holds a wall to wall Obamathon, the Washington Post is reporting that McCain is significantly closing the gap in major battleground states. If Obama can't improve his numbers under these absolutely most favorable of conditions, he is going to have a lot of problems when the debates come around and McCain is able to finally press him eye to eye for the nation to watch.
Wednesday, July 23, 2008
Iraq Speech Part I: Obama Tosses Our Military Under The Bus To Defend His Poor Judgment (Updated)
Obama's latest ploy is to claim that his judgement in opposing the surge was not poor because: . . . With respect to the surge, you know, we don't know what would have happened if I -- if the plan that I put forward in January 2007 to put more pressure on the Iraqis to arrive at a political reconciliation, to begin a phased withdrawal, what would have happened had we pursued that strategy. Read the entire transcript. Just when one thinks that Obama has plumbed the depths of political cynicsm, he hits a new low. Obama's attempt to take away credit from U.S. forces and denigrate their achievement, their sacrifice and the brilliance of their command is the lowest he has gotten - so far. And to claim that no one could forsee what would have happened had we followed his plan to withdraw immediately in 2007 is just ridiculous.
1. No one could have foreseen the rise of the Anbar Awakening movements, and it was these movements that played a large role in the success we see today in Iraq.
2. No one could have foreseen the simultaneous "cease fire" by Sadr, an act taken apparently unilaterally and with no relationship to U.S. combat actions.
3. The two events above are what truly have led to security in Iraq, with the "surge" of U.S. forces being an ancillary factor.
[Update: The videos that were here are now replaced by quotes from the transcript. The videos became non-operational after RedLasso was forced to cease operations by a lawsuit - another MSM attack on bloggers and rights of fair use.]
This from the NYT Transcripts of the Obama's speech & Q&A session:
I am pleased that as a consequence of great effort by our troops, but also as a consequence of a shift in allegiances among the Sunni tribal leaders as well as the decision of the Sadr militias to stand down, that we've seen a quelling of the violence.
. . . Second question was how would I apportion the improvements in Iraq. I don't know how to put a numerical factor on that. There is no doubt that when we put in 30,000 American troops, here is no doubt that when we put in 30,000 American troops, who are dedicated, who are brave, and who bring extraordinary skill to their jobs, that they're going to make a difference.
I think the commanders on the ground themselves would -- would acknowledge that, had you continued to see Sunni leadership align itself with AQI, that we would be in a different situation right now. That if you continued to see ethnic cleansing in Baghdad or the Sadr militias continuing to engage in some of that activity and constant reprisals, that you'd still have some big problems there right now.
But I don't know how to put a numeric -- you know, a number to that.
As I wrote yesterday, on the day the surge was announced, al Qaeda controlled practically all of the Sunni provinces and Iran through its proxies had a stranglehold on the South. Just how hard is it to assess where Iraq would be today if we had not challenged those situations militarily? One need engage in no speculation to make such an assessment.
How does Obama think the Anbar Awakening started? This didn't come about magically. U.S. forces solicited it from its very inception. It actually coallesced in September, 2006 and was well known - even the NYT was writing about its success by April, 2007. Does Obama think that the creation, survival or spread was unrelated to the surge?
Why does Obama think that Sadr left Iraq for Iraq in January, 2007 and all of his Mahdi Army suddenly dropped below the radar screen? A large part of the justification for the surge was to stop the militia attacks. In 2004 and 2005, the U.S. had decimated the Mahdi Army. They damn well knew what was coming in the surge if they tried to continue their operations to Lebanize Iraq.
The only way Obama can defend his judgment is by falsely minimizing the success of U.S. forces. The fact that he has chosen to do so tells you even more about just how partisan and warped his judgment truly is.
Update: Joe Scarborough and Harold Ford Jr. respond not to Obama, but the argument he is in essence making that the Awakening Movements and their success was unrelated to the surge. It is brutal:
Tuesday, July 22, 2008
Judgment To Lead?
Stuttering Baracky - and he stutters a lot today - can't even exercise sound judgment with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight. Asked if he knew in 2007 what he knows now, would he still have been against the surge, he answers that yes, he would. Sen. Barack Obama said it was "fair" to notice that he did not anticipate that the surge of U.S. troops into Iraq would be coincident with the so-called Sunni Awakening and the decisions of Shia militias to reduce their footprints, the combination of which led to measurable declines in violence. This is a complete twisting and rewrite of history. In November 2005, American commanders held a breakthrough meeting with top Sunni chiefs in Ramadi, hoping to lure them away from the insurgents' fold. The sheiks responded positively, promising cooperation and men for a police force that was then virtually nonexistent. Read the entire article. [emphasis added] Moran noted that Obama had claimed that the surge "would not make a significant dent in the violence." Let me help Mr. Obama. Speculation is guessing among equally possible conclusions. One speculates when there are insufficient facts to make a reasonable projection. But if the facts clearly preponderate in one direction, you are making reasonable estimates. So . . . Obama also told Moran that there were circumstances under which he could revise his instruction to U.S. generals to begin withdrawing combat brigades at the pace of one-to-two per month. Is there anything that Obama will not lie about? Obama specifically justified surrendering in Iraq irrespective of whether it would lead to genocide. Let's take a trip down memory lane to July 20, 2007: Democratic presidential hopeful Barack Obama said Thursday the United States cannot use its military to solve humanitarian problems and that preventing a potential genocide in Iraq isn’t a good enough reason to keep U.S. forces there. Read the entire article. This is a man willing to say anything to get elected. He is as intellectually a dishonest person as I can ever recall taking the public stage - and that includes the last Democrat to hold the Presidency. Indeed, Obama puts slick Willie to shame.
What kind of a BS answer is that?
After stuttering for 30 seconds, he says he was correct to vote against the surge because he disagreed with the Bush Administration. That is meaningless. He came out against the surge in 2007 because he claimed it would backfire, worsening security. There is no logic whatsoever to his answer, though he tries to leave the impression that his vote was based on some higher ethical principle. This guy is the penultimate con-man.
There is much, much more.
There is an additional interview on ABC and Nightline still to come, though not yet available. There is this report in advance of the showing of the Nightline interview from Marc Ambinder blogging at the Atlantic (H/T Gateway Pundit):
In an interview with ABC's Terry Moran, Obama said that he "did not anticipate, and I think that this is a fair characterization, the convergence of not only the surge but the Sunni awakening in which a whole host of Sunni tribal leaders decided that they had had enough with Al Qaeda, in the Shii’a community the militias standing down to some degrees. So what you had is a combination of political factors inside of Iraq that then came right at the same time as terrific work by our troops. Had those political factors not occurred, I think that my assessment would have been correct."
The Sunni Awakening Movement was well underway by September 2006 - four months before the surge was announced and Obama took his stand against it. And it was a movement that was begun by the U.S. forces soliciting a partnership. Here is a short history of the movement from the Washington Post:
But in January 2006 a suicide bomber attacked a police recruiting drive, killing 70 people. Insurgents killed at least four sheiks for cooperating with the Americans, and many others fled.
The killings left the effort in limbo, until a turning point; insurgents killed a prominent sheik last year and refused to let family members bury the body for four days, enraging Sunni tribesmen, said U.S. Lt. Col. Miciotto Johnson, who heads the 1st Battalion, 77th Armored Regiment and visits al-Rishawi frequently in western Ramadi.
Al-Rishawi, whose father and three brothers were killed by al-Qaida assassins, said insurgents were "killing innocent people, anyone suspected of opposing them. They brought us nothing but destruction and we finally said, enough is enough."
Al-Rishawi founded the Anbar Salvation Council in September [2006] with dozens of Sunni tribes. Many of the new newly friendly leaders are believed to have at least tacitly supported the insurgency in the past, though al-Rishawi said he never did. . . .
How could Obama claim that he did not anticipate something that was already well known and in full swing by the time the surge was announced in January, 2007? And he damn well knew about by July, 2007 when he was calling for a withdraw from Iraq, explicitly saying he did not care if doing so would lead to genocide.
As to Sadr, Obama's claim is ridiculous. Sadr's forces had twice been mauled by the U.S. and when the U.S. announced the surge, Sadr's forces were dead in the cross-hairs. That was WHY Sadr ordered a pull back - to preserve his Mahdi Army against U.S. forces. Does Obama lack the judgment to see the relationship between cause and effect?
And Obama fails to even acknowledge the role Iran has played. Looking at Obama objectively, one wonders if he believes reality is whatever he wants it be.
To continue:
Responded Obama: "In the violence in Iraq overall, right. So the point that I was making at the time was that the political dynamic was the driving force between that sectarian violence. And we could try to keep a lid on it, but if these underlining dynamic continued to bubble up and explode the way they were, then we would be in a difficult situation. I am glad that in fact those political dynamic shifted at the same time that our troops did outstanding work."
"But," asked Moran,"if the country had pursued your policy of withdrawing in the face of this horrific violence, what do you think Iraq would look like now?"
Obama said it would be hard to speculate. . . .
In 2007, Iran was deeply involved in dominating the Shia south and al Qaeda had a stranglehold on the Sunni population that the U.S. - supported by and supporting the Awakening movements - was just starting to unravel. Had we drawn back from that, Iraq today would be divided between al Qaeda, Iran and possibly Turkey. Further, al Qaeda, which is now suffering throughout the Middle East because of its complete failure in Iraq, would be in a far stronger position internationally and global Sunni terrorism would not be falling.
See, no speculation needed.
"I've always reserved the right, uh, to say---let's say that ethnic, uh, ethnic fighting broke out once again---I've reserved the right to say---I don't--I'm not going to stand idly by if genocide is occurring. . . .
“Well, look, if that’s the criteria by which we are making decisions on the deployment of U.S. forces, then by that argument you would have 300,000 troops in the Congo right now — where millions have been slaughtered as a consequence of ethnic strife — which we haven’t done,” Obama said in an interview with The Associated Press.
“We would be deploying unilaterally and occupying the Sudan, which we haven’t done. Those of us who care about Darfur don’t think it would be a good idea,” he said. Obama, a first-term senator from Illinois, said it’s likely there would be increased bloodshed if U.S. forces left Iraq. . . .
Bottom line - Obama's judgment is not just suspect, but nearly nonexistent. He may have some small iota of judgement to lead, but it is utterly clear that it would be in a direction no one would want to follow.
Thursday, July 17, 2008
Is It Time To Declare V-I Day?
The war continues to abate in Iraq. Violence is still present, but, of course, Iraq was a relatively violent place long before Coalition forces moved in. I would go so far as to say that barring any major and unexpected developments (like an Israeli air strike on Iran and the retaliations that would follow), a fair-minded person could say with reasonable certainty that the war has ended. A new and better nation is growing legs. What's left is messy politics that likely will be punctuated by low-level violence and the occasional spectacular attack. Yet, the will of the Iraqi people has changed, and the Iraqi military has dramatically improved, so those spectacular attacks are diminishing along with the regular violence. Now it's time to rebuild the country, and create a pluralistic, stable and peaceful Iraq. That will be long, hard work. But by my estimation, the Iraq War is over. We won. Which means the Iraqi people won. . . . Read the entire article. Michael Totten is a bit less sanguine, but not all that much: "The war in Iraq is all but over right now, and it will be officially over if the current trends in violence continue their downward slide. That is a mathematical fact." Read the entire article. . . . The Iranian leaders responsible for Iranian policy in Iraq – principally Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and Brigadier General Qassim Soleimani, commander of the Qods Force – also remain determined. They are retraining and re-equipping thousands of fighters who fled the most recent Iraqi and Coalition operations in Basra, Baghdad, and Maysan Provinces. Read the entire article. The news that Al Qaeda in Iraq has been soundly beaten and is on the verge of annihilation, was met with worries and a quick call to action on Capitol Hill today. In an attempt to salvage some semblance of victory for the embattled fighters, Congressional Democrats voted early Thursday to approve funding that would provide desperately needed supplies for the group. Read the entire post. There is much more.
So have we won the war in Iraq?
And if so, what next?
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The counterinsurgency phase of the war - the one that started after the six week victory over Saddam's military, the one that picked up steam between Iran's creation of the Mahdi Army and al Qaeda's barbarous acts, is over. We have won. New war may well yet come, but you can mark the calendar on the counterinsurgency.
Al Qaeda in Iraq has been crushed and is no longer a coherent force. Sadr's Mahdi Army has been crushed and is now demobilized. Many of its leaders and thousands of followers have fled to Tehran. There are remnants of al Qaeda and the Mahdi Army still inside Iraq and they are able to conduct discrete acts of mayhem. But they are being relentlessly pursued by U.S. and Iraqi forces, they are unable to regroup. Both have been broadly rejected by the people of Iraq, and Iraq no longer presents a hospitable environment for these organization to again easily take root.
There is no ongoing civil war inside Iraq. Ethno-sectarian deaths were at zero in May and June 2008. The Iraqi government controls virtually all of Iraq, including Sadr City and Basra, and the Iraqi government has emerged as a nationalist force. The Iraqi government has met 15 of the 18 bench marks that were set by the U.S. - and embraced by Mr. Obama - as the measures of progress towards reconciliation and a stable country. The bench mark regarding the oil law is moot for the moment as all oil revenues are being fully and fairly shared even in the absence of a law. Provincial elections will be held this year.
Today, the U.S. military turned over full control of Diwaniya Province to the Iraqi government. That marks the tenth province turned over to Iraqi control. Anbar Province, deemed lost a little over a year ago, is expected to be turned over to Iraqi control in a matter of days. The other seven provinces are expected to be turned over by years end.
Virtually all of the goals of the surge have been met. And as to our forces in Iraq, if current trends continue for July, it will result in the lowest loss of U.S. life to hostile fire in Iraq during any one month period since June, 2003. This continues a steady decline in U.S. casualties in Iraq over the past months. The biggest enemy many of our soldiers in Iraq face now is boredom.
Michael Yon, taking stock of the current situation in Iraq, had this to say:
While we can claim victory in the counterinsurgency, the threats to Iraq are still extant. Al Qaeda is a transnational organization and al Zawahiri would love nothing more than an opportunity to reinfest Iraq and destroy the Awakening movements. Iran, currently housing thousands of Sadrists who escaped the offensives, is training and rearming these people, hoping to reintroduce them into Iraq and take another crack at Lebanization. Indeed, Iraq is an existential challenge to Iran and, like a shark that will die should it ever stop swimming, Iran's theocracy may come to an end if they fail to dominate Iraq.
Fred Kagan, writing at the WSJ, views the situation similarly and has several recommendations:
Past patterns suggest those fighters will return to Iraq and attempt to restart attacks against Coalition Forces in time to disrupt Iraqi elections and to affect America's voting. Their attacks are likely to be more spectacular, but less effective at disrupting Iraqi government and society.
If America remains firm in its commitment to success in Iraq, success is very likely. The AQI and Shiite militias at present do not have the capacity to drive Iraq off course – unless both the U.S. and the Iraqi government make a number of serious mistakes.
The most serious error would be to withdraw American forces too rapidly. That would strengthen the resolve of both al Qaeda and Iran to persevere in their efforts to disrupt the young Iraqi state and weaken the resolve of those Iraqis, particularly in the Iraqi Security Forces, who are betting their lives on continued American assistance.
The blunt fact is this. In Iraq, al Qaeda is on the ropes, and the Shiite militias are badly off-balance. Now is exactly the time to continue the pressure to keep them from regaining their equilibrium. It need not, and probably will not, require large numbers of American casualties to keep this pressure on. But it will require a considerable number of American troops through 2009.
Recent suggestions in Washington that reductions could begin sooner or proceed more rapidly are premature. The current force levels will be needed through the Iraqi provincial elections later this year, and consideration of force reductions makes sense only after those elections are over and the incoming commander in Iraq, Gen. Ray Odierno, has evaluated the new situation.
The benefits to the U.S. from seeing the fight through to the end far outweigh the likely costs. For one thing, Iraqis have shown their determination to increase their oil output, currently averaging 2.5 million barrels a day, as fast as they can – something that can only happen if their country is secure.
Far more important is the opportunity in our hands today to work with a Muslim country in the heart of the Arab world to inflict the most visible and humiliating defeat possible on al Qaeda. Success in Iraq also makes it possible to establish a strategic partnership with a legitimate, democratic majority-Shia state that is aligned with the U.S. against Iran.
Recent comments by some Iraqi leaders about the current negotiations for a status-of-force agreement – made in the context of an increasingly heated election season in Iraq, and with the desire to improve Iraq's bargaining position in the negotiations – do not call the U.S. partnership into question. As we recently found in Baghdad, even the most outspoken advocates of rapid American force reductions strongly insist on a strategic partnership with America that helps Iraq stand up to Iran. Most of Iraq's military leaders are unequivocal about the need for a continued U.S. force presence.
The Iraqi government and people – whose surging anti-Persian feeling is more obvious every day – have already shown their willingness to push back against Iranian intervention. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's attack on Iranian-backed forces in Basra, followed by Iraqi-led operations in Baghdad, central Iraq and Maysan, is proof of Baghdad's willingness. Helping Iraq to succeed is our best hope of finding a way of resolving our differences with Iran over the long term without coming to blows.
It is time for Americans to recognize it's a whole new ballgame in Iraq. The civil war is over, American troops are not an "irritant" fueling the unrest, and far from becoming dependent upon us, the Iraqi government and the army show more determination every day to run their country and to protect it. But they continue to want and need our assistance.
We will likely see significant force reductions from Iraq over the next several months and I would not be surprised to see force reductions below those of pre-surge levels by September. There is still a mission to keep the remnants of al Qaeda and the Special Groups under constant pressure. And there is a need to maintain significant combat power to dissuade Iran from any unwise moves for the foreseeable future.
And lastly, while this victory may come as good news to most Americans, clearly that is not the case for all who nominally claim the title of "American." TNOY has an exclusive on the efforts of a coalition of the far left Code Pink, the Breasts Not Bombs group and Congressional Democrats, all of whom are in crisis mode over the issue of how to shore up al Qadea before it is too late:
“There is no question but that they are in a bad way,” said Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi. “What began as a glorious campaign against the American occupiers, has taken a turn for the worse. These culturally equal individuals have been shot at, had missiles fired at them, and been made to miss at least one of their five daily prayers on several occasions. What’s more, our polling data shows that a full 100% of them are living below the poverty line! If it weren’t for that fact that many of them have dual citizenship between their home countries and Holland, they wouldn’t even be receiving welfare payments or free health care. But I have sponsored legislation that will go a long way towards turning the tide back in favor of these brave freedom fighters.”
Pelosi’s bill calls for two battalions of Code Pink protesters to be sent to Iraq immediately. They will be deployed at key positions to block advancing U.S. Marines. . . .
Monday, June 30, 2008
Iraq Update
With less than 10 hours remaining until the end of June in Iraq at the time of this post, it is clear, barring heavy last-minute casuaties, that May and June will show the lowest two-month total of US troop deaths in the five-year history of our involvement there. The Iraqi death toll also continues its downward trajectory. The month of June saw a further 10% drop in deaths due to political violence over May's figures. This continues a trend since the summer of 2007, with a blip that occurred in March and April when the government initiated offensives against the Sadrists. The Mahdi Army suffered a significant blow during fighting against Iraqi and Coalition forces this year, according to an Iraq intelligence report. . . . Read the entire article. Iraq's Salahuddin province has been known for years as a violent stronghold of Sunni insurgents, including al-Qaida. But lately it has been relatively quiet. U.S. military units there say that's because former rebel fighters are turning themselves in by the hundreds — including some who had been the most virulently anti-American leaders. Read the entire report.
All measurements of violence and casualties in Iraq continue to fall. U.S. casualties are at their lowest two month total since the invasion of Iraq. The demise of the "powerful" Mahdi Army is examined. Voluntary pacification programs are encouraging hundreds of former insurgents to turn themselves in. Iraq is opening the bidding for exploitation of its oil resources. The government of Iraq plans to spend huge funds rehabilitating Sadr City. And lastly, Talisman Gate raises a problematic area that has no good solutions.
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Falling Casualties
This from Bizzy Blog with charts:
How with the media handle the news?
. . . May-June two-month total of 48 troop deaths from all causes is quite a bit lower than any other two-month period in the entire war. The next-lowest is 60, in November and December of 2007.
The two-month death toll of 38 from hostile causes is the lowest since August and September of 2003. . . .
The gains made by the counterinsurgency strategy are huge, and everyone is crossing their fingers, hoping that they hold. If they do, than the "military and political developments that have caused attacks against Coalition troops to fall by 80 percent year-on-year will be viewed with success."
The Demise of the "Powerful" Mahdi Army:
Sadr announced the demobilization of the Mahdi Army about two weeks ago. Long War Journal reports that the decision came amidst high casualties and a loss of public support:
. . . "This led to the almost complete collapse of the army," the official said. An estimated 1,300 Mahdi Army fighters "escaped to safe houses in Iran." Muqtada al Sadr currently resides in Qom, Iran, under the protection of Iran's Qods Force. . . .
The setbacks in Baghdad, Basrah, and the South have forced Sadr to turn the Mahdi Army into "a secret military organization," the Iraqi report stated. "The number of members doesn't exceed 150-200, hugely down from the total estimated number of 50,000 in the past two years."
Iraqi intelligence believes the Mahdi Army, which is funded and supported by Iran, "will be somewhat [similar] to Al Qaida and some of the other Sunni armed groups and will have to carry out quality operations against US forces and assassinate some of the important Iraqi figures [to prove itself]."
. . . The intelligence report suggests Sadr was forced to change strategy and retreat in the face of heavy casualties and dwindling support from the Shia population. . . .
Voluntary Pacification:
As the Iraqi government and U.S. forces bring greater security, many insurgents are voluntarily turning themselves in, taking advantage of U.S. programs, as word has gotten out that they will be treated fairly. This from NPR reporting on one such program in Salahuddin province:
Other Iraq Related News:
Iraq produces 2.5 million barrels of oil per day. The country has just opened bidding for 35 oil companies to rehabilitate existing fields and to drill new areas, with the expectation of raising production to 4 million barrels per day.
With Sadr City now under its control, the government of Iraq has pledged $100 million dollars to rebuild Sadr City and to bring in jobs and services.
War is chaotic, solutions to problems are often muddled and gray. Thus you do have probably more than a few very bad actors in the Sons of Iraq and on the U.S. payroll who Iraq decides they do not wish to forgive and forget. Nibras Karzimi discusses one such instance at Talisman Gate. It is one of countless such issues that will rise and be resolved, probably to no one's satisfaction, in the years ahead.
Monday, June 23, 2008
Iraq, A Broken Clock & The NYT
The difference between a broken clock and the NYT agenda journalism on Iraq over the past five years has been that the broken clock has been accurate at least twice a day. That said, the quality of the NYT Iraq reporting has just met with a sudden and amazing improvement. For the first time in the past five years, the NYT manages to get two major points right about Iraq in the same article. The NYT hits the nail on the head at the beginning of their article Saturday, "Big Gains for Iraq Security, but Questions Linger:"
Violence in all of Iraq is the lowest since March 2004. The two largest cities, Baghdad and Basra, are calmer than they have been for years. The third largest, Mosul, is in the midst of a major security operation. On Thursday, Iraqi forces swept unopposed through the southern city of Amara, which has been controlled by Shiite militias. There is a sense that Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki’s government has more political traction than any of its predecessors.
And at the conclusion of their article, the NYT finishes by hitting the nail on the head a second time, discussing that the security gains are fragile and Iraq needs U.S. forces for protection against internal and external foes if it is to survive (the foes go unnamed, as apparently acknowledging the Iranian's acts of war is still a bit too much reality for NYT to take on at the moment).
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This from the NYT, following the lead paragraph quoted above:
For Hatem al-Bachary, a Basra businessman, the turnabout has been “a miracle,” the first tentative signs of a normal life.
“I don’t think the militias have disappeared, and maybe there are sleeper cells which will try to revive themselves again,” he said. “But the first time they try to come back they will have to show themselves, and the government, army and police are doing very well.”
While the increase in American troops and their support behind the scenes in the recent operations has helped tamp down the violence, there are signs that both the Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi government are making strides. There are simply more Iraqi troops for the government to deploy, partly because fewer are needed to fight the Sunni insurgents, who have defected to the Sunni Awakening movement. They are paid to keep the peace.
Pehaps the least covered aspect of the Iraq War has been the surge in Iraqi forces, both in numbers and training. We have heard of a few Iraqi units that have faded under fire, but given that we are building Iraqi forces from scratch, the degree at which they are progressing is heartening indeed. This is not just picking up the pieces of the old Soviet model, top down military that Iraq had under Sadaam. The U.S. military model is competely new to Iraq. It relies heavily on highly professional junior leaders who are expected to display judgment and initiative - and they are grown over years. Later in its article, the NYT to its credit, discusses in detail the tremendous growth in the Iraqi forces.
That said, NYT just can't untangle themselves from the far left meme that Anbar is only quiet because we have bribed the Anbar Sunnis. The Anbar Sunni Awakening started of its own accord as a push back to the animalistic brutality and draconian treatment at the hands of al Qaeda. True, thankfully, the U.S. has exploited it, but to suggest, as the NYT does, that bribery is at the heart of the pacification of Anbar is dissembling.
To continue with the NYT article:
Mr. Maliki’s moves against Shiite militias have built some trust with wary Sunnis, offering the potential for political reconciliation. High oil prices are filling Iraqi government coffers. But even these successes contain the seeds of vulnerability. The government victories in Basra, Sadr City and Amara were essentially negotiated, so the militias are lying low but undefeated and seething with resentment.
This is the NYT back in its old, highly disingenuous form. Sadr's forces resisted in Basra, supported by Iran, and they suffered exceptionally high casualties over six days of fighting before they surrendered. Much the same thing happened in Sadr City, where Sadr waved the white flag after suffering high casualties and with a full scale offensive into Sadr City literally days away. To describe these actions as simple negotiations and to call the Sadrists undefeated is ridiulous. Iran's proxy Sadr has suffered a devestating series of reverses and their popularity is at its nadir. Sadr just demobilized the Mahdi Army. Is the NYT paying any attention at all?
. . . Attacks like the bombing that killed 63 people in Baghdad’s Huriya neighborhood on Tuesday showed that opponents can continue to inflict carnage.
This too is quite troubling. That bombing was carried out by an Iranian proxy against Shi'ites. That was not an "opponent" doing the bombing, that was an act of war carried out at the behest of a foreign power that wants the U.S. out and Iraq "Lebanized." Unfortunately, the NYT studiously ignores the Iranian threat and acts of war throughout its otherwise heartening article.
Perhaps most worrisome, more than five years after the American invasion, which knocked Mr. Hussein from power but set off great chaos, Iraq still lacks the formal rules to divide the power and spoils of an oil-rich nation among ethnic, religious and tribal groups and unite them under one stable idea of Iraq. The improvements are fragile.
A year ago, there were the eighteen benchmarks that the NYT trumpeted to show that Iraq was a failed state incapable of governing itself. Today, of those benchmarks, the only substantive one remaining is the oil law. To cite to the oil law while studiously ignoring all of the other progress is both disingenuous and a red herring.
What the NYT fails to say is that no one claims that the oil wealth flowing to the central government is not being shared and shared fairly. The system is not broken because of the lack of an oil law. There is no blood being spilled over the sharing of oil wealth. As to the "5 year" remark, the NYT fails to note that democratic government in Iraq just turned two years old. The Iraqis are still arguing over the precise contours of how an oil law should be set up, true, but their time frame to get legislation in place on this issue is hardly excessive, particularly when compared to our own government's years of inability to pass laws on such things as entitlement reforms.
That said, the biggest problems the Iraqi government faces is getting basic government services out to the people. This is the non-warfare part of supporting Iraq that goes unreported in our news but that is equally as important to long term success as the security gains. The LWJ did an exceptional article on this topic several months ago that is well worth the read. In essence, the problem is not sectarianism, but a highly inefficient bureacracratic system that is riddled with far too much corruption. The Iraqi government and the U.S. are making much headway in streamlining the system and rooting out the corruption, but the challenges are immense and the clock is ticking.
. . . The most obvious but often overlooked reason for the recent military success has been an increase in the number of trained Iraqi troops.
The quality of the recruits and leadership has often been poor, even in recent months. In Baghdad’s Sadr City, one Iraqi company abandoned its position in April, forcing American and Iraqi commanders to fill the gap with hastily summoned reinforcements. In Basra, more than 1,000 recently qualified soldiers deserted rather than obey orders to fight against Mr. Sadr’s Mahdi Army. One senior Iraqi government official conceded that the deserters simply “felt that the other side was too strong.”
But sheer numbers have helped to overcome the shortcomings. After the embarrassing setback in Basra, Mr. Maliki was able to pull units from elsewhere to provide reinforcements and saturate the city with checkpoints and patrols, restoring a measure of order after years of domination by Islamist militias and oil-smuggling mafias.
This continuing Basra narrative of painting it as an Iraqi Army failure because they did not blow through unexpectedly strong resistance in six days of attacking against defenders occupying urban terrain is just utterly ridiculous. As is the NYT's continued emphasis of a few military units that did not perform to standard under fire. That was a small part of the forces sent into Basra. And some green units failing under fire is as old as the military itself. For example, the word "decimate" comes from the ancient world's finist military, the Romans, who inflicted a decimation - the ritual slaughter of every tenth soldier - upon legions or cohorts that broke under battle. Suggesting that Iraq's newly minted military is somehow weak because of the actions of a few units under combat likewise shows that, while the NYT may understand agenda journalism, their understanding of the military and history is sorely lacking.
But the government’s successes in Basra and Sadr City were not so much victories as heavy fighting followed by truces that allowed the militias to melt away with their weapons. “We may have wasted an opportunity in Basra to kill those that needed to be killed,” said one American defense official, who would speak candidly about the issue only if he was granted anonymity.
Let's see, hundreds of Sadrists killed, hundreds of criminals captured, virtually all of Iraq now under government control, the Iranians exposed, Sadr exposed, the Sadrist trend isolated in the Parliament, and the Mahdi Army demobolized. If that does not sound like victories to the NYT, they need to radically up their meds. The goal never has been complete destruction of the Sadrists, its been to split off the majority from the trained and paid Iranian proxies. With virtually all of Iraq in government hands, the ability of any militia to operate is severely circumscribed. The government does not have to destroy the militias in cataclysmic battles to win. Just as al Qaedea hemmoraged people and support as the tide turned against it, so too is that happening Sadr and his militia.
I wont' bother to fisk most of the rest. The NYT spends several paragraphs reporting quite literally the wildest speculations it can find from various individuals who state things such as that Maliki is an agent of Iran, etc. Compare that to the reporting from ABC not long ago and from the Atlantic Monthly where both describe Malik's popularity as being at its zenith across all religious and ethnic lines in Iraq. No need to discuss that, though, when you can get a money quote from someone with an axe to grind or a conpiracy theory dreamed up below their tin foil hat. But when we finally get to the end, the NYT, to their credit, hits the nail on the head a second time.
Reversible Gains
The anti-government and anti-occupation forces have also stumbled. The Islamist Sunni insurgents alienated many Iraqis with a trail of blood and bans on alcohol and smoking. And as attacks on Shiite areas by Sunni insurgents dropped, Shiites who had looked to the Mahdi Army for self-defense were less willing to put up with abuses.
. . . Despite their newfound confidence, some senior Iraqi officials close to Mr. Maliki said that without an American military safety net they are vulnerable to threats from outside and inside their borders. One important but less-noticed element of the security negotiations has been Iraq’s effort to extract an American pledge to defend the government against foreign or domestic aggression. Mr. Adeeb, the top Maliki adviser, said officials wanted the Americans to protect the Iraqi government against anything the government viewed as a threat — not just what the Americans saw as a threat.
“Our political system is weak, the terrorists and former regime members are sparing no effort to overthrow the system, and neighboring countries have their own ambitions,” Mr. Adeeb said. “Our army is not qualified to defend Iraq yet.”
Amen. Which is why a precipitous withdrawal from Iraq as Obama has articluated is just incredibly wrong-headed and comes with existential implications for all the gains made in Iraq and for the national security threats we face from the mad mullahs in Iran. When even the hyperpartisan NYT is coming around to that conclusion, one wonders if the fantasy based folks on the far left will begin to see the light. Or perhaps this is just laying the groundwork for the mother of all flip flops from Obama once he has a chance to visit Iraq and consult with our military commanders - General Pew and Admiral Rasmussen in particular.
At any rate, my hats off to the NYT. They have raised their level of reporting on Iraq to the level of a broken clock. This is a heartening development indeed.
Friday, June 20, 2008
The Last Iranian & Sadrist Bastions Fall Without A Fight
The Iraqi security forces today formally kicked off the operations against the Mahdi Army in the southern province of Maysan. On the day the government's amnesty offer expired, the Iraqi Army and police conducted multiple raids throughout Amarah, the provincial capital. A senior Sadrist was detained during the raids. Read the entire article. When you hear the words "Iraqi" and "air assault" together in the same sentence, it should do your heart good. Helicopter borne air assault missions are not rocket science, but they do require a measure of competence at multiple levels and across multiple units to be able to pull off. I dare say the Iraqi military's professionalism seems to be increasing sharply. And then there is this, also from LWJ, today: The Iraqi security forces have detained five senior Sadrist leaders and a department director in Masyan province during Operation Promise of Peace. The Mahdi Army, the armed wing of the Sadrist movement, has not put up any opposition to the government’s efforts to secure Maysan, a Sadrist stronghold on the Iranian border. Read the entire article. And this is how it was reported in the UK's Times: They came at dawn, thousands of Iraqi troops and US special forces on a mission to reclaim a lawless city from the militias who ran it. Read the entire article. So how does our perfidious press play up what is exceptionally good news. Wapo runs a short story on page A-13, prominently noting that the Sadrists are claiming that the arrest of the Mayor is purely a political ploy The NYT gives this similar treatment in tone and length, reporting the news from the Sadrist/Iranian perspective.
Maysan Province, and its capital city of Amarah, were a hotbed of Iranian and Sadrist activity - until a few days ago. Now the city mayor is in jail, the Iraqi military partol the streets, and the "Iranian agents" have gone back towards Tehran. It has all occurred without a shot being fired. This is front page news in the UK Times while our perfidious MSM buries the news and what little it reports, it does so from the Sadrist / Iranian perspective.
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This from Bill Rogio at the LWJ yesterday:
Iraqi forces arrested Rafeaa Jabar, the head of the Sadrist office in Maysan province. He is the mayor of Amarah and the deputy governor of the province.
. . . There have been no reports of major clashes or opposition to the Iraqi operations. Dozens of wanted individuals have been detained and large quantities of weapons have been found during the operation. Sixty "militiamen" surrendered during the amnesty period. A partial curfew has been imposed on some regions.
While the operation officially kicked off today, the Iraqi security forces have been operating in force throughout Maysan since last Saturday, when patrols and raids began in Amarah. Security forces began massing in Amarah last Thursday and Iraqi soldiers replaced border guards along the Iranian border.
A flurry of activity occurred in Amarah on June 18. Iraqi soldiers captured three wanted during an air assault in central Amarah. Twelve policemen were detained for storing weapons and explosives in a jail in the city. Iraqi forces also found a large weapons cache in a cemetery in central Amara.
Iraqi security forces have also stepped up security in the neighboring provinces of Dhi Qhar and Wasit. In Wasit province, which borders Amarah to the north, security officials said "tight security measures" have been imposed to assist in the Maysan operation. On June 18, police seized a car "laden with 27 Iranian-made bombs" and detained the driver. Coalition forces detained three more Mahdi Army operatives in Al Kut on June 17. The US military has captured 12 mid-level and senior Mahdi Army leaders in Wasit province since June 3.
The Mahdi Army has pushed back in Wasit province. A district police chief and another officer were killed and 10 policemen were wounded in an IED attack on June 17.
In Dhi Qhar, which borders Maysan to the south, provincial officials said operations are under way to support the Maysan offensive. "A detailed plan has been established in the province to maintain stability during the expected drive into Maysan province," Staff Brigadier General Sabah al Fatlawi, the provincial chief of police, told Voices of Iraq. Police found a large cache of TNT during a raid in northern Dhi Qhar on June 18.
Iraqi forces are conducting a series of raids in Amarah and throughout the southern province, "capturing key targets including government officials wanted by the authorities in a number of cases," said Brigadier General Abdul Karim Khalaf, a spokesman for the Ministry of the Interior.
"Five officials from the provincial council who represent the Sadr movement have been arrested for aiding the militia," Mahdi al Asadi, the spokesman for the Maysan police told AFP. Iraqi forces detained the mayor of Amarah and the deputy governor yesterday.
Iraqi forces also detainedEngineer Mohammed Nouri, the provincial director of the irrigation projects department after discovering "amounts of weapons and ammunitions hidden in one of the department’s stores," an anonymous source told Voices of Iraq.
Thirty-one "wanted men" have been detained since the operation was kicked off in Amarah yesterday. Five Mahdi Army fighters surrendered to the security forces. More than 60 "militiamen" surrendered during the amnesty period.
Several large weapons caches and a command and control center have also been uncovered in the province. "A militia headquarters was seized by Iraqi Security Forces after a weapons cache was discovered containing 676 mines, 249 mortar rounds, 241 rocket-propelled grenades and four homemade-rocket launchers," Multinational Forces Iraq reported. "In operations surrounding Amarah, a total of 273 mortar rounds were discovered, along with numerous other accelerants."
. . . The Mahdi Army has not fought back as Sadrist leaders and Mahdi Army commanders and fighters are rounded up in Amarah, Khalaf said.
The Mahdi Army took heavy casualties while opposing the Iraqi security forces in Basrah and the South and US and Iraqi forces in Sadr City during operations to secure the areas in March, April, and May. More than 1,000 Mahdi Army fighters were killed in Sadr City alone, and another 415 were killed in Basrah. Several hundred were killed during fighting in the southern cities of Najaf, Karbala, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Amarah, Samawah, and Nasiriyah.
The Mahdi Army and the Sadrist movement have been relegated to complaining about the actions of the security forces.
. . . The Iraqi security forces will expand its operations right along the Iranian border in an attempt to disrupt the Mahdi Army supply lines from Iran. "The operations would include a drive into Marshes area where important targets are hiding."
The push into the Marshes comes as the Iraqi security forces have ramped up operations in neighboring Basrah, Wasit and Dhi Qhar provinces.
Amarah is a strategic hub for Iranian operations in southern Iraq
Maysan province is a strategic link for the Ramazan Corps, the Iranian military command set up by Qods Force to direct operations inside Iraq. Amarah serves as the Qods Force—Ramazan Corps forward command and control center inside Iraq as well as one of the major distribution points for weapons in southern Iraq. . . .
By the end of the day, al-Amarah was under Iraqi Government control - without a shot being fired.
The city had been taken over by the Shia al-Mahdi Army two years ago after British troops handed it to an ill-prepared Iraqi Army. “We can't say al-Amarah was entirely bad, there are good people here, poor people. But the city was controlled by the al-Mahdi Army, and these people are all backed by Iran,” said Captain Hussein Ali of the Scorpion police brigade, one of the Iraqi units drafted in to take part in Operation Omen of Peace.
Yesterday the city's streets - unpaved, dirt tracks between grubby, low brick houses - were crawling with Iraqi security forces. Soldiers searched houses as police manned checkpoints and Soviet-era tanks guarded bridges over the Tigris River.
The flood of troops, who had moved into position outside the city a week ago, had encountered no resistance as they moved in yesterday. The leaders of the Shia militias that once ruled as crime bosses and warlords were either gone or in hiding. Even the police chief fled a week ago, fearing arrest for his affiliation to al-Mahdi Army, while the mayor, a member of the Sadrist movement, was arrested.
Outside one of the long-neglected police bases built by the British Army, scores crowded to sign up as police officers, the only regular job in a city whose main industry is weapons smuggling from nearby Iran, but a profession that until now was closed to most.
“In the past, you needed contacts with the tribal sheikhs or to pay three million dinars in bribes to get a job as a policeman,” said Raed Mijbil, 30. “All the Iraqi security forces were corrupt.”
Nouri al-Maliki, the Shia Prime Minister, has insisted that his large-scale operations in the south are not targeting the Sadrist movement, which has been increasingly weakened by internal divisions, its brutal reputation for murder and extortion, and a more confident Iraqi military. Hojatoleslam Moqtada al-Sadr, the fundamentalist Shia cleric who heads the al-Mahdi Army and the Sadrist political movement, ordered his men not to resist the government forces, and a senior member of his parliamentary block expressed grudging support.
“We stand with the Government on imposing the law and we are showing goodwill,” said Bahaa al-Araji, a member of the Sadrist parliamentary bloc. “But law must be imposed on everybody. We hope the target of the plan is not our movement.”
Locals said that militiamen had been spotted throwing their weapons into the Tigris or trying to hide them along the lush river banks. One man said that he saw two women digging up a stash hidden by a fighter and taking them into a weapons collection point in the hope of a reward.
. . . While the Prime Minister had personally to lead his shaky forces on the offensive in Basra, he and his army have gained in confidence since establishing control of the southern port city, even flooding the Sadr City stronghold in Baghdad with thousands of soldiers. For the first time in years the young cleric looks unsure of himself. Last week he announced that the main wing of al-Mahdi Army would devote itself to civilian projects, while a streamlined, smaller group would carry on attacking the US military, whom the demagogue deems a legitimate target for resistance.
Nabil Ibrahim, 20, an al-Amarah resident, was pleased to see the influx of government troops but upset that the men who had turned his city into a lawless no man's land had escaped. “The leaders who escaped aren't all al-Mahdi Army, they are Iranian intelligence agents. We are sad because they got away and they'll be back.”
Captain Ali denied that the criminal leaders had been allowed to get away. “We didn't just let them escape, this was a kind of amnesty. This was a last chance for those who were misled by the militias and regretted it,” he said. He said that the local population was co-operating with the security sweep, and that the army had found more than 900 roadside bombs in weapons stashes.
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